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 1 
CHAPTER 1 
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE IN UK INDIVIDUAL INFORMATION LAW: 1948 TO 2017 
INTRODUCTION 
One major 21st century challenge is the regulation of information and, in particular, 
information about individuals. In the United Kingdom, the regulation of individual information 
has a history extending back to at least the 19th century. That history spans several 
overlapping legal regimes. In particular, those regimes are confidentiality, the right to private 
life, data protection, and official secrecy and unauthorised disclosure offences. The 
regulation of individual information is a “socio-technical problem”1 of enormous complexity, 
difficulty and importance. It has emerged during a period of vast technological, social and 
political change and lies at the interface of technology and institutions, both public and 
private. 
The regulation of individual information is an important aspect of the broader infrastructure 
within which individuals, markets and institutions act.2 Information flows are crucial to the 
success of both public services and private markets, facilitated by rapid technological 
development. Information systems have intensified some risks of processing and using 
information and created newly perceived dangers for individuals and society. Intensified risk 
and new purported dangers in turn threaten to undermine the benefits brought about by the 
development of information systems and pose new challenges for regulation.  
This thesis adopts an architectural perspective. It asks how and why the architecture of 
individual information law has been developed in relation to the public-private divide. By 
public-private divide, I mean the ways in which public authorities are regulated differently 
from private actors in relation to individual information. The overlapping legal regimes 
affecting individual information law have often been analysed in isolation from one another. 
This thesis seeks to identify common approaches to the public-private divide across the 
history of individual information law. The analysis demonstrates a common set of concerns 
and approaches across these distinct but overlapping regimes for the regulation of individual 
information. I use the term individual information inclusively, conscious of the differing scope 
of confidential, private, personal, official and official individual-identifying information or data 
across the areas of law studied. Although there are differences in scope, these areas all 
                                               
1 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy and the Integrity of Social Life (2010), p. 
5. 
2 See Ibid. and Daniel Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age 
(2004). 
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regulate to a significant extent information about individuals, even if some are more 
comprehensive than others. 
Information technologies do not operate in isolation but have social and political dimensions. 
Helen Nissenbaum argues that it is artificial to distinguish between technology and its 
application: information technologies operate as “socio-technical devices and systems”.3 She 
suggests it is preferable to study and evaluate socio-technical systems themselves in order 
to identify the risks they present.4 Solove argues that it is helpful to think of the law 
regulating information in architectural terms.5 The harms threatened by information systems 
and practices in institutions are “systematic and structural in nature”.6 Such an architecture 
can empower and disempower, protect individuals from or expose individuals to danger.7 For 
Solove, privacy is both a “form of freedom built into the social structure”8 and a “condition we 
create”.9  
The public-private divide, or its absence, in a crucial feature of the architecture of information 
law. Understanding the role that different approaches have played in the development of that 
divide reveals important insights about the debates at the heart of the regulation of 
information. This thesis identifies four approaches to the public-private divide which have 
been important across the development individual information law in the UK.  
FOUR APPROACHES TO THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE IN INDIVIDUAL INFORMATION LAW 
This thesis develops an argument that, across the history of confidentiality, privacy, data 
protection, and official secrecy and unauthorised disclosure offences applicable to or in the 
UK, a complex set of interactions between four approaches to the public-private divide can 
be identified. These approaches are market, individual, state-facilitative and state-restrictive 
approaches. By an approach, I mean a common set of concerns, attitudes, assumptions and 
tendencies that purport to justify a distinctive public-private divide in individual information 
law. The thesis proposes the four approaches as part of an historically-grounded framework 
for understanding the public-private divide in individual information law. The thesis identifies 
trends in the importance of those approaches over time and within different branches of 
individual information law. It also identifies the role of diverse actors in the development of 
the public-private divide and their relationship to different approaches. Finally, it explains and 
                                               
3 Nissenbaum (2010), p. 5. 
4 Ibid., p. 88. 
5 Solove (2004), p. 100. 
6 Ibid., p. 97. 
7 Ibid., p. 99. 
8 Ibid., p. 186. 
9 Daniel Solove, Understanding Privacy (2008), p. 65. 
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describes the complex set of interactions between the approaches that have characterised 
the development of the public-private divide over the course of its development between 
1948 and 2017.  
Individual approaches are motivated by a central concern for the individual. Individual 
information affects the interests, rights and dignity of individuals in a variety of ways. 
Individual approaches are equally fearful of violations, risks or harms emanating from both 
public and private bodies. They therefore favour a high level of protection for individual 
information, irrespective of the nature of the body that may cause a violation, risk or harm to 
individuals. An individual approach results in a preference for a high and uniform level of 
regulation and so resists a public-private divide.  
Market approaches emphasise the importance of regulation to facilitate market transactions. 
This is understood as both requiring the free flow of individual information and enhancing 
market confidence and public trust in the handling of individual information by others. Such 
approaches therefore favour the lowest level of regulation consistent with confidence and 
trust in the market. Market approaches are also generally hostile to differences in regulation 
between public and private bodies. This is because such differences may create barriers to 
the free flow of information. This results in a preference for a low and uniform level of 
regulation. It resists a public-private divide. 
State-restrictive approaches emphasise both the special risks created by public authorities 
and the special obligations they owe. Such approaches therefore favour the imposition of 
greater restrictions and safeguards on public authorities than on private bodies. Usually, that 
entails greater legal restriction on the collection, use or dissemination of individual 
information by public authorities. Sometimes state-restrictive approaches seek to achieve 
their aims by imposing greater transparency requirements on public authorities to enhance 
accountability. These approaches therefore sometimes weaken the protection afforded to 
certain classes of individual information, such as information about officials, government 
contractors or employees. State-restrictive approaches therefore tend to support a public-
private divide.  
By contrast, state-facilitative approaches emphasise the special benefits of placing more 
information in the hands of public authorities or enhancing public authorities’ ability to control 
individual information. These approaches emphasise the privileged role of the state in 
securing the public interest or the common good. They therefore favour fewer restrictions on 
individual information where this facilitates its use by public authorities. Sometimes, state-
facilitative approaches also favour granting public authorities more robust systems to protect 
and control information in the performance of public tasks, in particular individual information 
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about officials, government contractors or employees, for example through the 
criminalisation of unauthorised disclosure. State-facilitative approaches therefore show a 
preference for a public-private divide, though one different in shape, emphasis and 
justification from state-restrictive approaches. 
The thesis seeks to clarify the role played by these four approaches in shaping the public-
private divide in individual information law across various processes and diverse institutions. 
The historical analysis in this thesis seeks to achieve two things. First, it demonstrates that 
there is a more complex interaction between the various approaches than a mere struggle 
between different approaches. Second, it demonstrates that there has not been a simple 
historical shift from one approach to the public-private divide to another, towards the erosion 
of the public-private divide in individual information law. In particular, there has not been a 
simple shift from a state-restrictive to an individual approach, even though the law has 
enhanced the level of protection afforded to individual information against private actors.  
On the contrary, this thesis argues that these rival approaches coexist and interact. While 
individual approaches have indeed emerged and grown in significance, other approaches 
have also seen ongoing acceptance, endurance, and even resurgence. Market approaches 
have gained a widespread acceptance as a baseline of individual information law, though 
they are often transcended by other approaches. State-facilitative approaches have endured 
and can occasionally reassert themselves, especially where executive actors play a leading 
role in shaping the development a part of the law. Although the rise of individual approaches 
has been highly influential in eroding the public-private divide in information law, rather than 
falling into obsolescence, state-restrictive approaches have often resurged and played a 
decisive role in shaping individual information law. While there are affinities between certain 
approaches and institutions, which can lead to a privileging of an approach within a given 
institutional setting, those patterns are neither universal nor constant. The development of 
information law is instead dynamic and reflects complex interactions between diverse 
approaches. Particular institutions have adopted different approaches over the course of the 
history of individual information law. The thesis therefore contributes to the more normative 
literature on public-private divides in information law by supplying a more nuanced and 
historically-grounded understanding of the development of those divides in the UK and 
Europe. 
The historically-informed theoretical framework developed in this thesis suggests that 
disagreement over the public-private divide does not merely reflect disagreement over the 
proper implementation of information rights, although that is an aspect of the divide, but also 
reflects core ideological disagreement about the aims and objectives of individual 
information law. In particular, it reflects different ideas about the nature of and threats to 
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individual rights, the requirements of markets, and the proper role and function of the public 
authorities. Rather than a lack of coherence, this points to deeper debates and themes. The 
public-private divide in individual information law rests on a more complex history than either 
a paradigmatic shift from a state-restrictive to an individual approach or mere struggle 
between rival approaches. A thorough understanding of this is valuable because it helps us 
to appreciate the diversity of approaches, concerns and agendas that have shaped 
individual information law. Additionally, those approaches, concerns and agendas are not 
unique to one branch of individual information law but are found across confidentiality, 
privacy, data protection, and official secrecy and unauthorised disclosure offences. A clear 
understanding of this diversity across individual information law is therefore important for 
both considering the future of the public-private divide and comprehending the existing law. 
The history of the public-private divide demonstrates some instances of conflict or struggle 
between rival approaches but also other forms of interaction. Inconsistency across the 
jurisprudence can reflect diversity of thought about the public-private divide, both through 
compromises struck and ambiguity preserved. Multiple approaches sometimes subsist or 
coexist within the same body of jurisprudence or the same piece of legislation. Sometimes 
one approach mitigates or softens a more dominant approach within the law. Again at other 
points in the history of individual information law, multiple approaches favour a shared 
outcome: cooperation is apparent. At other points, pressure from advocates of one approach 
catalyse action which ultimately develops in line with a different approach. Sometimes a 
state-restrictive changes are introduced with a state-facilitative motive or individual rights 
protection is advanced with a state-facilitative concern. On other occasions, a shift in 
approach or emphasis can be discerned over time as minds change without an obvious 
break with the past: the evolution of approach over time. The type of approach adopted can 
shift over the course of legal development, especially as responsibility for the development 
of the law shifts between different institutional actors, executive, legislative or judicial, with 
different or evolving approaches to the public-private divide. The development of individual 
information law has also shifted between the European and national level, with different 
approaches leading to both convergence and divergence between European and national 
law.  
In its analysis, the thesis seeks to explain the asymmetries within individual information law 
and the alliances, synergies, interactions, catalysts and compromises between different 
approaches that have shaped the public-private divide. It concludes by pointing to the wide 
acceptance, often transcendence, of market approaches, the endurance of state-facilitative 
approaches, the emergence and rise of individual approaches and the resurgence of state-
restrictive approaches within individual information law. These complex interactions between 
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different approaches have shaped the uneven public-private divide across UK individual 
information law. 
SCHOLARSHIP ON THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE IN INDIVIDUAL INFORMATION LAW 
The public-private divide is a topic of serious concern in the scholarship on the regulation of 
information. This thesis critiques two distinctive historical narratives about the development 
of individual information law through a study of the public-private divide. The first narrative is 
that individual information law is undergoing a general, paradigmatic shift from a state-
restrictive to an individual approach, resulting in the gradual erosion of a historic public-
private divide. The second narrative is that individual information law is the result of 
struggles between state, private enterprise and the citizen. This thesis argues that neither 
narrative fully captures the complexity of the historical development of the public-private 
divide in UK individual information law.  
The first distinctive narrative portrays the development of the public-private divide in 
individual information law as a shift from a now anachronistic state-restrictive approach 
towards a modern individual approach. This narrative is evident in both discussions of 
European human rights and European data protection. 
Writing on the development of positive obligations in European human rights law, Dimitris 
Xenos argues that “a profound and permanent change has been brought about in the 
understanding and assertion of human rights”,10 whereby European human rights have 
“passed to its complete phase” from “an entitlement to… non-violation by state-agents” to 
the enjoyment of human rights against all.11 Xenos’s narrative is one of the progressive 
abandonment of a state-restrictive approach to human rights in favour of an expanding 
individual approach. This thesis suggests that a more complex set of interactions has 
characterised this legal development and such a profound and permanent shift cannot be 
found in relation to individual information law. 
Peter Blume identifies the public-private divide in data protection law as a “basic issue” 
which causes obvious “friction” in the development of policy in European data protection.12 
He writes that in the 1960s public sector data processing was the main source of concern, 
with the state playing “the role of the iconic Big Brother”.13 By contrast, there is now, in 
Blume’s view, a presumption that “the information relation between individual and 
                                               
10 Dimitris Xenos, The Positive Obligations of the State under the European Convention of Human 
Rights (2012), p. xxxi. 
11 Xenos (2012), p. 2. 
12 Peter Blume, The Public Sector and the Forthcoming EU Data Protection Regulation (2015) 
E.D.P.L. 32, 32. 
13 Ibid., p. 32. 
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corporation should be regulated”.14 This presumption is a “basic feature of West-European 
data protection”.15 Blume argues that data protection is now “a primary and in some sense 
vanguard example of the broad application of human rights”,16 in contrast to traditional 
conceptions of human rights that focus the prevention of “different kinds of state abuse” of 
rights.17 Lee Bygrave also notes that whereas historically many national data protection 
regimes in Europe “differentiated regulation” for the public and private sector, such 
“differentiation has largely disappeared in Europe”:18 we see an erosion of the public-private 
divide. This thesis highlights that a more complex interaction of approaches stands behind 
the legal development of data protection law. It adds historical depth and understanding to 
such accounts, in particular by demonstrating the role of different approaches in shaping the 
current law.  
The second narrative addressed by this thesis is one of the development of the public-
private divide as the result of struggle. Some privacy and data protection scholarship 
highlights the role of struggle between the state, commercial organisations and individuals. 
Helen Nissenbaum portrays the regulation of information as the site of intense struggles and 
“hard-fought interest brawls”.19 She notes the focus on “interest politics” in privacy law,20 
regretting the advantages that “corporate and government actors” enjoy,21 which allow their 
priorities, interests and approaches to largely prevail over those of others.22 Orla Lynskey 
has also described data protection law as involving a “tug of war for control over personal 
data” between “private organisations and governments” and the individual, especially over 
the enforcement of existing law.23 This thesis supplements such observations of the 
importance of struggle with accounts of other forms of interaction between different 
approaches: compromise, cooperation, inspiration, catalysation, reaction, resistance, 
erosion, evolution, parallel coexistence and simple shifts in approach. It thereby hopes to 
supply a more detailed account of the ways in which different approaches have interacted to 
shape the public-private divide.  
The theme of struggle as a key mechanism legal development is also common in the 
literature on Europeanisation and global governance. Daniel Wincott argues that the EU is a 
                                               
14 Peter Blume, Privacy as a Theoretical and Practical Concept (1997) 11(2) International Review of 
Law, Computers and Technology 193, p. 199. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Peter Blume, Data Protection in the Private Sector (2004) 47 Scandinavian Stud. L. 297, 298. 
17 Ibid., p. 298. 
18 Lee Bygrave, Data Privacy Law: An International Perspective (2014), pp. 142 to 143. 
19 Nissenbaum (2010), p. 8. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Orla Lynskey, The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law (2015), p. 1. 
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dynamic forum “built through political contests and struggles”,24 in which it is important to 
avoid an assumption of coherence and rationality at the European level.25 David Kennedy, a 
scholar of global governance, notes “the ubiquity of struggle”26 in governance, of which the 
law is an instrument and a tool.27 He argues that “patterns of past struggle [are] woven into 
the fabric of stability”.28 He further identifies a tendency of the expert participants in those 
struggles to “forget their struggles and their role…[in order] to celebrate their knowledge as 
universal, their world as ordered, their path forward aligned with progress”.29 He fears that 
this reduces understanding of how the present was created and how it might be changed, 
remarking that the “result of continuous struggle is an eerie stability it is hard to imagine 
challenging or changing.”30 This thesis demonstrates a much wider range of interactions 
beyond struggle through the history of the public-private divide, although I share Kennedy’s 
wider conviction about the value of knowing how the present was created, in order to 
imagine how it might be changed.  
A more complex historical account of the development of the public-private divide in 
information law might also contribute to normative arguments on the public-private divide in 
information privacy. One main concern of this scholarship is the blurring of the public-private 
divide through interactions between public and private bodies. For example, Solove argues 
that the nature of modern bureaucracy is neither wholly public nor private but is now one of 
mixed bureaucracy: “we are increasingly seeing collusion, partly voluntary, partly coerced, 
between the private sector and the government.”31 Neil Richards also argues that the public-
private divide in the regulation of information is breaking down because surveillance now 
“transcends the public/private divide”.32 Similar points have been made by Jack Balkin, who 
argues that the distinction between public and private surveillance has “blurred if not 
vanished” because they are “thoroughly intertwined”.33 Similarly, Victoria Schwartz, writing in 
the context of US law, argues that the “customary differences” between public and private 
actors;34 in terms of coercive power,35 ability to harm “identify formation and democracy”,36 
                                               
24 Claudio Radaelli, “The Europeanization of Public Policy” in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio 
Radaelli (eds), The Politics of Europeanization (2003), p. 30. 
25 Ibid., p. 31. 
26 David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape Global Political 
Economy (2016), p. 7. 
27 Ibid., p. 11. 
28 Ibid., p. 7. 
29 Ibid., p. 5. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Solove (2004), p. 175. 
32 Neil Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance (2012-2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 1934, 1935. 
33 Jack M Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State (2008) 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 7. 
34 Victoria Schwartz, Overcoming the Public-Private Divide in Privacy Analogies (2015) 67 Hastings 
Law Journal 143, 149. 
35 Ibid., p. 181. 
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access to technology,37 and the extent of bureaucratic features;38 are “beginning to break 
down in a modern world”.39 Schwartz notes that this is exacerbated by modern information 
sharing between the public and private sectors.40 The historical account provided by this 
thesis highlights the ways in which these concerns at various points have been found in 
market and individual approaches and at other points challenged, or ignored, by state-
restrictive and state-facilitative approaches. A nuanced historical account could enrich 
normative arguments about the public-private divide in individual information law. 
There is also sometimes a tendency, in some normative arguments, to characterise state-
restrictive concerns as anachronistic, reflecting concerns of the 1950s and 1960s, while 
arguing for an individual approach and characterising this approach as modern. The focus 
on state-restrictive and individual concerns could usefully be supplemented by more 
reflection on market and state-facilitative approaches and a greater consideration of the 
reasons for the occasional resurgence of state-restrictive approaches. For example, Simson 
Garfinkel argues that “the age of monolithic state control is over”.41 For Garfinkel, future 
technology-driven dangers lie not “in totalitarianism, but in capitalism, the free market, 
advanced technology, and the unbridled exchange of electronic information.”42 Although 
these concerns are proper ones, this thesis highlights a more complex historical picture than 
a straightforward shift away from the state and towards commercial actors as a source of 
concern. Although an individual approach has risen in importance, there is also evidence of 
the resurgence of state-restrictive concerns in some areas and the endurance of state-
facilitative approaches and a broad acceptance of market approaches to individual 
information law. Privileging a narrative of paradigmatic shift carries the risk of obscuring 
important developments in this field. 
SCHOLARSHIP ON THE CHANGING NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF THE STATE 
Several broader developments in the nature and function of the state make plausible the 
expectation that the public-private divide in individual information law will diminish. Given the 
plausibility of that hypothesis, the thesis is important in demonstrating that any assumed 
erosion and increased irrelevance of the public-private divide has not in fact occurred, and 
certainly not in a straightforward manner or on a linear trajectory. This in turn suggests that 
more complex processes are responsible for the public-private divide in individual 
                                                                                                                                                  
36 Ibid., p. 182. 
37 Ibid., p. 183. 
38 Ibid., p. 184. 
39 Ibid., p. 149. 
40 Ibid., p. 149. 
41 Simson Garfinkel, Database Nation: The Death of Privacy in the 21st Century (2000), p. 3. 
42 Ibid. 
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information law. The intertwining of public and private bodies more broadly has not 
undermined the continued appeal of all four approaches. The thesis therefore calls for a 
more careful examination of the reasons for this appeal and arguments beyond structural 
change. There is a need to account for the continued appeal of the different approaches. 
Some scholarship sees the structure of the state as driving and determining the 
development of physical and legal infrastructures, which produce and process the 
information required by those structures. For such approaches, the structure of the public-
private divide between public authorities and private actors determines the shape of the 
public-private divide in information law. Pierson and Leimgruber contend that welfare states 
presuppose, coincide with and require the “development of sufficient bureaucratic capacity” 
to carry out their programmes.43 Higgs explains that it was the 20th century “rise of an all-
encompassing Welfare State”44 which led to “a vast expansion in the contacts citizens had 
with the central state, either as recipients of welfare, or as the payers of taxes” and “created 
huge flows of information and the elaboration of ever more sophisticated and anonymous 
systems for their storage and manipulation”.45  
The nature and function of the state in the UK has changed considerably since the 1940s. 
The welfare state that developed after the Second World War was restrained in the 1970s 
and 1980s by the growing popularity of neoliberal critiques,46 based on a concern for 
efficiency and liberty, a “morally engaged conservatism” and fears that the welfare state 
undermined responsibility and civil society.47 These ideological changes were accompanied 
by changing economic and demographic trends48 that constrained the state’s capacity, 
although the extent of retrenchment in the welfare state49 and the reality of economic and 
demographic “crises” facing the welfare state50 have been challenged. These economic 
critiques of the public services were subsequently also recognised by social democratic 
critiques of the welfare state. This resulted in the promotion of “quasi-markets”, introducing 
                                               
43 Chris Pierson and Matthieu Leimgruber, “Intellectual Roots”, in Francis G Castles, Stephen 
Leibfried, Jane Lewis, Herbert Obinger and Christopher Pierson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the 
Welfare State (2010), p. 33. 
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Since 1500 (2003), p. 149. 
45 Ibid., p. 150. 
46 See, for example, Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1944) and Milton Friedman, Capitalism 
and Freedom (1962). 
47 Francis G Castles, Stephen Liebfried, Jane Lewis, Herbert Obinger and Christopher Pierson, 
“Introduction”, in Francis G Castles, Stephen Leibfried, Jane Lewis, Herbert Obinger and Christopher 
Pierson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State (2010), pp. 9 to 11. 
48 See “permanent austerity” in Paul Pierson, The New Politics of the Welfare State (2001), p. 13. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Francis G Castles, The Future of the Welfare State: Crisis Myths and Crisis Realities (2004). 
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new incentive structures for providers and choice for recipients of services.51 Other left 
critiques favoured a shift to a “social investment state”,52 which would coordinate rather than 
deliver welfare.53 Some commentators observe that these trends have resulted in a 
restructuring of welfare states, as market mechanisms became “ideationally unchallenged 
across the political spectrum”.54 
Majone argues that there has been a “rise of the regulatory state to replace the dirigiste state 
of the past”:55 a shift from the “positive to the regulatory state”.56 The regulatory state adopts 
the role of “umpire” over privatised services rather than being the “producer of goods and 
services”.57 It relies on regulation rather than “public ownership, planning or centralised 
administration”.58 This more limited state role reflects “budgetary limitations on the activities 
of regulators”, who are able to externalise the costs of compliance.59 Due to this, the “state 
steers [but] it does not row”.60 Different information systems are required to carry out the 
tasks of the regulatory state. 
Gilbert points to a paradigm shift from “welfare state” to “enabling state”, although Gilbert 
denies that it exists anywhere in a “pure form”.61 Gilbert advances a convergence thesis in 
respect of the enabling state: within certain parameters the shift is an inevitable one.62 The 
shift from welfare state to enabling state entails a shift from a “universal approach” to a 
“selective approach” to benefits and from “public delivery” to “private delivery”.63 Gilbert 
identifies the “privatisation of social welfare” and an “increased targeting of benefits” as two 
key trends associated with this shift.64  
                                               
51 See Julian Le Grand, Motivation, Agency and Public Policy: Of Knights and Knaves, Pawns and 
Queens (2003). 
52 Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (1998). 
53 Desmond King and Fiona Ross, “Critics and Beyond”, in Francis G Castles, Stephen Leibfried, 
Jane Lewis, Herbert Obinger and Christopher Pierson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare 
State (2010), p. 54. 
54 Ibid., pp. 55 to 56; see also Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? Regan, Thatcher and the 
Politics of Retrenchment (1994). 
55 Giandomenico Majone, The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe (1994) 17(3) West European 
Politics 77, 77. 
56 Giandomenico Majone, From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of 
Change in the Mode of Governance (1997) 17(2) Journal of Public Policy 139, 139. 
57 Majone (1994), p. 80. 
58 Ibid., p. 77. 
59 Ibid., p. 87. 
60 David Osbourne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is 
Transforming the Public Sector (1992). 
61 Neil Gilbert, Transformation of the Welfare State: The Silent Surrender of Public Responsibility 
(2002), pp. 4 and 46 respectively. 
62 Ibid., p. 42. 
63 Ibid., p. 3. 
64 Ibid., p. 5. 
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Vincent-Jones argues that a “radical transformation” is occurring as the UK replaces 
“bureaucratic monopolies” with “competitive quasi-markets”, through a process “whereby 
public service functions are performed increasingly by private firms or semi-autonomous 
state or voluntary bodies in contractual relationships with public purchasing agencies”.65 This 
involves indirect and regulatory controls over direct and bureaucratic controls.66 It also 
entails the use of “contract by public purchasers as a regulatory mechanism”.67 As a result of 
this, there is both “governance of contract” and “governance by contract”,68 each of which 
will produce a need for information that is not found in systems of bureaucratic control. 
For Moran, there has been a change of “epoch”, as yet incomplete,69 driven by the fall of 
Keynesianism.70 This entails a shift from “tacit knowledge” to “the expansion of audit into 
ambitious systems of surveillance”.71 This requires for more expansive information gathering 
and use. 
Other approaches to the regulatory state have also reflected the changing relationship 
between public and private actors. For example, risk-based approaches rely on fewer 
resources and more prioritisation and targeting. Black claims that “risk is fast becoming the 
central organising principle in regulation and public service delivery” to target resources.72 
Such measuring and monitoring risk requires extensive information systems. 
Public and private actors tasks are increasingly intertwined and supported by information 
flows. Scott writes that regulatory resources, including information, are “dispersed and 
fragmented” both “among state bodies, and between state and non-state bodies”.73 He notes 
that the dissemination of information can undermine the informal authority of the “information 
rich” by redistributing the balance of information resources.74 The result is a transformation in 
the way the state interacts with the market. Pierson and Leimgruber suggest that the 
regulation of information will develop to support targeting and will facilitate information flows 
between public authorities and private contractors.75 Commentators in the US note this 
                                               
65 Peter Vincent-Jones, The Regulation of Contractualisation in Quasi-Markets for Public Services 
(1999) Public Law 304, 304. 
66 Ibid., p. 310. 
67 Ibid., p. 313. 
68 Ibid., p. 316. 
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70 Ibid., pp. 2 to 7. 
71 Ibid., p. 7. 
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Public Law 329, 330. 
74 Ibid., p. 347. 
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“peculiar vulnerability of the needy and dependent to official or quasi-official inquiry and 
surveillance”76 due to the “pervasive requirement of establishing need”77 through the “means 
test”78 and in order to combat fraud.79 The need to target resources and interventions lead 
public authorities to “concentrate on the unique personal circumstances of the recipients” 
which “require intimate knowledge” of the individual’s circumstances.80  
Although certainly important phenomena, the thesis resists the conclusion that the 
development of individual information law follows the structure and function of the state and 
its interaction with private actors. Undoubtedly, these trends are important for understanding 
the attractions and justifications for different approaches. This thesis resists the inference of 
inevitability in favour of a more nuanced understanding of the influence of different 
approaches to the public-private divide. The thesis hopes to provoke a deeper consideration 
of the reasons for the persistence of other approaches and their values. 
EMPHASIS ON REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: CONTINUITIES IN THE 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE 
The broader literature on the information society also places an emphasis on revolutionary 
change driven by information technology. This thesis challenges those broader deterministic 
and revolutionary expectations by demonstrating the recurrence of four approaches to the 
public-private divide. This recurrence is a point of continuity despite technological change. 
Despite the revolutionary nature of change claimed more broadly, a distinctive set of 
approaches to the public-private divide have shaped information law since the 1940s. The 
thesis should therefore give pause for thought about radical claims of change driven by 
information technology. 
The variety of complex interactions between different approaches identified in this thesis 
contradict deterministic claims made in the literature on the information society. Scholarship 
on the information society commonly emphasise narratives of change as a frame for legal 
development. Changes in technology and its use will disrupt existing regimes and produce a 
very different regulatory landscape. These changes sometimes describe the shift to an 
information society as a third revolution, after the agrarian and industrial revolutions: an 
information revolution.81  
                                               
76 Joe Handler and Magaret Rosenheim, Privacy in Welfare: Public Assistance and Juvenile Justice 
(1966) Law and Contemporary Problems 377, 377. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., p. 380. 
79 Ibid., p. 383. 
80 Ibid., p. 379. 
81 Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (1980). 
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There is a tendency to suggest that revolutionary developments will inevitably result in 
revolutionary approaches to law, institutions and information. This thesis does not dispute 
that important and far-reaching changes are occurring. Neither does it doubt that such 
change presents new challenges for the regulation of information. Nor does it challenge the 
view that information and technology are changing the way that individuals, institutions and 
law interact. This thesis instead seeks to argue that, within these narratives of change, there 
subsists an important point of continuity. That point of continuity takes the shape of an 
enduring and complex interaction between different approaches to the public-private divide 
at the heart of historical debates and attempts to regulate information.  
The literature on technological development and the information society contains 
deterministic claims about the historical impact of technology. Although this determinism is 
not directed at the public-private divide, the historically-grounded theoretical framework 
identified points against the deterministic historical claims of the broader literature. 
Technological determinism is a theme of discussions on the impact of rapid changes in 
information technology. The changes brought about by information technology are often 
understood as revolutionary82 or inevitable in nature.83 Stubbs characterises the modern 
period as a “post-information age period of sustained disruption and change”,84 in which he 
compares modern technology-driven change to the industrial revolution and its significant 
impact on the nature of society”.85 Toffler compares the changes in information technology to 
the industrial revolution, entailing a “radical shift of direction” in society.86 Gates argues that 
the “global interactive network will transform our culture as dramatically as Gutenberg’s 
press did the middle ages”.87 Castells makes a similar comparison, arguing that it will 
introduce “a pattern of discontinuity in the material basis of economy, society and culture”.88 
Negroponte makes the strong deterministic claim that “like a force of nature, the digital age 
cannot be stopped”.89 Coyle sees the changes brought about by technology as 
“inexorable”.90 
Some have resisted deterministic rhetoric in the literature on the information society. May 
resists the view that the information society marks “the dawning of a new age” in which old 
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understandings are “immediately invalidated”.91 It is not, in May’s view, the “end of history”.92 
He criticises “tales of transformation” as exaggerations.93 May considers that the “vision of 
an information society itself often takes the character of an all-encompassing story about this 
new age”.94 He is sceptical about the profundity, though not the fact, of change, instead 
emphasising continuities.95  
May comments that “this disjuncture with the past” is one which “resonates throughout the 
literature of the information society”,96 where there is a “common perception of inevitability” 
about the changes wrought by technology.97 May criticises the “unidirectional determinism” 
assumed by “overarching claims for revolution”.98 Hamelink similarly criticises the 
information society as a “powerful myth” that “the ‘information revolution’ is the most 
significant historical development of our time”.99 For May, these characterisations of the 
information society are ultimately historical claims.100 May emphasises “human agency in the 
history of technology”101 and argues: 
There is nothing natural, nothing inevitable about the information society: while we 
can only make our own history in the circumstances we find ourselves in, we should 
recognize that these circumstances are not as fixed or narrow as many 
commentators on the information society tell us.102 
May’s rhetoric is perhaps too strong. The strong claim of choice is an overreaction to 
deterministic narratives. This thesis indicates broad erosions of the public-private divide in 
response to change. However, it also highlights its nuances and the role of other 
approaches. Although there is not inevitability, neither can we fully discount the influence of 
broad societal and technological trends. The thesis instead points to a more complex and 
nuanced history, the role of diverse actors and approaches and therefore resists historical 
determinism.  
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ADOPTION OF A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE 
This thesis is a response to calls for more historical analysis regarding the regulation of 
information.103 Individual information law in the UK stands at a significant watershed in its 
history. It is on the brink of an important and as yet unclear process of change regarding the 
UK’s position in respect to the rest of Europe. A study of the history of individual information 
law during the period in which it grew dramatically and closely with Europe is of value in 
understanding the current law and thinking about its future.  
In particular, the thesis argues that a state-restrictive approach is not just an artefact of 
thought before the 1960s but has a continuing appeal and vibrancy. It cannot be disregarded 
as an approach in the future. The endurance of state-facilitative approaches show that this 
approach similarly cannot be disregarded in the future. The widespread acceptance of 
market approaches, even if often transcended, speaks to a floor of individual information law 
that similarly cannot be disregarded. Finally, even if perhaps threatened by Brexit, the 
individual approach that owed much to Europeanisation in privacy and data protection law 
has firmly risen and so cannot be disregarded. The thesis hopes to enrich our understanding 
of the origins of the public-private divide in UK individual information law and, in identifying 
the complexity of its development and resistance to erosion, identify those approaches that 
will continue to influence its future development: ideas about individual rights and interests in 
information and rival conceptions of the role of the state and the needs of markets.  
A historical approach is best able to demonstrate the complex interaction of the four 
approaches throughout the period examined: 1948 to 2017. This period was chosen to 
examine the modern law throughout a distinctive period of Europeanisation. As the UK took 
decisive steps to alter its relationship with Europe in March 2017 by notifying the EU of its 
intention to withdraw, this thesis focuses on legal developments up to 2017.  
There are important early signs that the development of individual information law shifted its 
focus to a post-Brexit future following this date. Although the Data Protection Act 2018, 
which received royal assent on 23 May 2018, implements the EU Law Enforcement Directive 
and supplements the GDPR, it was an Act passed in the shadow of Brexit. National policy 
during the passage of that legislation focused on the position of the UK’s data protection 
laws post-Brexit. For example, on 7th August 2017 Matt Hancock MP, then Minister of State 
for Digital, highlighted that bringing EU law into domestic law with the then Data Protection 
                                               
103 See Lee Bygrave, “Legal Scholarship on Data Protection: Future Challenges and Directions”, in 
Terwangne, Degrave, Dusollier and Quick (eds.), Liber Amicorum Yves Pollet: Essays in Honour of 
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Bill “will ensure that we help to prepare the UK for the future after we have left the EU”.104 
The Department for Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport also emphasised the importance of 
the Bill for maintaining “uninterrupted” data flows post-Brexit.105 The UK Government’s 
August 2017 position paper, The Exchange and Protection of Personal Data: A Future 
Partnership Paper, in turn advocated a “UK-EU model for exchanging and protecting 
personal data, which could build on the existing adequacy model” for third countries.106 
There are similarly clear indications that European policy shifted to a focus on the UK post-
Brexit by the end of 2017. For example, on 9th January 2018, the European Commission 
confirmed in a “Notice to Stakeholders” that the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
would cease to apply to the UK as a matter of EU law, in the absence of ratified withdrawal 
agreement, on 30 March 2019.107 Negotiations had advanced considerably on post-Brexit 
data protection, as evidenced by Article 66 and 67 of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement, by 
March 2018,108 although there remains a lack of agreement on the final draft at the time of 
writing. Given the uncertainty around the final outcome of these negotiations and the shift in 
focus apparent in national and EU policy by the end of 2017, this thesis takes 2017 as the 
end of a distinctive period of legal development. The Data Protection Act 2018 is addressed 
briefly where relevant to the implementation of the GDPR only.  
Glyn Watkin has observed that awareness of a “European dimension to English legal 
developments” is a “recurring theme among contemporary historians of English law”.109 This 
thesis is no exception, drawing on the Europeanisation literature to help understand 
processes of legal change in information law in the UK. Higgs describes the developing 
relationship between the state, information and citizens in the UK as a “long, complex and 
discontinuous process”.110 He argues that it requires a “more complex, and interesting, 
history of information”.111 Bygrave, reflecting on the future of data protection scholarship, 
also highlights additional reasons to be attentive to the history of this field.112 He argues that 
historical analysis can provide an opportunity to reflect upon the “rich heritage” of data 
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protection law as it develops.113 Historical analysis is able to supplement the broader 
scholarship in ways that resist both “pressures to specialise” and “a  fracturing of data 
protection scholarship into silos of discourse that rarely speak with, let alone acknowledge, 
one another”.114 This thesis seeks to contribute to the historical literature on information law 
in response to all these concerns by drawing identifying common approaches and complex 
historical interactions across a broad range of fields within information law.  
More generally, Allison argues that legal history can improve the quality of deliberation 
surrounding legal development, change and reform.115 It can help us to avoid accounts 
which succumb to a simplistic “Whig history” with a disguised normative agenda, it can free 
current thinking from historical accident, and can demonstrate the continuing importance of 
historical choices bound up with current arrangements.116 
This thesis is legal historical in method. It uses detailed analysis of legislation, case law, 
parliamentary debates, preparatory and policy materials to identify the approaches taken by 
executive, legislative, judicial and regulatory actors both in the UK and Europe, where 
European law has either been implemented in the UK or has otherwise influenced the 
adoption of legislation. It takes as its period 1948 to 2017, from drafting the treaties that 
became the ECHR and EU and arguably the first modern confidentiality case law in the 
UK117 to the start of negotiations for Brexit, which place in doubt the continuing shape of data 
protection in the UK and mark a new, and perhaps a quite different, phase of 
Europeanisation.  
The period 1948 to 2017 represents a distinctive period of Europeanisation in UK information 
law and this thesis draws on the literature on Europeanisation processes to inform its 
historical approach. It takes this broad approach to a narrow concept to illustrate the wide 
application of the four-model framework to the development of information law, underlining 
its usefulness for understanding information law debates. This is important because it 
highlights the importance of engagement with the theories and arguments that underpin 
those struggles and debates as the UK negotiates a new relationship with European 
institutions and evaluates the case for change in a global landscape. 
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A HISTORICAL APPROACH INFORMED BY SCHOLARSHIP ON EUROPEANISATION 
The historical approach in this thesis is informed by the broader scholarship on 
Europeanisation. That scholarship also addresses the limits of models of history as either 
struggle or as a linear paradigmatic shift. The scholarship instead highlights the complexity 
of interactions between ideas and institutions in the process of Europeanisation. Although it 
acknowledges the role of struggle, it goes beyond it. Finally, it acknowledges the ways in 
which legal development can shift between European and national levels. 
This thesis is intended to engage with an aspect of the “ontological challenge” within the 
literature on Europeanisation. The challenge seeks to identify the role of agency and 
structure in the development of European law. The history of UK individual information law 
1948 to 2017 is a European history. It is deeply connected with the development of individual 
information law from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Council of 
Europe, and in the European Union (EU). The thesis demonstrates how a four-approach 
framework can enrich a historical understanding of the complex, inconsistent and diverse 
legal architecture that has developed in relation to the public-private divide in UK individual 
information law. In doing this, it better reveals the agency of those engaged in the 
development of the law regulating information and the choices that prevailed in debates 
between executive, legislative, judicial and regulatory elites, as well as the structural features 
that sometimes privilege particular approaches. 
The thesis addresses the ontological challenge of understanding Europeanisation by 
drawing attention to the role of various elites in the development of the law and explaining 
the approaches that motivate, frame or resolve their conflicts.  Featherstone defines the 
“ontological challenge” of Europeanisation as a challenge “to clarify the role of structure and 
agency within the Europeanization process, whilst identifying the mechanisms that are the 
interactive link between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘EU’ spheres of activity.”118 He observes that 
the relationship between “cause and effect” is “deceptive”119 and the “the relationship 
between structure and agency is by no means simple.”120 Europeanisation was by no means 
uniform across the law of confidentiality, the right to private life, data protection and the 
criminalisation of unauthorised disclosures. This thesis helps to highlight that uneven 
European influence across individual information law. 
The Europeanisation literature is sceptical of deterministic theories of change. In this it can 
be contrasted with aspects of the literature on technology and information society which 
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emphasise the inevitability of certain changes in information technology law, a form of 
technological determinism, and literature on the changing structure and function of the state 
which emphasises the inevitability of changes in the bureaucratic capacity of the state in 
relation to information, a form of structural determinism. In identifying a point of continuity 
rooted in a conceptual tension which forms the subject matter of complex interactions, this 
thesis speaks to themes of ongoing agency and choice in the face of these various 
deterministic claims and integrates the history of the public-private divides in UK information 
law into the literature on Europeanisation by showing the extent to which legal development 
is non-linear, fragmented, and shaped by agency and choice. 
The concept of Europeanisation is subject to a wide variety of definitions.121 It has enjoyed 
popularity as a “fashionable term” in politics and international relations122 and has been the 
subject of research for over 30 years.123 The literature has an important historic focus. 
Europeanisation itself can be viewed as a historical process.124 Featherstone and Radaelli 
consider that “Europeanisation is not so much a theory as a distinct set of processes in need 
of explanation.”125 Although reference to “domestic adaptation to the pressures emanating 
directly or indirectly from EU membership” is the most common scope of the term,126 other 
definitions are broader in scope, treating Europe as a region or including European 
institutions such as the Council of Europe or the ECHR.127 This thesis adopts a broader 
definition of Europe to include such institutions. It does this because it takes an inclusive 
approach to the definition of individual information law. 
Europeanisation must be distinguished from several related or similar concepts. It is not neo-
functionalism. Neo-functionalism is narrower than Europeanisation and relates to a change 
whereby actors prefer European integration.128 Europeanisation by contrast covers a 
broader range of changes in response to Europe. It is not integration, which is an institutional 
process of pooling national sovereignty.129 Europeanisation concerns the effects resulting, in 
part, from that integration.130 It is not merely EU policy formation.131 Rather, Europeanisation 
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concerns “the penetration of the European dimension in national arenas of politics and 
policy”.132 EU policy formation does not concern implementation at the national level. 
Europeanisation is also not simply harmonisation or convergence.133 As Radaelli notes, 
these are consequences, and not necessary consequences, of Europeanisation, which may 
also result in divergence.134 
The scholarship on Europeanisation provides two different accounts of the effect of 
Europeanisation on national legal development.135 Borzel characterises these as structuralist 
vs agency-centred accounts.136 Structuralist accounts argue that Europeanisation should 
cause “structural convergence”.137 Jaaskinen argues that national legal systems tend to “limit 
Europeanisation that threatens their own coherence” but convergence is ultimately inevitable 
due to Europeanisation itself.138 Agency-centred accounts anticipate a greater degree of 
divergence at the national level and the uneven implementation of European norms.139 This 
is due to the role played by “change agents” such as norm entrepreneurs and epistemic 
communities.140 This thesis traces a middle way, conscious of the role played by both 
structure and agency but resistant to determinism. Instead it understands the agency of 
various actors as shaped by different approaches to the public-private divide.  
The thesis also draws on rational institutionalism in acknowledging the role of structure on 
legal development.141 Rationalist institutionalism posits that “the absence of multiple veto 
points and the presence of supporting institutions” encourage change.142 Equally, the 
existence of veto points and unsupportive institutions create opportunities for divergence or 
resistance. These structural features do not explain why actors choose change but it does 
sometimes help to explain why they succeed or fail in realising their preferences. 
Accordingly, the thesis observes that the complex interactions between the four approaches 
identified shape the agency of actors while structural factors sometimes help to explain the 
nature and result of those interactions.  
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As Borzel observes, rationalist or sociological institutionalist accounts can operate 
“simultaneously or characterize different phases in processes of adaptational change”.143 
This thesis illustrates this in relation to information law. Featherstone and Radaelli explain 
that “Europeanisation is not producing a coherent, homogeneous, and harmonized Europe” 
because there is a great deal of diversity between states in terms of the “role of the state in 
the economy, the scope of the welfare state, the functions of social policy”.144 
Europeanisation “has a differential or asymmetrical impact”.145 Europe is a “complex reality” 
with elements of both convergence and fragmentation.146 Featherstone emphasises that the 
“impact of Europeanisation is typically incremental, irregular, and uneven over time and 
between locations, national and subnational.”147 Europeanisation as a research agenda is an 
examination of asymmetries.148 Those asymmetries are asymmetries of “absorption, 
accommodation, and transformation”.149 For Featherstone, Europeanisation as a field of 
research “acknowledges the dynamism, imbroglio, and limits to determinism in present-day 
Europe.”150 Goetz argues that the EU should be understood as “arena” rather than “actor”, 
with processes that are “circular rather than unidirectional, and cyclical rather than one-
off”.151 Such observations are reflected in this thesis. 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis critiques the two narratives that individual information law consists of a gradual 
erosion of the public-private divide in light of an increasingly individual approach and that 
individual information law was produced by struggle, across four major areas of individual 
information law: confidentiality, the right to respect for private life, data protection and the 
criminalisation of unauthorised disclosures, including official secrecy. In doing this, it 
demonstrates that the rise of an individual approach has also often been accompanied or 
followed by the resurgence of a state-restrictive one. State-facilitative approaches have also 
endured and reoccurred at various points in the history of individual information law. The 
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 23 
acceptance of market approaches have also frequently played an important role in the 
erosion of the public-private divide. In addition to struggle, these areas of law demonstrate a 
broader set of complex interactions between the four approaches identified, including 
tensions, compromises, catalysts, reactions, parallel coexistence and shifts between the 
approaches over time. 
In chapter 2, I examine the development of legal doctrines regulating confidential 
information. In chapter 3, I examine the development of European human rights law on the 
right to respect for private life, in so far as it touches upon individual information. In chapter 
4, I consider the implementation of that European human rights law in the UK. In chapter 5, I 
analyse the development of European data protection law and, in chapter 6, its 
implementation in the UK. Finally, in chapter 7, I examine the development of the 
criminalisation of unauthorised disclosures, through the history of official secrecy and the 
plethora of individual-identifying unauthorised disclosure offences that multiplied after reform 
of official secrecy in 1989. In chapter 8, I conclude that an understanding of the complex 
interactions between the four approaches identified provides a more accurate historically-
grounded theoretical framework for explaining the development of the public-private divide in 
UK individual information law than other common narratives of legal change in this field. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
INTRODUCTION 
Confidentiality has a long history as a branch of information law. It has played an important 
role in protecting individual information, although it also protects a much wider range of 
information than purely individual information. It was especially important in this regard 
before the development of the right to private life and data protection. The thesis therefore 
examines the public-private divide in relation to confidentiality first.  
The history of legal doctrines concerning confidentiality illustrates the role of all four 
approaches to the public-private divide in its development. Save for the development of the 
tort of misuse of private information from breach of confidence after the Human Rights Act 
1998,1 this was a national judicial project, in which the law developed with little direct 
European influence. First, a market approach has always informed the law on confidentiality. 
This approach was highly influential in its early development, though it was later transcended 
by other approaches. It remains a baseline in the law of confidentiality. Second, an individual 
approach exercised consistent influence to protect individuals’ confidential information in a 
widening range of circumstances, which went beyond the market. Confidential information 
itself, protected against any party and not merely where a confidential relationship existed, 
was arguably protected against all by 1990. This was to be substantially strengthened in 
relation to private information, which substantially overlaps with confidential information, after 
the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998.2 The two approaches, market and individual, 
have therefore coexisted in parallel within the jurisprudence with the individual approach 
gradually expanding over time. 
However, to understand the development of the law of confidence as a gradual shift from a 
market to a more individual approach under the influence of growing concern for individual 
privacy would ignore important counter trends in the law regulating confidentiality and public 
authorities. Both state-restrictive and state-facilitative approaches have shaped distinct parts 
of the law of confidentiality. Important state-facilitative trends include generous public 
interest defences for disclosure to public authorities from the late 1960s to at least the 1990s 
and other state-facilitative duties of confidence to the Crown. State-restrictive duties of 
confidence, albeit alongside state-facilitative exceptions, developed in the 1990s in relation 
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to information obtained in the exercise of official power. Analysis of these doctrines 
demonstrates a tension between state-facilitative and state-restrictive approaches. That 
tension operated in addition to market concerns. These developments ran parallel to the 
adoption of a more individual approach in relation to information that was confidential 
independently of a relationship of confidence or information that was private information 
about individuals for the purpose of the tort of misuse of private information. Further, the 
state-restrictive approach has had a resurgence in more recent case law on the scope of 
statutory exemptions to duties of confidence owed by public authorities.3  
This analysis resists conclusions that the public-private divide is developing along a simple 
trajectory towards the obsolescence of the public-private divide. It also demonstrates the 
importance of complex interactions between the four approaches over the history of the law 
of confidence.  
THE PROTECTION OF CONFIDENCE 
The protection of confidentiality, in UK common law and equity, has a long history stretching 
back beyond 1948. It represents some of the earliest information law in the UK. The modern 
action for breach of confidence is, however, usually dated to the 1948 decision in Saltman 
Engineering Co v Campbell Engineering Co.4 As Glover notes, the underlying policy of the 
law of confidentiality has not been consistent at all times and in all respects.5 These different 
policies reflect differences in approach to the public-private divide in information law.  
Confidentiality has long been influenced by the concerns of the market approach.6 Glover 
observes that “confidence of the business or industrial sort… can be rationalised under 
economic and moral headings”,7 which rely on the law of confidentiality to enhance 
productivity and maintain “business ethics and good faith in commercial dealings”.8 In 1980, 
Wacks similarly observed that traditional breach of confidence was more concerned to 
“protect the business interests of the plaintiff rather than his interests in preserving privacy”.9 
In 1998, Barber wrote that “breach of confidence primarily operates in the commercial 
sphere, protecting companies from errant employees capitalising on sensitive information”.10 
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However, even before the Human Rights Act 1998 had any impact on the development of 
the law of confidentiality, an individual approach had also started to inform the development 
of the law.11 Aplin noted that “privacy interests” had been protected by the law of confidence 
“albeit in a partial fashion” before the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998.12 However, 
neither did the law of confidentiality lack a public-private divide.13 As Barber stated in 1998 in 
relation to confidentiality: 
It is commonly supposed that English law does not possess a droit 
administratif analogous to that found in French law; there are no special rules 
governing private law rights in tort and contract. This is a bold statement that 
is more venerated than followed.14  
The law on confidentiality has addressed a range of relationships: commercial, private and 
governmental.15 The law played a role in protecting “the boundaries” of those relationships.16 
The law itself was shaped by the particular context, including whether the duty involved a 
public authority or private actor.17 
This chapter analyses the development of confidentiality at common law and in equity and 
identifies three trends relevant to the public-private divide. In all of this, the UK courts have 
shown themselves to develop the common law and equity flexibly, demonstrating a key role 
for the national courts in developing the public-private divide in UK individual information law. 
First, at its core, breach of confidence was about the protection of commercially valuable 
information and business relationships. A market approach underpinned the public-private 
divide in this respect, with confidential information protected against both public and private 
actors engaged in commercial transactions. The early law of confidentiality developed from 
private litigation between private parties and reflected limited regulation of information to 
promote the functioning of the market.18 This approach, though sometimes overtaken by 
other approaches, has remained a consistent feature of the law of confidentiality. It protects 
individual information in the service of the needs of the market. 
Second, breach of confidence has expanded to recognise an increasing number of private 
relationships as carrying duties of confidence. This ever-widening set of relationships more 
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clearly reflects the development of breach of confidence as a protection for the private lives 
of individuals. Confidentiality therefore increasingly reflected an individual approach beyond 
a market approach. This arguably extended so far as information which was confidential 
itself, without a particular relationships, and later to all private information.19 Of course, one 
of the most important developments in information law was the development of the tort of 
misuse of private information from breach of confidence, under the influence of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 and Article 8 ECHR. This thesis considers that development in chapter 4 on 
the national implementation of European human rights, including how far the development 
was driven by the UK courts themselves or was driven by the ECHR and the Human Rights 
Act 1998. 
Third, breach of confidence also developed state-facilitative and state-restrictive dimensions 
in relation to public authorities. Rather than existing in tension with market and individual 
approaches, these developments represent parallel specialised rules. These developments 
have created and sustained public-private divides in the law of confidentiality. The national 
courts were historically state-facilitative in their recognition of a public interest defence for 
the disclosure of confidential information to or by public authorities, where disclosure was 
reasonably connected with their functions, which were understood widely. The national 
courts also developed a set of state-facilitative duties of confidence to the Crown, imposed 
on ministers and certain officials to uphold institutions that supported the functioning of 
government, although state-restrictive assumptions also played a role in shaping those 
duties.20 The national courts followed a state-restrictive approach by imposing duties of 
confidence on public authorities in relation to information gathered in the course of their 
functions, especially their coercive powers. In the 1990s this case law was itself tempered by 
the courts’ state-facilitative approach to public interest disclosure or disclosure pursuant to 
statutory power.21 In the most recent Supreme Court decision, however, the Supreme Court 
has made a dramatic move towards a state-restrictive approach, with the recognition of the 
confidentiality owed by public authorities is a fundamental common law right which 
necessitates the narrow interpretation of statutory powers to disclose such information.22 The 
state-restrictive and state-facilitative approaches have therefore been in tension throughout 
the development of these doctrines. The law reflects some shifting tendencies between 
state-facilitative and state-restrictive approaches. 
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CONFIDENCE AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS: MARKET APPROACHES 
Confidentiality at common law and in equity in the UK has long been informed by a market 
approach. This regulates market actors, irrespective of their status as public or private. The 
protection of confidentiality at common law and in equity has protected commercially 
valuable information, including information about individuals, from disclosure to support the 
functioning of the market. It has also protected the confidentiality between employer and 
employee, professionals and their clients, and fiduciaries and their principals in order to 
enable them to better carry out tasks of economic importance. For example, national courts 
have long protected confidentiality via implied contractual terms in contractual 
relationships.23 Some of the relationships protected by breach of confidence were plainly 
commercial. The protection of confidentiality in those relationships served important market 
functions, such as supporting the relationship between banker or accountant and client.24 
This can also be seen in the national courts’ treatment of fiduciary duties when using 
information gained in the course of fiduciary relationships.25 These obligations contain no 
public-private divide and set a uniform level of regulation directed at enhancing the market. 
In early cases, it was quickly established that the courts would protect confidentiality in a 
relationship of employment.26 The courts also protected the confidentiality between certain 
professionals and their clients or customers. For example, in Weld-Blundell v Stephens, the 
court held that a chartered accountant must keep his client’s letter of instruction confidential, 
even where the letter made libellous accusations.27 Warrington LJ commented that there 
was “no reason founded on public policy or any other ground why an agent should be at 
liberty to disclose evidence of a private wrong committed by his principal”.28 The analysis 
was based on implied contractual terms. A similar analysis can be found in Tournier v 
National Provincial and Union Bank of England.29 In that case, the court held that there was 
an implied contractual term that a banker would preserve his customer’s confidence 
regarding “knowledge acquired in the character of a professional adviser” to him or her.30 
Banks LJ noted that the “credit of the customer depends very largely upon the strict 
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observance of that confidence”.31 Scrutton LJ grounded his decision in implied terms “which 
must necessarily have been in the contemplation of the parties making the contract”.32 He 
had “no doubt” that such an implied term existed in relation to bankers and noted that it 
“applies in other confidential relations, such as counsel or solicitor and client, or doctor and 
patient.”33 Atkin LJ noted that the limit of the implied duty was reached where disclosure was 
“reasonably necessary for the protection of the bank’s interests, either as against their 
customer or as against third parties in respect of transactions of the bank for or with their 
customer, or for protecting the bank, or persons interested, or the public, against fraud or 
crime”.34 These obligations preserve confidentiality in any information, including individual 
information, within commercial important relationships as a necessary part of their effective 
functioning and find their limit where the confidentiality would inhibit other commercial 
interests, including an economic interest in tackling fraud and other crime. 
Some other traditional relationships of confidence, however, did not so obviously serve the 
market, such as doctor and patient or lawyer and client.35 Confidentiality encourages 
frankness and the exchange of information between these vocations and the individuals they 
serve and so, in that sense, facilitate the “business” of a doctor, accountant, or lawyer. 
However, confidentiality also facilitates the access of individuals to professionals who serve 
a broader range of interests and rights, such as access to medical advice or treatment, with 
the benefits it brings to public health, or access to legal advice, as part of wider access to 
justice and in upholding the rule of law. The recognition of such relationships arguably 
reflects more an individual approach than a market one. It is difficult to characterise these 
relationships as purely commercial or intended to enhance the flow of information in the 
market. Rather, it is to protect individual privacy interests irrespective of the market. To that 
extent, individual and market approaches have coexisted and sometimes cooperated in the 
law of confidentiality from some of its earliest case law. 
The market approach observed in the pre-1940s jurisprudence on confidence intensified in 
the late 1940s. From 1948, national courts developed clearer protection for commercial 
confidentiality in equity as well as through contractual interpretation. At this point, the law of 
confidence can be clearly distinguished as an independent field. Saltman Engineering Co v 
Campbell Engineering Co is often taken as the starting point for the modern law of breach of 
confidence.36 In that case, Lord Greene held that the use of “confidential information”, 
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obtained “directly or indirectly” from the complainant and without the complainant’s express 
or implied consent, would be a breach of confidence.37 Such a principle, expressed at that 
level of generality, contained no public-private divide and reflected a market rationale. 
Various other cases subsequently dealt with misuse of commercial confidential information.38 
Injunctions were granted by the courts to prevent the continued use of information after a 
period of cooperation between businesses,39 information obtained from the unlawful 
inspection of a hired telephone answering machine,40 and confidential information about 
manufacturing processes.41 This extended even to the unconscious use of confidential 
information.42 A key concern was to prevent recipients of confidential information from using 
that information as a “spring-board” for activities detrimental to the economic interests of the 
confider.43 In Seager v Copydex, Lord Denning MR expressed a “broad principle of equity 
that he who has received information in confidence shall not take unfair advantage of it”.44 
He argued that one “should not get a start over others by using the information which he has 
received in confidence. At any rate, he should not get a start without paying for it”.45 This 
reflects market considerations about the economic value of information. Any protection of 
individuals was purely incidental to the market logic. 
The conditions necessary for an obligation of confidence, outside a contractual relationship 
between the parties, were elaborated in 1969 by Megarry J in Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) 
Ltd.46 The decision held that three conditions had to be fulfilled for a breach of confidence to 
occur: that the “information itself… [had] the necessary quality of confidence about it”; had 
“been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence”; and there had been 
“an unauthorised use of that information to the detriment” of the confider.47 In that case, the 
confidential information had been exchanged for the purpose of a joint venture. However, the 
court held that an undertaking to pay royalties for the use of the information was sufficient 
instead of an injunction. Megarry J, discussing the “spring-board”, considered that “the 
                                               
37 Ibid., p. 213. 
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essence of the duty seems more likely to be that of not using without paying, rather than not 
using at all”, where the duty related to the field of “industry and commerce”.48 Megarry J did, 
however, accept that that the “duty may exist in the more stringent form”, that is not to 
disclose at all, outside the commercial context, such as Argyll confidentiality.49 He insisted 
that the obligations in the commercial context must be those “upon which the same and fair 
conduct of business is likely to depend”.50 This extended to the question of whether to grant 
an injunction: “A product on the market may need protection against rivals in cases where a 
mere idea for a product, neither on the market now nor planned to be put on the market at 
any foreseeable date, may not”.51 The concerns of traditional confidentiality case law were 
therefore primarily commercial and market-orientated. Any protection for individual privacy 
that resulted from breach of confidence was incidental to this commercial logic grounded in a 
market approach. Further, there was no reason in principle why public authorities in 
appropriate circumstances could not be subject to such duties of confidence. The courts 
accepted that a more stringent approach could be found in order to protect certain 
information outside the commercial context: a rising individual approach. There was 
therefore little by way of a public-private divide in respect of such jurisprudence in the early 
jurisprudence of the national courts. A market approach dominated with some aspects of 
individual approaches coexisting or cooperating with that approach. 
CONFIDENCE AND PRIVATE RELATIONSHIPS: INDIVIDUAL APPROACHES  
Between the late 1960s and 1990s, before the important effects of the Human Rights Act 
1998 were felt, the national courts nevertheless developed the law of confidentially 
according to an individual approach. This was not incompatible with parallel market 
approaches to commercial information and so in practice acted to extend protections and go 
beyond a market approach: an example of coexistence and transcendence of the market 
approach over time. This extended the recognition of non-commercial relationships as giving 
rise to duties of confidence and the eventual, though dicta, suggestion that “obviously 
confidential” information was protected per se by confidentiality.52 This marked a stronger 
individual approach to confidentiality.  
This expansion first recognised the marital relationship as such a relationship of confidence 
in 1967.53 In Argyll v Argyll, one ex-spouse sought an injunction to protect information about 
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their “private life, personal affairs or private conduct communicated… during the subsistence 
of [the] marriage” from being disclosed to and by national newspapers.54 The court expressly 
went beyond the clear principle that the “court may restrain any breach of confidence arising 
out of contract or any right of property”55 to recognise that “the court in the exercise of its 
equitable jurisdiction will restrain a breach of confidence independently of any right at law.”56 
These duties attached to the relationship and reflected an individual approach to 
confidentiality, building on top of the market approach of the earlier case law. The court 
considered that “there could hardly be anything more intimate or confidential than is involved 
in that relationship, or than in the mutual trust and confidences which are shared by husband 
and wife”.57 It also commented that “the confidential nature of the relationship is of its very 
essence and so obviously and necessarily implicit in it that there is no need for it to be 
expressed”.58 The court considered that the preservation of the confidentiality of marital 
communications was “an objective of public policy”59 and the disclosures in question fell 
““within the mischief which the law as its policy seeks to avoid”.60 No market interest was 
served by protecting such information. This shows the expanding influence of the individual 
approach, which entailed a greater level of protection for individuals, protecting their 
interests, but without a public-private divide. Any third party recipient of such confidential 
information could in principle be bound by it. 
The courts subsequently went on to expand the categories of private relationship that would 
be protected by confidentiality. In Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers, information 
acquired via a press telephone tap was held to be subject to a duty of confidence.61 In 
Stephens v Avery, a duty of confidence was recognised in relation to a friendship.62 
Information acquired by secret photography was held to be subject to a duty of confidence in 
Shelly Films v Rex Features Ltd63 and Creation Records Ltd v News Group Newspapers 
Ltd.64 Cases like Barrymore v News Group Newspapers Ltd extended duties of confidence to 
other sexual relationships.65 The gradual extension of confidentiality to other relationships, 
and information acquired surreptitiously, marks the growing influence of an individual 
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approach to the regulation of individual information through confidentiality law, developed by 
the courts. 
Some dicta in the 1990s suggested that the courts would be willing to develop the law 
considerably to protect the confidential information of individuals. The dicta of Lord Goff in 
Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) stated that a duty of confidence could: 
not merely to embrace those cases where a third party receives information 
from a person who is under a duty of confidence in respect of it, knowing that 
it has been disclosed by that person to him in breach of his duty of 
confidence, but also… an obviously confidential document… picked up by a 
passer-by.66 
This is evidence that the law on confidentiality was already countenancing the protection of 
individual privacy long before the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force. Phillipson and 
Fenwick consider that, by covering “cases where obviously personal information is 
surreptitiously obtained”,67 the case law had already developed to a point at which it was 
“almost indistinguishable from a ‘pure’ privacy tort”.68 For Phillipson and Fenwick it was a 
“most radical development”.69 It certainly laid the ground for the later development of the law 
of confidence following the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998. It also demonstrates a 
willingness to protect far more than commercial confidences and business relationships 
necessary for the proper functioning of the market by 1990, indicating the growing influence 
of an individual approach in the development of the law of confidentiality transcending the 
market approach. 
CONFIDENCE AND THE STATE: STATE-FACILITATIVE AND STATE-RESTRICTIVE APPROACHES 
Any narrative that points only to the development of an individual model in the law of 
confidence would seriously neglect important counter tendencies, not least the tension 
between the state-facilitative and state-restrictive approaches in doctrines relating to public 
authorities. This is especially so in the more recent resurgence of a state-restrictive 
approach in the recognition of Marcel confidentiality as a common law fundamental right in R 
(Ingenious Media) v Commissioners for Revenue and Customs.70 
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Despite containing both market and individual approaches in the development of its 
jurisprudence, the national courts also showed a distinctive interest in state-facilitative and 
state-restrictive concerns when developing the law of confidentiality in relation to public 
authorities. The national courts did this in three respects. First, confidentiality adopted a 
relatively state-facilitative approach to the public interest defence in the context of 
disclosures to and by public authorities, at least initially. Second, the courts developed 
several duties of confidence owed by officials to the Crown and significantly shaped by the 
public context, reflecting a tension between state-facilitative and state-restrictive 
approaches. Third, the courts imposed duties of confidence on public authorities in relation 
to a wider range of information gathered through legal power or public duty, reflecting a 
state-restrictive concern but substantially tempered by state-facilitative attitude to statutory 
processing, at least until Ingenious Media. 
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST DEFENCE 
Between the 1960s and 1990s, the national courts developed a public interest defence in the 
law of confidentiality in line with a state-facilitative approach. The national courts far more 
willingly and readily recognised an overriding public interest in the disclosure of confidential 
information by or to public authorities than to other private individuals or the general public. 
Only the press and medical professionals received similar treatment from the national courts, 
and sometimes only in more limited circumstances. However, this difference was later 
eroded as a growing focus on freedom of speech weakened the distinctiveness of the state-
facilitative approach in national courts. 
Early discussions concerning disclosure in the public interest emphasised the importance of 
disclosure “to one who has a proper interest to receive the information”.71 This was 
considered straightforward by the courts where there was a disclosure of “a crime to the 
police” or “a breach of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act to the registrar”, although 
disclosure “on a broader field, even to the press” was accepted as at least excusable in 
some limited cases.72 A defence of public interest in disclosing confidential information to the 
Daily Mail that revealed an employer to be misleading the public as to the reasons for price 
increases was not an unfounded defence, although this was not elaborated upon by the 
court in Initial Services Ltd v Putterill.73 The stronger argument put to the court that the press 
was never a “proper authority” for the purpose of public interest disclosure was indeed 
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rejected by Salmon LJ.74 However, neither was it endorsed with the same clarity and 
enthusiasm as a disclosure to the police. Disclosure to either public or private actors in the 
public interest was in principle possible. However, the jurisprudence took disclosure to public 
authorities for the purposes of their functions as clear examples, whereas disclosure to the 
press was merely excusable. This indicates a state-facilitative reasoning: a clear example of 
disclosure in the public interest is to the properly constituted public authority whereas less 
clear is the public interest in disclosure to the press or private organisations. 
Another example can be found in Butler v Board of Trade.75 The plaintiff tried to argue that 
confidential documents could not be adduced by the Board of Trade in legal proceedings. 
Goff J had no difficulty in holding that “the interest and duty of the defendants as a 
department of the state to prosecute offenders under the Companies Act must prevail over 
the offender’s limited proprietary right in equity to restrain a breach of confidence”.76 It would 
be neither right nor permissible to exercise an equitable jurisdiction to restrain the 
prosecution from “adducing evidence relevant to the crime”.77 Disclosure to the proper public 
authority for the purposes of their functions was a clear and unproblematic public interest 
defence. 
Similarly, in Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner,78 although Sir Robert Megarry 
denied that a duty of confidentiality existed on the facts, he went on to consider whether 
there might be a public interest defence for breach of confidence by the police where the 
disclosure related not to wrongdoing, but the suspicion of wrongdoing.79 Megarry VC said 
that the matter had to be approached with “some measure of balance and common sense”.80 
Against the rights of telephone subscribers had to be balanced the “desires of the great bulk 
of the population” not to be victims of crime: such disclosures were “important weapons in 
protecting the public”.81 He held that the police would have “just cause or excuse”,82 a public 
interest defence, if there were “grounds for suspecting” individual telephone taps would give 
“material assistance in detecting or preventing crime”, “discovering… criminals” or “otherwise 
assisting in the discharge of the functions of the police in relation to crime”.83 This would only 
apply if the material obtained was only used for those purposes.84 Finally, any other 
                                               
74 Ibid., p. 409. 
75 [1971] Ch 680. 
76 Ibid., p. 691. 
77 Ibid., p. 690. 
78 [1979] Ch 344. 
79 [1979] 1 WLR 760, pp. 376 and 377. 
80 Ibid., p. 377. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
 36 
irrelevant information acquired had to be restricted to the minimum number of people 
“reasonably required to carry out the process of tapping”.85 This dicta analysis suggests a 
state-facilitative approach to the public interest defence in 1979. This is because it was very 
comfortable with permitting disclosure to the police for the purpose of crime detection as a 
public interest. 
Similarly, Scott J held, in Re A Company’s Application,86 that it was in the public interest for 
a financial and management advisor to disclosure those breaches of a regulatory scheme 
and tax improprieties “that it is the province of those authorities [Financial Intermediaries, 
Managers and Brokers Regulatory Association (FIMBRA) and the Inland Revenue] to 
investigate.”87 He considered that “no harm will have been done” if the regulator decided that 
“the allegations are not worth investigating” and “if harm is caused by the investigation itself, 
it is harm which is implicit in the regulatory role of [FIMBRA]”.88 Any confidential information 
would be information that the regulator was entitled to obtain pursuant to their powers.89 
Similarly, the disclosure of information relating to “fiscal matters that are the concern of the 
Inland Revenue” to the Inland Revenue would not breach confidentiality.90 Again a clear 
state-facilitative approach influenced the public interest defence. 
In W v Egdell,91 the disclosure of a psychiatric report, which had been commissioned by a 
patient for a mental health tribunal appeal, but which was subsequently withdrawn by the 
patient after he saw the report, was held to be in the public interest where the disclosure was 
to the medical officer of the secure unit holding the patient and the Secretary of State. The 
patient suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and had killed a number of people with 
homemade bombs and other weapons. The commissioned report uncovered new evidence 
of ongoing dangerousness unknown to the secure unit. Sir Stephen Brown P held that the 
“balance of public interest clearly lay in the restricted disclosure of vital information to the 
director of the hospital and to the Secretary of State who had the onerous duty of 
safeguarding public safety”.92 Once again the national courts facilitated the flow of 
information to public authorities charged with public functions, although it was not considered 
whether such information could be disclosed directly to other parties for their safety. 
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The national courts also distinguished the wholly commercial context from the context of 
public authority functions in Re Smith Kline and French Laboratories.93 In doing so it 
emphasised that the public interest in disclosure to a public authority exercising public 
functions might be privileged. In that case a company provided confidential information to a 
licensing authority under the Medicines Act 1968 in order to obtain a licence for their 
product. They did not wish their information to be used for other purposes or to benefit their 
competitors. Licences could be obtained by competitors who showed that their product was 
“essentially similar” to an existing licenced product. The company applied for judicial review 
to prevent the licensing authority’s proposed use of their information to evaluate competitors’ 
applications for licences as “essentially similar” products because this would entail using or 
disclosing their confidential information to competitors. The fact that a product was ruled 
“essentially similar” could be valuable information to a competitor. Dillon LJ held that the 
court had to take a “practical approach”94 and that because the licensing authority was “a 
public authority exercising important functions in the public interest” the resolution of the 
case would not necessarily “be the same as it might have been in a wholly commercial 
context”, a clear state-facilitative consideration.95 He held that because the “protection of 
public health is the fundamental purpose of the licensing system” under the relevant Act and 
a “purpose of great public importance”.96 The authority could therefore use the information 
for all its statutory functions.97 No more granular assessment of the public interest was 
undertaken. The case shows a clear state-facilitative tendency within the jurisprudence on 
public interest defences, explicitly distinguishing it from the same test in a wholly commercial 
context. 
Public interest defences were readily found for the disclosure of confidential information to 
public authorities between the 1960s and 1990s, especially where they had responsibilities 
relating to crime, regulation or public safety. A public interest analysis was also later applied 
to the disclosure of confidential information held by public authorities themselves.98  A state-
facilitative approach is apparent in this when this is compared to the public interest defence 
for the disclosure of confidential information to private actors. The public interest defence 
could be relied on by individuals disclosing confidential information to private actors, but in 
more limited circumstances.  
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In 1969 in Fraser v Evans,99 Lord Denning MR, in obiter dicta comments, considered that 
some matters “are of such public concern that the newspapers, the Press, and indeed, 
everyone is entitled to make known the truth and to make fair comment on it” as “an integral 
part of the right to free speech and expression”, which “must not be whittled away”.100 
Similarly, in Hubbard v Vosper,101 Lord Denning MR held that confidential disclosure of 
materials from a Scientology course could potentially be published in the public interest 
where the relevant courses “contain such dangerous material that it is in the public interest 
that it should be made known.”102 This judgment was followed in similar circumstances in 
Church of Scientology v Kaufman by Goff J.103 The public interest defence was therefore 
also available in principle for disclosure to private actors. 
However, the public interest defence was initially relatively narrow. In Beloff v Pressdram,104 
Ungoed-Thomas J held that the reproduction of an internal Observer memorandum 
describing a conversation between the plaintiff and a named Cabinet Minister was subject to 
public interest defence only in relation to completed or contemplated “breach of the country's 
security… breach of law, including statutory duty, fraud, or otherwise destructive of the 
country or its people, including matters medically dangerous to the public; and doubtless 
other misdeed of similar gravity.105 Contrast that with the acceptance of the public interest in 
wide use and disclosure by a public authority for the better performance of all its statutory 
functions in Re Smith Kline and French Laboratories.106 The court held that because the 
memorandum in question failed to disclose “any ‘iniquity’ or ‘misdeed’”, it fell outside the 
scope of the public interest defence.107 This was narrower than disclosure to public 
authorities for their functions. 
On the other hand, some cases became considerably more liberal in their approach to public 
interest disclosures. The jurisprudence was not consistent over time. There is some 
evidence that the expansion of public interest defences to enhance free speech eroded the 
public-private divide. In Woodwood v Hutchins,108 Lord Denning MR held that the public 
interest permitted the disclosure of confidential information by a press relations agent to the 
press relating to several singers following the termination of the contract between them. This 
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was done to correct a false image cultivated by those singers in the press.109 Lord Denning 
MR held that the singers had “sought publicity” and presentation “in a favourable light” to 
their commercial advantage, and could not subsequently complain “if a servant or employee 
of their afterwards discloses the truth about them” because “the image which they fostered 
was not a true image”. It was therefore “in the public interest that it should be corrected.”110 
He considered that “there should be truth in publicity. The public should not be misled”.111 In 
Schering Chemicals Ltd v Falkman Ltd, Lord Denning also emphasised the importance of 
press freedom and the public interest defence.112 He held that it should only be restricted 
where there was a “social need for protecting the confidence sufficiently pressing to 
outweigh the public interest in freedom of the press” and “where the private interest in 
maintaining the confidence outweighs the public interest in making the matter known to the 
public at large”.113 Later, in Lion Laboratories v Evans,114 the court held that it was in the 
public interest for former employees of a manufacturer of breathalyser instruments to supply 
confidential information relating to the inaccuracy of such instruments to a newspaper, 
expanding the public interest defence to circumstances where there was no wrongdoing on 
the part of the plaintiffs.115 Stephenson LJ did not doubt the “right of the press to probe and 
question”, although he did still “doubt that technical matters… [were] best investigated in the 
columns of a daily newspaper” rather than the Home Office.116 Although initially disclosure to 
or by public authorities for functions related to criminal investigation, regulatory, public 
safety, and even the efficient exercise of licensing powers, were readily accepted by the 
courts, reflecting state-facilitative tendencies, this was somewhat eroded by the development 
of public interest defences, as these expanded to address freedom of speech concerns. 
Nevertheless, the earlier history of public interest defences in confidentiality law demonstrate 
a state-facilitative approach to public authorities. 
DUTIES OF CONFIDENCE TO THE CROWN    
Alongside other equitable duties of confidence imposed on individuals in certain 
relationships, in the mid-1970s the national courts developed a set of obligations of 
confidence on Cabinet ministers and certain other officials. These obligations had an 
unusual public character and operated distinctively from general equitable obligations of 
confidence, reflecting the fact that they were owed to the Crown and not to the individuals 
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involved in their private capacity. These distinctive aspects reflect a hybrid of state-facilitative 
and state-restrictive tendencies. They were state-facilitative in that the obligation was 
imposed to facilitate government and to centralise processes for the authorisation of 
disclosure. However, they contained state-restrictive elements which denied the state a free-
standing interest in confidentiality and insisted on injunctive relief only where it was in the 
public interest to have it.   
In 1976, in AG v Jonathan Cape,117 Lord Widgery CJ held that the obligation of secrecy that 
attached to Cabinet discussions was not merely binding in morals but also in law.118 He 
denied that the courts were “powerless to restrain the publication of public secrets, while 
enjoying the Argyll powers in regard to domestic secrets”119 and that “when a Cabinet 
Minister receives information in confidence the improper publication of such information can 
be restrained by the court.”120 This followed from the fact that the doctrine of collective 
Cabinet responsibility was “an established feature of the English form of government” so that 
“some matters leading up to a Cabinet decision may be regarded as confidential.”121 This 
duty of confidence demonstrated an unusual public character. It was not merely the 
recognition of a conventional private duty of confidence. A conventional duty of confidence 
might be expected to apply to the recipient of confidential information in Cabinet and be 
owed to the minister who imparted the information in confidence. Rather, the shape of the 
duty was distinctively public. Lord Widgery CJ explained that as the duty was “imposed to 
enable the efficient conduct of the Queen's business” it was the case that “the confidence is 
owed to the Queen and cannot be released by the members of Cabinet themselves”.122 First, 
the imposition of a duty to enable efficient government business expresses a state-facilitative 
approach to the regulation of such information. Second, it was not a legal right of the 
individual who expressed the confidential information. It was explicitly not like ordinary duties 
of confidence between private individuals, whose own consent to disclosure would be 
sufficient. Instead, Widgery CJ elaborated that “a resigning Minister who wishes to make a 
personal statement in the House, and to disclose matters which are confidential under the 
doctrine obtains the consent of the Queen” and that consent is “obtained through the Prime 
Minister”.123 This approach to consent for the purposes of confidentiality mirrored the 
constitutional convention regarding Cabinet responsibility. The effect of the duty was 
therefore to concentrate decision-making authority in the hands of the Prime Minister, 
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providing control over the disclosure of confidential Cabinet discussions. Furthermore, 
Widgery CJ held that he could not “accept the suggestion that a Minister owes no duty of 
confidence in respect of his own views expressed in Cabinet”.124 The duty therefore not only 
could not be released by the confider, but it also acted to bind the confider him or herself, 
completely unlike ordinary duties of confidence. Widgery CJ’s justification for this was that 
otherwise the confidence, needed for the efficient conduct of Government business, could 
too readily be undermined: “It would only need one or two Ministers to describe their own 
views to enable experienced observers to identify the views of the others.125 The result was 
a highly unusual duty shaped by a state-facilitative approach. 
However, the new duty also contained some state-restrictive dimensions showing a mixture 
or tension of approach. The duty of confidence in Attorney General v Jonathan Cape did not 
give rise to remedies per se but could only be protected by an injunction in more limited 
circumstances. A breach could only be “restrained by the court when this is clearly 
necessary in the public interest.”126 This was quite different from the duties of confidence 
owed to private individuals, who have remedies against a breach unless a public interest 
defence applies. Instead, the effective burden was reversed, so that the Crown must show a 
public interest in restraining publication. This is a state-restrictive dimension because it 
denies the state free-standing interests in confidentiality which it can enforce against third 
parties. Instead, the state must point to reasons beyond its own interest to restrain the 
disclosure of confidential information. Such a limitation is state-restrictive in nature. 
In 1990, the House of Lords in Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2)127 
imposed a similar duty of confidence to the Crown on members of the security service.128 
Lord Keith commented that the disclosure of confidential information could “result in a 
financial loss to the public” or “tend to harm the public interest by impeding the efficient 
attainment of proper government ends”.129 Commenting on the distinctively public nature of 
the duty being recognised in equity, Lord Keith said that “the position of the Crown, as 
representing the continuing government of the country may… be regarded as being 
special”.130 This was because the Crown “representing the nation as a whole” had “no 
private life or personal feelings capable of being hurt by the disclosure of confidential 
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information”.131 Therefore, the Crown could only seek “to prevent disclosure or to seek 
redress” if it was “in a position to show that the disclosure is likely to damage or had 
damaged the public interest”.132 Lord Keith stated that what must be shown by the Crown 
would “depend on the circumstances of each case”.133 He accepted that there might be a 
“general public interest in the preservation of confidentiality” owed by Crown servants and 
their agents and “in encouraging other Crown servants to preserve it”.134 He noted that the 
“position may be different” in a case “where publication is proposed by third parties 
unconnected with the particular confidant”.135 The suggestion seems to be that in relation to 
the public interest, an injunction may be granted more readily to prevent breach by a Crown 
servant or agent than by a third party who obtains confidential information with knowledge 
from such a person. A state-restrictive logic therefore runs through this part of the law of 
confidentiality, tempering the state-facilitative approach underpinning the doctrine. This was 
later applied in Lord Advocate v The Scotsman.136 In that case the concession that further 
publication would not be capable of damaging national security, such that the contents of a 
book written by a former member of MI6 was “entirely innocuous”, led the court to hold that 
no prima facie claim for breach of confidence could be pleaded.137 Lord Jauncey noted that it 
was “now beyond doubt that the Crown can only restrain the publication of confidential 
information if the public interest requires such restraint.”138  
The courts have, on the other hand, also shown a willingness to go even further to enforce 
duties of confidence against former members of the security services than against private 
parties: a state-facilitiative approach. In Attorney General v Blake,139 the court held that, 
despite the disclosure of information in a book by the double agent George Blake no longer 
being confidential nor damaging to the public interest by 1989,140 it would enforce the 
contractually binding confidentiality undertaking of the defendant141 by an account for profits, 
considering the case to be an exceptional one where other remedies were “inadequate”.142 
Lord Nicholls added that the “Crown had and has a legitimate interest in preventing Blake 
profiting from the disclosure of official information, whether classified or not, while a member 
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of the service and thereafter.”143 This was to remove the “financial incentive” from members 
of the security service to break their undertaking and because the “undertaking, if not a 
fiduciary obligation, was closely akin to a fiduciary obligation, where an account of profits is a 
standard remedy in the event of breach… In the special circumstances of the intelligence 
services, the same conclusion should follow even though the information is no longer 
confidential.”144 Although in highly unusual circumstances, the case reflects a state-
facilitative concern to protect the confidentiality of security services information. The courts 
have been willing to remove the financial incentive to leak official information, even where it 
was no longer confidential due to the passage of time. Within the special duties of 
confidence owed to the state, both state-facilitative and state-restrictive approaches have 
interacted to shape legal doctrine. 
DUTIES OF CONFIDENCE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES TO PRIVATE ACTORS  
In the 1990s, the scope and nature of duties of confidentiality owed by public authorities to 
private actors was significantly developed by the courts. This was done according to a state-
restrictive approach, although exceptions were heavily influenced by the legislative context, 
which acted in a broadly state-facilitative manner.  
One core historic limitation on the law of confidentiality was its inability to impose duties of 
confidence on public authorities. This was due to the common lack of a contract into which to 
imply duties of confidence on a public authority, in contrast to the common presence of a 
contract between private individuals.145 The effect of this reliance on implied terms in 
contract was initially to facilitate the state. This was illustrated clearly in Malone v 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner.146 Although a claim based upon confidentiality failed in 
relation to the interception of telephone conversations on the authority of warrants issued by 
the Secretary of State, Sir Robert Megarry also noted that had the telephone services in 
question been provided under a contract with the Post Office, then an argument based on 
implied terms might have been feasible.147 Such an implied term would provide that the 
“telephone conversations should remain confidential and be free from tapping”.148 However, 
the effect of the statutory regime was that telephone services were provided pursuant to a 
statutory duty, with a statutory power to “make a scheme of charges and other terms and 
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conditions for those services” with those charges recoverable as if “simple contract debts”.149 
This meant that that “no contract as such” existed between the public body and the individual 
and so no “contention based on implied terms” was possible.150 There was therefore no 
implied contractual duty binding on the public authority in question. Had the service provider 
been a private actor, reliant on a contract for services, then such a duty could have been 
implied. The fact that the relevant service was carried out under statutory power rather than 
contract therefore undermined the ability of the national court to impose an implied term 
concerning the confidentiality of the telephone service. This would often be the case where 
public authorities provided services pursuant to statute rather than through contract. The 
operation of the law was therefore state-facilitative.  
The courts were also initially resistant to attempts by private actors to impose duties of 
confidence on public authorities by seeking to make confidential disclosures to such public 
authorities. In Re Smith Kline and French Laboratories,151 the court held that the licensing 
authority could use the confidential information disclosed to them for any purpose of the Act 
and not just the single purpose for which the company had disclosed it in the original 
application. In addition to resting this on a public interest analysis,152 Lord Templeman 
suggested that the company could only provide the information to the public authority on the 
basis that it was “for the purposes of the Act”153 and not for more limited purposes. This 
created an all or nothing approach to confidential disclosures based on the total scope of the 
authority’s powers. It did not permit a more limited disclosure for a defined purpose. This 
would be possible in relation to confidential disclosures to private bodies. Lord Templeman 
explained that this was “the price which the appellants must pay for cooperating in the 
regime designed by Parliament for the protection” of others.154 In the Court of Appeal, 
Staughton LJ had contrasted exchanges between private parties where it “may be possible 
to discern a common purpose for entrusting information”, with disclosure to a public authority 
where “the purpose is less likely to be common” to the parties.155 In those cases, the 
“purpose of the licensing authority in acquiring the information was to use it for all or any of 
its duties” was determinative of the purposes for which the information could be used.156 
Therefore, there was no need to consider “any countervailing public interest” to justify such 
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use.157 In effect, information provided to public authorities would be for all their lawful 
functions. This involved a state-facilitative approach to public authorities going even beyond 
public interest defences. The existence of a statutory purpose precluded any further analysis 
of the public interest. 
In the 1990s, the national courts’ jurisprudence started to reflect a more state-restrictive 
model in relation to information provided to public authorities. The national courts did this by 
subjecting information disclosed to public authorities under compulsion to a duty of 
confidence. However, the operation of exceptions for disclosures pursuant to statutory or 
other powers, or a public interest defence highly deferential to the statutory scheme, in effect 
rendered the scope of this duty of confidence coterminous with the public authority’s powers, 
broadly understood. This meant that the use of such information for those powers was 
permitted. Only ultra vires disclosure was a breach of confidence. This increased the 
remedies available to individuals against public authorities for unlawful disclosure of such 
information: a state-restrictive approach to public authority use of information acquired 
pursuant to public power. However, the law remained relatively state-facilitative where a 
public authority used information within the scope of its powers. Therefore both state-
facilitative and state-restrictive tendencies operated within this area of the law of 
confidentiality.  
In Marcel v Metropolitan Police Commissioner,158 police released documents that had been 
seized during a criminal investigation to solicitors who wished to bring a civil action. This was 
done before a subpoena had been properly served on the police. Dillon LJ held that “powers 
to seize and retain [documents] are conferred for the better performance of public 
functions by public bodies and cannot be used to make information available to private 
individuals for their private purposes”.159 This meant that the “police should not disclose 
documents, otherwise than for the specific purposes specified in the [relevant legislation], 
unless a subpoena had been served on the relevant police officer.”160 The documents and 
information seized during a police search were confidential and could only be used for the 
performance of public functions or disclosed pursuant to an order of the court. Dillon LJ 
observed that “because the police officer seizes documents under the [relevant legislation] 
for limited purposes… he owes a duty of confidence to the owner not to use the documents 
for other purposes”.161 Sir Christopher Slade emphasised the “draconian” nature of search 
and seizure powers and the expectation “that the authority would treat the documents and 
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their contents as confidential, save to the extent that it might use them for purposes as 
contemplated by the relevant legislation”.162 The emphasis on the limited purposes for which 
public authorities could act and the coercive nature of the collection of that information 
justified the decision. This is a state-restrictive approach. 
The Marcel doctrine was subsequently extended beyond information obtained through 
draconian police powers. In Hoechst UK Ltd v Chemiculture Ltd,163 Morritt J applied Marcel 
to information which had been disclosed by an officer of the Health and Safety Executive. 
The information had been obtained by the exercise of powers conferred by the Food and 
Environment Protection Act 1985. The powers were wider than powers of search and 
seizure. Morritt J held that “information obtained pursuant to statutory powers can only be 
disclosed by the recipient to such persons and for such purposes as are envisaged by the 
statute conferring the powers or pursuant to a court order”.164 Marcel confidentiality was 
therefore expanded to a wider application, covering information obtained through the 
exercise of statutory power. With this, the state-restrictive approach expanded to cover 
considerably more information. 
In subsequent cases, it became unclear whether the Marcel principle permitted any 
disclosures pursuant to a legal power or whether the statutory context was informative but 
not exhaustive of the public interest in disclosure. There were therefore two different lines of 
case law, the latter potentially more state-facilitative than the former. First, in Re Arrows (No 
4),165 the court took the former approach. It considered whether information given to the 
liquidators of a company could be disclosed to the Serious Fraud Office. Lord Browne-
Wilkinson held that “the Marcel principle cannot operate to prevent the person obtaining the 
information from disclosing it to those persons to whom the statutory provisions either 
require or authorise him to make disclosure” before noting that the relevant Act contained a 
“series of provisions which envisage that information and documents in the hands of the 
liquidators is to be disclosed to others, including disclosure for the purposes of criminal 
‘proceedings’.”166 The national courts therefore allowed statutory powers to override Marcel 
confidentiality without more.167 In some later cases, on the other hand, the tendency to align 
duties of confidence with the relevant statutory framework was displaced by a more liberal 
public interest. In Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire,168 the court held that the 
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release of a custody photograph of a known shoplifter to shop employees was not a breach 
of confidence. Laws J held on that on general principles, and based on Marcel, that a 
suspect photograph was confidential information.169 Laws J held that the police could “make 
reasonable use” of a photograph “for the purpose of the prevention and detection of crime, 
the investigation of alleged offences and the apprehension of suspects or persons unlawfully 
at large”.170 Laws J suggested that the “better analysis” of this lay in the public interest 
defence.171 The action by the police had been “obviously and unarguably in the public 
interest” as it had been “reasonably directed to the prevention of crime.”172 Similarly, in 
Woolgar v Chief Constable of Sussex Police,173 the court considered whether the police 
could disclose a police interview transcript without the suspect’s consent to the regulatory 
body for nursing. The transcript was straightforwardly confidential.174 Kennedy LJ held that 
where a regulatory body which was held to be “operating in the field of public health and 
safety” sought access to information and the police were “reasonably persuaded [that it] is of 
some relevance to the subject matter of an inquiry being conducted by the regulatory body”, 
this would give rise to a “countervailing public interest” which would entitle “the police to 
release the material to the regulatory body on the basis that, save in so far as it may be used 
by the regulatory body for the purposes of its own inquiry, the confidentiality which already 
attaches to the material will be maintained.”175 Kennedy LJ added that even in the absence 
of a request the police could pass on confidential information which “in their reasonable 
view” was “in the interests of public health or safety”.  
In both Hellewell and Woolgar, the courts analysed disclosure based on the reasonable view 
of the public authority that disclosure would be in the interests of the public functions of their 
own or another public authority, as a public interest defence. This was sometimes wider, and 
therefore more state-facilitative, than the narrower approach in Re Arrows (No 4). However, 
in either line of case law the effect of these authorities was to establish state-facilitative 
exemptions for disclosure in the pursuit of public functions. The duty itself was state-
restrictive to the extent it granted remedies to individuals for unlawful disclosure which did 
not exist under Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner and could not be implied in the 
public authority context due to the frequent absence of a relevant contract. The development 
of the Marcel doctrine therefore shows a mixture of state-facilitative and state-restrictive 
approaches to the public-private divide. 
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R (INGENIOUS MEDIA) V COMMISSIONERS FOR REVENUE AND CUSTOMS 
In the most recent case law, the Supreme Court has taken a more state-restrictive approach 
to confidentiality. It did this by recognising Marcel confidentiality as a common law 
fundamental right in the context of interpreting the scope of statutory powers to disclose 
confidential information. The result of this was that the principle of legality applies to 
statutory powers to disclose confidential information, potentially narrowing the interpretation 
of exemptions to Marcel confidentiality. This represents a shift in the balance between state-
facilitative and state-restrictive approaches in the most recent thinking of the UK Supreme 
Court, towards the latter. 
In R (Ingenious Media) v Commissioners for Revenue and Customs,176 the Permanent 
Secretary for Tax at Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) disclosed information, in 
an off-the-record meeting, to journalists. The information related to the tax activities of the 
applicants, who were involved in film investment schemes, and HMRC’s view of those 
activities. This was all information derived from information held by HMRC in connection with 
its functions. Some of the information was later published in a national newspaper. The case 
was brought as a judicial review, seeking a declaration, rather than as an action for breach 
of confidence. HMRC officials were bound by a statutory duty of confidentiality in section 
18(1) of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005. That duty extended to 
“information which is held by the Revenue and Customs in connection with a function of the 
Revenue and Customs”. Exemptions to the statutory duty were listed in section 18(2). The 
case concerned the proper interpretation of section 18(2)(a)(i), which provided an exemption 
for disclosures “made for the purposes of a function of the Revenue and Customs”. The 
Permanent Secretary for Tax argued that the practice of off-the-record meetings with 
journalists covering financial news, involving limited disclosures was for the purposes of a 
function of HMRC. This was because such disclosures brought HMRC several benefits: the 
meetings encouraged good relations with the press, enabled HMRC to more effectively 
communicate its approach to complicated tax avoidance schemes to the public, and 
provided opportunities for investigative journalists to share information with HMRC about 
individuals that might help HMRC in its own investigations. 
The High Court and Court of Appeal both treated the case as a conventional judicial review. 
They both held that the disclosure was a proper one under section 18(2)(a)(i). Sales J, in the 
High Court,177 held that there was a “rational connection between the function of HMRC to 
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collect tax in an efficient and cost-effective way” and the disclosures in question.178 The 
Permanent Secretary for Tax had made a “judgment” that “fell within the lawful parameters” 
of section 18(2).179 This was because the decision required “evaluative judgments”.180 It was 
inappropriate for the “court to approach the matter as if it were the primary decision-maker” 
because the court was not “deeply familiar” with the “background of policy” and press 
relations, whereas the Permanent Secretary for Tax and his advisers were “experts”.181 It 
was “legitimate” to seek good press relations and the decision was one “properly and 
rationally” open to the Permanent Secretary for Tax.182 In the Court of Appeal,183 Sir Robin 
Jacob favoured a “wide view” of permissible disclosure.184 The court was not “a tax gatherer” 
nor “in a position to evaluate the likely effect of a disclosure on an HMRC function in the 
same way as an official concerned with the day to day operation of the system”.185 He 
ultimately concluded that it was “entirely in the public interest that HMRC should let the 
public know its views about [film investment schemes]”.186 The decisions of the High Court 
and Court of Appeal were therefore relatively state-facilitative: imposing low intensity review 
out of deference to the expertise of the authority and generous in interpreting the functions of 
HMRC to include efficiency and cost-effectiveness. In this, they were deferential to the 
decision of the Permanent Secretary, holding that a decision to disclose was an evaluative 
judgment. The decisions held that the disclosures were also proportionate interferences with 
both Article 8 ECHR and Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR. 
The Supreme Court took a much more state-restrictive approach to the disclosures. It 
rejected the wide interpretation of section 18(2)(a)(i) favoured by the High Court and Court of 
Appeal. The Supreme Court decision differed from the earlier judgments by drawing on the 
Marcel jurisprudence. It did not merely reflect a difference is opinion about the appropriate 
scope of the statutory exemption or the proper degree of deference to the decision-maker. 
Rather, Lord Toulson identified Marcel as authority for a “well-established principle of the law 
of confidentiality that where information of a personal or confidential nature is obtained in the 
exercise of a legal power or in the furtherance of a public duty, the recipient will in general 
owe a duty to the person from who it is received or to whom it relates not to use it for other 
                                               
178 Ibid., para. 39. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid., para. 40. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid., paras 43 to 46. 
183 R (Ingenious Media) v Commissioner for Revenue and Customs [2015] EWCA Civ 173; [2015] 1 
WLR 3183. 
184 Ibid., para. 29. 
185 Ibid., para. 46.  
186 Ibid., para. 71. 
 50 
purposes”.187 In particular, Lord Toulson did not focus on the statutory confidentiality 
imposed by section 18(1). Lord Toulson’s judgment emphasised those parts of the earlier 
case law that characterised statute as overriding confidentiality, rather than a public interest 
analysis: the narrower of the two lines of cases law. He cited In Re Arrows (No 4)188 as 
authority for the proposition that Marcel confidentiality could not prevent disclosures either 
required or authorised by statute. The judgment did not refer to Hellewell or Woolgar, where 
the public interest analysis was shaped by the statutory context and was arguably broader.  
Lord Toulson subjected the broader interpretation of section 18(2)(a)(i) to a more 
fundamental set of criticisms. He argued that were section 18(2)(a)(i) to be interpreted 
broadly, then the obligation of Marcel confidentiality owed by HMRC would “have been very 
significantly eroded by words of the utmost vagueness”.189 The principle of legality applied, 
as articulated by Lord Hoffman in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p 
Simms: “Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words”.190 The 
Supreme Court therefore held that a narrower interpretation of section 18(2)(a)(i) must be 
adopted, limiting disclosure to the purpose of HMRC’s primary function of revenue 
management and collection. Lord Toulson emphasised that “public bodies are not immune 
from the ordinary application of the common law”.191 The Supreme Court judgment is a 
significant development in the Marcel jurisprudence, requiring narrower interpretations of 
statutory powers to use confidential information because Marcel confidentiality is a 
fundamental common law right. 
Daly welcomed the Supreme Court judgment for “bringing clarity”192 and observed that: 
When it comes to protecting rights, the courts jealously guard the individual 
against the state. The history of the British Constitution is replete with 
examples of judges scrupulously examining the precise intention of 
Parliament when it gives powers to public officials which purport to override 
individual liberties.193 
This is certainly true and reflects a long tradition in UK constitutional law.194 However, seen 
in the light of the earlier case law on Marcel confidentiality, it is questionable whether this 
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really was an orthodox application of that “well-established principle”.195 The Supreme Court 
took a far more state-restrictive approach to Marcel confidentiality than the courts did in the 
1990s. It represents an important development of the jurisprudence on confidentiality on the 
part of the Supreme Court and demonstrates a resurgence and strengthening of the state-
restrictive approach in this field and an expansion of the fundamental rights recognised and 
protected in the common law. 
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE IN CONFIDENTIALITY 
The history of confidentiality in common law and equity demonstrates the importance of the 
four-approach framework for analysing the development of the public-private divide in 
individual information law. Early case law on confidentiality emphasised implied terms, 
fiduciary and commercial relationships and the protection of information to enhance the 
market. It had no public-private divide and was more limited in its scope, protecting 
information and relationships necessary to promote business and commercial interests. 
Even at a relatively early stage, long before the influence of the Human Rights Act 1998, the 
law showed a tendency to expand beyond the limits of a market rationale to increasingly 
protect information and relationships that vindicated the privacy of the individual. Regarding 
an expanding set of relationships, an individual approach transcended the wider market 
approach in the law of confidentiality. Although neither of these legal developments 
contained a public-private divide, they ran parallel to several lines of case law that applied 
the law of confidentiality distinctively in relation to public authorities from the 1960s. Although 
both state-facilitative and state-restrictive elements were present in specialised parts of the 
law on breach of confidence, the most recent judgment of the Supreme Court reflects a later 
turn towards a state-restrictive approach to information gathered pursuant to legal power or 
public duty. The recognition of Marcel confidentiality as a fundamental right demonstrates 
the ongoing importance of state-restrictive approaches. The history of confidentiality reveals 
complex interactions between different approaches to the public-private divide. It provides a 
more complex picture than the expectation of a linear progression towards an individual 
model. Beyond struggle, these interactions show parallel development, coexistence, 
cooperation and shifts in emphasis over time. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE AND EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
INTRODUCTION 
European human rights law, binding on the UK as a matter of international law, was a major 
European influence on the development of the public-private divide in UK individual 
information law. This chapter examines how the public-private divide developed in relation to 
the right for respect for private life in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). It demonstrates the role of various actors and approaches in the development of 
that divide and, although an individual approach has undoubtedly risen in prominence, it also 
demonstrates the resurgence of state-restrictive approaches and the endurance of limited 
state-facilitative elements.  
The history of the right to respect for private life in Article 8 ECHR demonstrates the rise of 
an individual approach to the public-private divide, especially in the jurisprudence on the 
positive obligations of the UK. Unlike the law of confidentiality or data protection, no market 
approach played any significant role in its history. Initially, the right to private life reflected a 
state-restrictive approach, although elements of the individual and state-facilitative 
approaches were present from the beginning. There is evidence of a variety of approaches 
during the drafting process and a degree of compromise between, or the coexistence of, 
state-restrictive and individual approaches in the development of the public-private divide. 
The picture is more complex than mere struggle but neither is it one of a linear march 
towards an ever purer individual approach. Instead, the ECHR jurisprudence demonstrates 
parallel approaches have both strengthened over time. Of course, an individual approach 
would not necessarily object to robust controls on public authorities but would seek 
equivalent protection against private actors, which is not a general concern of state-
restrictive approaches. There is therefore some scope for tensions and struggles between 
these approaches. 
Despite a significant erosion of the public-private divide under the influence of an individual 
approach, a state-restrictive approach has remained present, even strengthened, in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. The development of the public-private divide in this area does 
not reflect a straightforward shift from one paradigm to another. Rather, it reflects the 
compromises struck following tensions and struggles between advocates of individual and 
state-restrictive approaches and parallel developments which reflect different approaches. 
The chapter therefore both resists accounts of a linear paradigmatic shift and accounts that 
privilege struggle as a core feature of information law. This history demonstrates the 
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influence of several distinctive approaches to the public-private divide at the heart of the 
regulation of individual information through the ECHR. It demonstrates complex relationships 
between them.  
Both the drafters of Article 8 ECHR and its judicial interpreters, the European Commission of 
Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), played important roles in 
the development of the public-private divide. This chapter first considers the approach taken 
by Article 8 ECHR’s drafters and argues that there is greater evidence of a tension of 
approach, even at the earliest stage, than observed in traditional accounts.1 Next, the 
chapter examines the development of positive obligations on the State to regulate private 
actors and argues that, although this demonstrates clear evidence of the growing importance 
of an individual approach, these developments also reflect enduring conceptual struggles 
and parallel state-restrictive tendencies, which existing explanations of these legal changes 
neglect.2 Finally, the chapter presents further evidence for the continuing presence and 
influence of a state-restrictive approach alongside an individual approach. This is found in 
the continuing rhetoric of the ECtHR,3 the ECtHR’s treatment of State surveillance,4 and the 
ECtHR’s approach to the doctrine of imputation.5 It is also especially apparent in a parallel 
trend of the ECtHR to elaborate and intensify the requirements of the negative obligation on 
the state for public authorities. To that extent, it identifies a resurgence of a state-restrictive 
approach. National law regulating public authorities must still achieve standards of precision, 
detail, foreseeability and accessibility, with substantive safeguards and effective controls, 
quite beyond those required by national law regulating private actors.6  
ARTICLE 8 ECHR: THE DRAFTERS’ APPROACH TO THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE 
The text of Article 8 ECHR, drafted in 1950 and in force from 3rd September 1953, provides: 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
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crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. 
On its text alone, Article 8 ECHR reflects aspects of both individual and state-restrictive 
approaches. Article 8(1) ECHR expresses a broad right without reference to public or private 
bodies, albeit that only States are bound by the ECHR as parties. On the other hand, this 
must be read in light of Article 8(2) ECHR, which, as drafted, reflects a clear state-restrictive 
approach to the public-private divide. Public authorities cannot interfere with Article 8(1) 
ECHR, save where the interference is both “in accordance with the law” and “necessary in a 
democratic society” for one of a list of specified “interests”. The text is silent on its application 
to private actors or the limits to which private actors might need to be subject for the state to 
comply with Article 8(1) ECHR. The importance of a state-restrictive approach, by contrast, 
is clear on the face of Article 8 ECHR.  
Many commentators have observed that the ECHR was first conceived as a means to 
prevent interference with human rights by public authorities.7 Kilkelly characterises the 
ECHR as “a response to the atrocities of the Second World War.”8 Campbell argues that this 
historical context limited the drafters’ perspective: “dictatorship and abuse of state power 
[were] largely in mind”.9 This characterisation of the historical context might indicate that a 
consensus around a state-restrictive model would be present in the drafting materials for 
Article 8 ECHR. However, I contend that the drafting history reveals that an individual 
approach was contemplated by the drafters and shaped this final text, whereas those other 
accounts emphasise a state-restrictive approach of early human rights to the exclusion of an 
individual approach. Both approaches were present at the time of drafting Article 8 ECHR 
and shaped that draft in ways that were significant for the development of the public-private 
divide. 
Although Digglemann and Cleis attribute an important role to “coincidence” in the drafting 
process and regret the lack of explanation for the drafting decisions in the available 
materials,10 some materials do point to conceptual disagreement as an explanation for the 
text and structure of Article 8 ECHR. Digglemann and Cleis note that, following discussions 
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about whether protection should extend beyond the acts of public authorities to private 
actors in Article 8(1) ECHR, the drafters agreed to mirror the approach taken in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR).11 Article 12 UDHR prohibited “arbitrary 
interference” with privacy, family, home or correspondence using general language that did 
not exhibit a public-private divide. This demonstrates that the nature of the public-private 
divide in Article 8 ECHR was at least considered by the drafters. However, it falls short of 
demonstrating a real tension between differing approaches. The drafting of Article 8(1) might 
merely reflect the desire for a level of consistency with the UDHR. Indeed, closer 
formulations to Article 12 UDHR were adopted in the early drafting history of Article 8 
ECHR.12 The development of Article 8(2) ECHR might therefore simply reflect the drafters’ 
elaboration on “arbitrary” interference for the purpose of a public authority.  
However, there is an important further piece of evidence. There was a failed attempt by the 
United Kingdom’s negotiators to confine the right in Article 8(1) ECHR to a freedom from 
“governmental interference” in private and family life, home and correspondence.13 This 
appears to be an attempt to ensure that interference by private actors would not be within 
the scope of Article 8(1) ECHR at all. The UK’s failed amendment suggests the presence of 
a school of thought that would intensify the state-restrictive approach in Article 8 ECHR and 
remove the possibility of an individual approach to its interpretation. The UK’s attempt to 
clarify a state-restrictive understanding of Article 8 ECHR was defeated in favour of a more 
ambiguous formulation that left room for the eventual development of ECHR jurisprudence 
according to an individual approach. There are two available explanations for this, either of 
which demonstrates greater conceptual disagreement than that for which the traditional 
account allows. 
The first explanation for the UK’s amendment is that there was a fear that private actors 
would be unduly constrained by Article 8 ECHR, either in its text or in its subsequent 
jurisprudential development. The UK’s attempt to define Article 8 ECHR in terms of 
“governmental interference” could be an attempt to protect commercial private actors. This 
might seem unlikely considering the stance of the UK Government during the negotiations. 
The Labour Government of 1945 to 1951 was no defender of markets and actively opposed 
the protection of property rights in the ECHR.14 It would be surprising therefore if UK 
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negotiators sought to protect private interests in the flow of information. However, Duranti 
has highlighted the influence of conservative UK politics on the drafting process, and the 
restrictive drafting might reflect their influence in trying to defend the liberties of private 
actors.15 It is therefore unclear whether the intensification of a state-restrictive approach was 
motivated by market concerns or antagonism towards an individual approach to respect for 
private life.   
Alternatively, the amendment might indicate that the UK sought clarity in favour of a state-
restrictive approach in the context of discussions between negotiators which contemplated a 
broader scope for Article 8 ECHR. This might suggest that an individual approach was 
already sufficiently influential to merit the United Kingdom’s proposed amendment. Further, 
the rejection of this amendment points to the existence of disagreement as to the preferred 
approach. Although the text is silent on its application to private actors, this choice left the 
door open to a more individual model of the public-private divide in Article 8 ECHR. It reflects 
a compromise of approach in light of disagreement. Tensions or struggle over the preferred 
approach therefore resulted in a compromise draft that left the public-private divide in Article 
8(1) deliberately ambiguous. The result of this tension in drafting was important. A stronger 
consensus around an exclusively state-restrictive approach would have resulted in a right to 
freedom from governmental interference in private and family life. This might have restricted 
the avenues open to those who would later seek to develop Article 8 ECHR judicially in line 
with an individual approach. The more ambiguous text instead played an important role in 
the later development of positive obligations in Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence. It preserved 
opportunities for ECtHR judges to shape the public-private divide. Disagreement, struggle 
and compromise of approach was therefore present at the drafting of Article 8 ECHR. 
ARTICLE 8 ECHR: THE INTERPRETERS’ APPROACH TO THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE 
POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS AND ARTICLE 8 ECHR 
The development of positive obligations to “secure” respect for private life, even between 
private actors was a major jurisprudential development of Article 8 ECHR by the ECtHR.16 
Although negative obligations on public authorities in Article 8(2) ECHR had been applied 
very early in the ECHR jurisprudence and demonstrate the influence of a state-restrictive 
approach,17 positive obligations are now widespread and varied in ECtHR jurisprudence 
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across Convention rights.18 They are pervasive19 and “deeply embedded”20 in ECtHR 
jurisprudence.  
Mowbray, and later Pitkänen, describe the development of positive obligations in Article 8 
ECHR as occurring in “many contexts” as part of a second wave of legal developments 
between the late 1970s and early 1990s, after a first wave of case law had interpreted 
express positive obligations in the ECHR.21 Although the development of positive obligations 
accelerated for over 40 years,22 Feldman observed in 1997 that the ECtHR had “not 
imposed on States the obligation to enact regulatory legislation” in relation to private actors 
at that time.23 Those developments occurred only in the last 20 years. This correlates with 
Mowbray’s, and later Pitkänen’s, final period in the expansion of positive obligations under 
the full-time ECtHR after 1998, which Mowbray describes as both “imposing greater 
obligations”24 and “developing the spectrum of such obligations.”25 
This has been understood by some to represent a fundamental change from a state-
restrictive to an individual approach in European human rights.26 Others argue that positive 
obligations are a response to the privatisation of traditional State functions, suggesting that 
the fundamental approach remains state-restrictive in nature.27 However, I argue that neither 
of these explanations are completely satisfactory. The jurisprudence instead reveals the rise 
of a true individual approach, but tempered by the ongoing influence of the state-restrictive 
approach, which in relation to some parts of the jurisprudence has in fact intensified. This 
complex interaction is neither one of paradigm shift or straightforward conflict. 
Some commentators present these legal developments as part of a greater shift from a 
state-restrictive towards an individual model of human rights. Kay argues that the ECHR 
“now extends beyond anything contemplated” by the state-restrictive original drafters and 
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signatories.28 Xenos argues that these developments flow from scholarly debates in the 
1960s,29 which formed part of a dynamic campaign,30 in “response to human rights violations 
by private parties”.31 Xenos considers that, by the 1970s, a “new generation of Europeans” 
“brought up free from the complexes of the past” were able to move beyond a concern for 
negative liberty from interference by public authorities.32 Dickson similarly attributes the 
development of positive obligations to a rejection of “the idea that human rights can be 
adequately protected if States content themselves with merely standing by and doing 
nothing”.33 Both Xenos and Dickson suggest that the project of the ECHR was always 
greater than defence against State interference.34 This view reflects an individual approach. 
Xenos argues that there is a “growing recognition of human rights as freestanding 
constitutional imperatives”35 that makes the ECHR a “system of active protection that aims 
ultimately at the prevention of human rights violations”.36 Although these are important 
observations and capture a significant trend, I seek to show below that the interaction 
between state-restrictive and individual approaches to the public-private divide was more 
complex in the development of this jurisprudence. 
Other commentators see the development of positive obligations generally as a reaction to 
the changing structure of the state, motivated by a state-restrictive ambition. Donnelly has 
argued that positive obligations act to counter the “reductionist”37 neo-liberal understanding 
of individuals inherent in the philosophy of privatisation, by which the state seeks to divest or 
refuse to assume responsibility in a particular sphere of activity,38 although she 
acknowledges that positive obligations also contain an emphasis “on requiring the state to 
take responsibility for monitoring what happens in the context of private relations”.39 In her 
view, the development of positive obligations prevent the state avoiding its historic human 
rights obligations through restructuring. This is an underlying state-restrictive ambition, tied 
to historic state functions, rather than driven by a desire to protect rights equally across the 
public-private divide. By contrast, I consider below that positive obligations are broader than 
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this, reflecting aspects of a genuine individual approach, albeit alongside and interacting with 
state-restrictive tendencies. 
The ECtHR played a decisive role in the development of positive obligations, elaborating 
Article 8 ECHR, the text of which was drafted to leave open interpretations other than state-
restrictive ones. Several commentators note the role of the European Commission on 
Human Rights and ECtHR, referring to an “assertive jurisprudence”,40 “dynamic 
interpretation”,41 and “substantial creativity” on their part.42 The earliest case law gives little 
indication of the motivation for this legal development. The characterisation of the ECHR as 
a “living instrument” to be interpreted “in the light of present-day conditions” in Tyrer v United 
Kingdom43 provided important context for the creativity of the ECtHR. Positive obligations 
inherent in Article 8 ECHR were first recognised as possible in Marckx v Belgium in 1979.44 
In X and Y v Netherlands the ECtHR, for the first time, ruled that Article 8 ECHR obligations 
could include “the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in 
the sphere of relations of individuals between themselves.”45 This was justified by mere 
reference to Airey v Ireland.46 However, the relevant passage cited from Airey v Ireland only 
makes passing reference to Marckx v Belgium.47 There is therefore very little explanation for 
the general recognition of positive obligations to adopt measures regulating relations 
between private individuals from the more limited comments in the earlier cases. 
Additionally, none of these early cases on positive obligations and Article 8 ECHR involved 
information privacy,48 although they provided a foundation for the later developments of 
positive obligations in the context of information privacy. Due to this sparse reasoning, it is 
very difficult to identify the cause of this initial shift or the extent to which a single coherent 
approach underpins it. However, if the ECtHR felt compelled by the text or structure of 
Article 8 ECHR to recognise positive obligations, we might expect some comment on the 
reason for that. The silence suggests that the courts supported the development of positive 
obligations and did not feel required to act by the text. 
The jurisprudence of the European Commission of Human Rights initially did little to develop 
positive obligations to regulate private actors. The first time that the European Commission 
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of Human Rights grappled with positive obligations to regulate private actors, in the context 
of privacy, was in 1986 in Winer v United Kingdom.49 The applicant complained that English 
law lacked a remedy for gross privacy violations by private actors. However, the European 
Commission of Human Rights decided that there was no failure to respect the applicant’s 
rights as they were “not wholly unprotected”. This was because a partially successful 
defamation action was available: the “absence of an actionable right to privacy under English 
law [did not show] a lack of respect for the applicant’s private life and his home”. Rather, how 
the State fulfilled its positive obligation was “largely within its discretion”. This decision 
demonstrates the weakness of the positive obligation to secure private life against private 
actors in the mid-1980s.50 It is inconsistent with a claim that the ECtHR was pursuing any 
significant individual approach to positive obligations at that time. It demonstrates that an 
individual approach was contemplated, albeit that the wide margin of appreciation accorded 
removed much of its force. This was not so of negative obligations, which were enforced 
against public authorities robustly.51  
When next considered in the late 1990s, the jurisprudence on positive obligations suggests 
that an underlying individual model had become more important. However, there was no 
wholesale rejection of a public-private divide in favour of an individual approach to human 
rights by the wider court. Rival approaches therefore coexisted in tension. Some voices in 
the ECtHR went so far as to advocate the wholesale rejection of the public-private divide in 
favour of a full individual approach but were unsuccessful in leading a wholesale change of 
approach. This can be most clearly illustrated by the approach taken by Judge Wilberhaber 
in Stjerna v Finland, which was never adopted by the wider ECtHR. In Stjerna v Finland, 
Judge Wilberhaber doubted the coherence of the jurisprudence on positive and negative 
obligations. He preferred to “construe the notion of ‘interference’ so as to cover facts capable 
of breaching an obligation incumbent on the State under Article 8(1), whether negative or 
positive”.52 Judge Wilberhaber argued that this approach would “have the advantage of 
making it clear that in substance there is no negative/positive dichotomy as regards the 
State’s obligations to ensure respect for private and family life, but a rather striking similarity 
between applicable principles.”53 However, as Mowbray has noted, Judge Wilberhaber’s 
approach in Stjerna has never been adopted by the ECtHR, including at least one 
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unanimous Grand Chamber decision over which Judge Wilberhaber later presided.54 It does, 
however, demonstrate the existence of voices in the ECtHR which would dissolve the 
distinction in favour of a unified approach as early as 1997. The effect of doing this would be 
to introduce a pure individual model in which any interference, formerly negative or positive, 
would be subject to the requirements of Article 8(2) ECHR. The failure to adopt such 
reasoning indicates that the ECtHR continued to favour a state-restrictive approach to Article 
8 ECHR, and therefore a public-private divide, albeit that there was a willingness to increase 
the protection for individuals against private actors, which reflects the influence of concerns 
typical of an individual approach.  
Although the ECtHR did not adopt this individual approach to the regulation of private 
information, the influence and rise of an individual model is nevertheless apparent in the 
development of positive obligations. In Earl Spencer v United Kingdom, the applicants 
complained that highly sensitive personal information had been reported by news media, 
using long-range photography, without their consent.55 The application was ultimately held to 
be inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, as a remedy for breach of 
confidence was available and the applicants had neither demonstrated it insufficient nor 
ineffective. However, the European Commission of Human Rights refused to “exclude that 
the absence of an actionable remedy in relation to the publications of which the applicants 
complain could show a lack of respect for their private lives.”56 The regulation of media 
intrusion is quite different from a concern to ensure that the State cannot avoid its obligations 
through privatisation and other attempts to restructure. It suggests that the motivation is one 
based on an individual approach. It is concerned to protect individual interests, irrespective 
of whether the threat to those interests comes from a public or private actor. It cannot be 
related to a state-restrictive response to privatisation as the media does not perform a 
historic state function. This is all the clearer in the later development of the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence involving the media and private employers. 
In Von Hannover v Germany, the ECtHR held for the first time that positive obligations in 
Article 8 ECHR required the State to protect individual information contained in 
photographs.57 This was the first breach of Article 8 ECHR based on positive obligations in 
relation to individual information. The ECtHR rejected, as offering insufficient protection, the 
national courts’ failure to grant injunctions against certain magazines on the basis that the 
applicant was a “figure of contemporary society” who must tolerate photography of her daily 
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life in public places.58 The ECtHR held that the positive obligation to “adopt measures 
designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of relations of individuals 
between themselves” also “applies to the protection of a person’s picture against abuse by 
others”.59 The ECtHR stated that the applicable principles to both positive and negative 
obligations were “similar” and included a “fair balance” between competing interests, in 
which the “State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation.”60 Although the jurisprudence 
contains a similarity of applicable principle between public and private actors, reflecting an 
individual approach, it accorded flexibility to States via the margin of appreciation. Similar 
flexibility was not accorded to the regulation of public authorities under the negative 
obligation on the State.61 To that extent, a state-restrictive public-private divide endured and 
the same level of protection was not required by the ECtHR of States to fulfil their positive 
obligations.  
The requirement proved to be relatively flexible in light of the margin of appreciation 
accorded to States and the low intensity of review by the ECtHR when a national court seeks 
to apply its principles. In particular, the jurisprudence has not required the State to subject 
private actors to the same level of detailed legislative regulation as the negative obligation 
on public authorities required.62 It must be contrasted with the parallel tendency of the ECHR 
jurisprudence to intensify the requirements on public authorities to be “in accordance with 
the law”, which results in a focus on clear and precise legislation to justify interference. 
Similar clarity and precision is not imposed on private actors. Certainly, a particular State 
may implement its positive obligations in a manner that removes the public-private divide, 
and this would be compliant with the ECHR, but this has not been required at European 
level. The margin of appreciation therefore creates a form of public-private divide. Other 
cases illustrate the toleration of flexibility in the regulation of private actors. Such flexibility 
results in a public-private divide as a result of the ongoing influence of the state-restrictive 
approach. 
For example, in Armoniene v Lithuania, the margin of appreciation permitted “certain 
financial standards based on the economic situation of the State” to be taken into account 
when fulfilling the positive obligation to regulate private actors.63 Such allowances are not 
accorded to the negative obligation on the State.64 In principle, a cap on compensation for 
                                               
58 Ibid., paras. 75 to 79. 
59 Ibid., para. 57. 
60 Ibid., para. 58. 
61 See below, pp. 73 to 77. 
62 Ibid.  
63 (2009) 48 EHRR 53, para. 46. 
64 See below, pp. 73 to 77. 
 63 
breach of privacy was not “incompatible” with the obligation, provided it was not “such as to 
deprive the individual of his or her privacy and thereby empty the right of its effective 
content”. The ECtHR went on to hold that the resulting level of protection was, in fact, 
inadequate.65 Therefore, the jurisprudence permitted greater flexibility in regulating private 
actors than it permitted in regulating public authorities. This flexibility appears to 
countenance lower penalties in order to avoid overburdening market actors and therefore 
might reflect elements of a market approach. 
At least in relation to the media cases discussed above, positive obligations only impose a 
low intensity review of the application of a civil action resolved in conformity with the criteria 
laid down by the ECtHR for a balancing exercise. Negative obligations jurisprudence does 
not share this low intensity review approach.66 An individual approach, whereby interference 
is subject to the same level of protection irrespective of the source of the interference, is not 
fully realised in the jurisprudence. In Von Hannover v Germany (No. 2), the ECtHR reiterated 
its jurisprudence on photography but developed the concept of the margin of appreciation.67 
The ECtHR emphasised that it would perform a “supervisory function”, over both legislation 
and national judicial decisions, to review their compatibility “in light of the case as a whole” 
and without taking “the place of the national courts”.68 Provided that the decision was “in 
conformity with the criteria laid down in the [ECtHR’s] case law”,69 only “strong reasons” 
could justify a “substitution” of the ECtHR’s view for that of the national court.70  
It might be objected that this case law on positive obligations is a misleading comparator.  
The cases above concern intrusion by the media. The context requires a balance to be 
struck between the privacy of the individual and the freedom of expression of others. Of 
course, in one respect this highlights an enduring element of the state-restrictive approach. 
Public authorities do not have their own ECHR rights, including freedom of expression, and 
therefore are more restricted in what they can do than private actors. However, it is possible 
to go beyond media cases to demonstrate that positive obligations on the State only require 
the State to adopt a more flexible standard of regulation of private actors than is required of 
public authorities. 
The more flexible approach to private actors can be seen in the recent case of Barbulescu v 
Romania, especially when contrasted with the dissenting opinion of Judge Pinto De 
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Albuquerque in the first instance decision.71 The applicant alleged that the domestic courts 
had failed to protect his Article 8 ECHR rights, which had been breached by a private 
employer’s decision to terminate his employment based on monitoring a work email account. 
The applicant had been dismissed for breaking workplace rules which prevented work email 
accounts being used for personal purposes. There was no Article 10 ECHR right of the 
employer involved. In the first instance decision, the ECtHR treated the case as one 
concerning positive obligations, since the employer was a private company.72 The ECtHR 
held that the “employer’s monitoring was limited in scope and proportionate”, because only 
the email account and no other stored documents or data were searched, and the public 
authorities had not “failed to strike a fair balance, within their margin of appreciation”.73 It was 
significant that “the employer acted within its disciplinary powers” to access the email 
account “in the belief that it had contained professional messages”.74 The content of the 
emails were not “decisive” in the domestic court.75 The ECtHR held that “it is not 
unreasonable for an employer to want to verify that the employees are completing their 
professional tasks during working hours.”76 
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, in Barbulescu v Romania,77 clarified the nature and 
scope of the State’s positive obligations under Article 8 ECHR in the context of 
employment.78 The Grand Chamber held that in certain circumstances those obligations 
required the State to set up a “legislative framework taking into account the various interests 
to be protected in a particular context”.79 The ECtHR took the view that the State had to be 
granted a “wide margin of appreciation in assessing the need to establish a legal framework 
governing the conditions in which an employer may regulate electronic or other 
communications of a non-professional nature by its employees in the workplace”80 because 
no European consensus existed on the issue.81 This was not unlimited, however, and the 
State required “adequate and sufficient safeguards against abuse” by employers,82 including 
proportionality and procedural guarantees against arbitrariness.83 In this it acknowledged the 
legitimate interests of the employer. The ECtHR set out a number of factors that were 
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relevant for national authorities to consider, including employer notification regarding 
monitoring, the extent of monitoring and degree of intrusion, whether the employer “has 
provided legitimate reasons to justify monitoring”, whether less intrusive methods were 
available, the consequences of monitoring and the use made by the employer of its fruits – 
“in particular whether the results were used to achieve the declared aim of the measure”, 
and whether there were appropriate safeguards.84 The Grand Chamber acknowledged that 
the employer had “a legitimate interest in ensuring that its employees are performing their 
professional duties adequately and with the necessary diligence”,85 although the national 
court had not afforded adequate protection and failed to strike a fair balance between the 
interests in stake in the particular case.86  
The positive obligation undoubtedly erodes the public-private divide. As with the negative 
obligation on States, the ECHR requires a legislative framework with adequate and sufficient 
safeguards against abuse. It reflects the rise of an individual approach but it falls short of 
removing the state-restrictive public-private divide. The clearest public authority comparator 
is Copland v United Kingdom.87 Both cases concerned employer monitoring of computer 
use. The interference in Copland was held to be unlawful because the public authority sixth-
form college sought to rely on an implied power to monitor internet use, which was 
considered too vague to be “in accordance with the law”.88 Had the college been a private 
body, then presumably the same outcome as Barbulescu would have resulted. Each had a 
legitimate interest in monitoring. Indeed, reliance on an implied power implies that the 
monitoring was necessary or expedient for the performance of the public authorities 
functions. The majority approach to positive obligations in Barbulescu does not impose 
detailed requirements for legality on private actors, unlike those imposed on public 
authorities by the development of the negative obligation. A state-restrictive divide remains 
despite its softening under the influence of an individual approach. 
Dissenting voices in Barbulescu demonstrate that a full individual approach was advocated 
by at least one justice: a degree of conflict is therefore apparent between the individual 
approach favoured by Judge Pinto De Albequerque and the state-restrictive elements 
retained by the majority. There is a complex interaction between the underlying state-
restrictive approach and its softening by the parallel influence of an individual approach, 
which was not fully realised. The dissenting opinion of Judge Pinto De Albequerque in 
Barbulescu argued that “any interference by the employer with the employee’s right to 
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respect for private life and freedom of expression… must be justified in a democratic society 
by the protection of certain specific interests covered by the Convention” making reference 
to the right of others in both Article 8(2) and 10(2).89 The opinion argued that a 
“comprehensive Internet use policy” was required in the workplace with “specific rules on the 
use of email, instant messaging, social networks, blogging and web surfing” and “transparent 
rules on how the Internet may be used, how monitoring is conducted, how data is secured, 
used and destroyed, and who has access to it”.90 Blanket bans and blanket monitoring were 
therefore impermissible in his view.91 The opinion went into substantial detail as to the 
content and operation of such policies.92 Judge Pinto De Albuquerque argued that such an 
approach was required to prevent “employers acting as a distrustful Big Brother”,93 
concluding that a “human-rights centred approach… warrants a transparent internal 
regulatory framework, a consistent implementation policy and a proportionate enforcement 
strategy by employers”.94 For Judge Pinto De Albuquerque, ECHR rights had “horizontal 
effect”, “directly binding” on public authorities and “indirectly binding” on private actors, for 
whose violations the State was responsible to prevent or remedy as “an obligation of results, 
not merely an obligation of means”.95 This is an illustration of the higher standards that a 
purer individual approach to private actors would require. It illustrates both that such voices 
exist in the ECHR and that the majority have not adopted a fully individual approach to the 
public-private divide. Struggle, influence, and compromise are instead apparent between 
individual and state-restrictive approaches. Although the Grand Chamber required more 
detail in the assessment of positive obligations, it nevertheless did not go so far as Judge 
Pinto De Albequerque in his earlier dissenting opinion. The ECtHR’s lighter approach to 
private employers, and the rejection of Judge Pinto De Albuquerque’s proposed collapse of 
the public-private divide, reflect both ongoing conceptual disagreement within the ECtHR as 
to the preferred approach. The more limited adoption of an individual approach to Article 8 
ECHR than advocates of a widespread shift might have expected to see is also apparent.  
THE VITALITY OF THE STATE-RESTRICTIVE APPROACH IN ECHR JURISPRUDENCE 
ECHR jurisprudence on positive obligations has not fully removed Article 8 ECHR’s state-
restrictive public-private divide, although the influence of the individual approach eroded that 
divide. Both public authorities and private actors must, to some extent, be regulated by law 
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to protect Article 8 ECHR rights. However, it is mistaken to characterise this as a gradual 
evolution of thought from a state-restrictive to an individual approach. There are several 
reasons to think that the state-restrictive approach is still favoured by many members of the 
ECtHR, even if limited concessions have been made to regulate private actors. Rather than 
a gradual evolution of thought or a paradigm shift, this points to the coexistence of the rise of 
an individual approach with a resurgent state-restrictive approach, sometimes in tension with 
one another. Although the individual approach has expanded Article 8 ECHR protections, 
the state-restrictive approach remains vibrant. This can be seen in the ECtHR’s judicial 
rhetoric, its approach to state surveillance, its development of the doctrine of imputation, and 
its elaboration of the negative obligation on public authorities. Rather than waning in the 
wake of an advancing individual model, it points to the continuing vitality of the state-
restrictive approach in ECHR jurisprudence. 
JUDICIAL RHETORIC AND ARTICLE 8 ECHR 
First, despite the development of positive obligations, the ECtHR maintains a public-private 
divide in its rhetoric. On many occasions, the ECtHR has noted that the “essential object and 
purpose” of Article 8 ECHR is “to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the 
public authorities”,96 even if it has also more recently emphasised that the applicable 
principles are “similar” in relation to private actors.97 The ECtHR therefore continues to 
emphasise a state-restrictive core to Article 8 ECHR. It is ambiguous about the extent of 
similarity between the regulation of public and private actors. This suggests that a state-
restrictive approach is still considered relevant by members of the ECtHR. There is no clear 
evidence of agreement about the degree of similarity. This might point to the existence of 
disagreement. It at least demonstrates that a narrative of linear progress towards the 
individual approach does not capture the complexity of ECHR jurisprudence and the public-
private divide. If a strong consensus existed within the ECtHR around an individual model, 
then one might expect the essential object and purpose to be expressed in broader terms. 
Perhaps it would be expressed as the protection of the substantive right under Article 8(1) 
ECHR or as an “obligation of results”.98 The emphasis of the original state-restrictive 
ambition and the negative obligation on public authorities instead points to the continuing 
importance of the state-restrictive approach. That the positive obligation to regulate private 
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actors is secondary in the ECtHR’s rhetoric might demonstrate that rather that the individual 
approach is itself secondary in the thought of the ECtHR. 
STATE SURVEILLANCE AND ARTICLE 8 ECHR 
The ECtHR has developed a distinctive response to one aspect of State surveillance. State 
surveillance is an interference with Article 8(1) ECHR.99 Secret or covert surveillance can in 
principle be conducted by public authorities or private actors. A state-restrictive approach is 
apparent in this area in relation to legislation. The State is subject to greater control 
regarding surveillance because the ECtHR has recognised a distinctive form of legislative 
interference with Article 8 ECHR. The ECtHR is willing to carry out abstract legislative review 
of State surveillance powers. Private actors’ proposed or potential surveillance is not subject 
to such scrutiny: only concrete acts of private surveillance are regulated by frameworks 
established pursuant to the positive obligations of the State. 
First, the ECtHR has held that a “menace of surveillance” by the State can itself amount to 
an interference with Article 8 ECHR. In Klass v Germany, the ECtHR noted that secret 
surveillance powers over citizens were characteristic of “the police state”.100 It held that in 
“the mere existence of the legislation itself, there is involved, for all those to whom the 
legislation could be applied, a menace of surveillance”, which constituted an interference.101 
Such menaces can only be created by the state, even if the state could thereby empower 
private actors. The jurisprudence therefore recognises an interference that is unique to 
public authorities and reflects a state-restrictive approach, by subjecting it to control.  
However, there is an alternative argument that this in fact reflects a state-facilitative strand of 
thinking. The ECtHR has established that the review of legislation “in abstracto” is possible. 
This is “in recognition of the particular features of secret surveillance measures and the 
importance of ensuring effective control and supervision of them”.102 It is contrary to the 
ECtHR’s normal practice of only reviewing concrete interferences.103 The possibility of 
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review in abstracto means legislation can be reviewed and courts do not need to inquire into 
the concrete practices of the state. It therefore facilitates neither confirm nor deny policies. 
On the other hand, although the precise requirements have been refined and harmonised 
more recently,104 the ECtHR has clarified that the “principal reason” for abstract legislative 
review of surveillance measures is to prevent their secrecy rendering State surveillance 
“unchallengeable” in national courts and the ECtHR.105 The need for abstract review of 
potential State surveillance therefore arises from the privileged position of the state and the 
legal protection of secrecy that surrounds it. The jurisprudence therefore recognises the 
distinctiveness of the State and applies heightened legal scrutiny to legislation: a state-
restrictive response. The recognition of legislative interferences and the ECtHR’s willingness 
to engage in abstract review of legislation points to the endurance of a state-restrictive 
approach within the jurisprudence. 
THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION  AND ARTICLE 8 ECHR 
The ECtHR has consistently upheld a State-restrictive logic in its doctrine of imputation. 
Imputation addresses the circumstances in which acts or omissions will be attributed to a 
public authority for the purpose of Article 8(2) ECHR. If the history of Article 8 ECHR was 
one of the gradual evolution of thought from a state-restrictive to an individual approach, one 
might expect imputation to be more generously interpreted to protect individual rights 
irrespective of the source of interference. The history of the doctrine of imputation does not 
show this to be the case. Instead, the case law suggests that the state-restrictive approach 
is still influential in the ECtHR. 
In 1984 in A v United Kingdom,106 the European Commission of Human Rights resisted the 
argument that an interference by a private actor was an interference that fell within the scope 
of Article 8(2) ECHR. The complaint related to a barrister’s clerk who had revealed a private 
address. The ECtHR held it was inadmissible rationale personae because the clerk was a 
private actor and not a public authority.107 However, Bar Council disciplinary proceedings 
were admissible, as those proceedings were ultimately an exercise of judicial power through 
the oversight of barristers as officers of the court.108 The European Commission of Human 
Rights in 1984 clearly upheld a public-private divide. The state-restrictive approach, as with 
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positive obligations at that time, was clearly dominant. The Commission would not impute 
the act of a private individual to the State. 
The ECtHR later imputed some acts by private actors to the State, extending the doctrine of 
imputation. However, this legal development was not driven by an underlying individual 
approach. The later cases instead reinforce a state-restrictive logic. They act to prevent 
public authorities circumventing their negative obligations by relying on private actors. One 
such situation is active involvement by a public authority in an interference by a private party. 
In Storck v Germany, the ECtHR held that the police interfered with Article 8 ECHR rights by 
returning the applicant to private clinics where her rights were then violated.109 In returning 
her by force and thereby rendering further treatment possible, the police “became actively 
involved in and therefore responsible for the applicant’s ensuing medical treatment.”110 
Another situation concerns a “crucial contribution” of a public authority to a scheme in which 
a private party interferes with Article 8 ECHR. In MM v Netherlands, a private individual 
recorded telephone calls to gather evidence of an alleged sexual assault, encouraged to do 
so and aided by the police.111 The ECtHR held that there had been an “interference by a 
public authority”.112 This was because the police had made a “crucial contribution to the 
execution of the scheme”.113 The police had been responsible for the inception of the 
scheme and both the police and prosecutor were acting in the performance of their official 
duties by encouraging and aiding the recording.114 Similarly, in Van Vondel v Netherlands, 
the ECtHR held that a private telephone recording “does not per se offend against [Article 8 
ECHR], but that by its very nature this is to be distinguished from the covert monitoring and 
recording of communications by a private person in the context of and for the benefit of an 
official inquiry – criminal or otherwise – and with the connivance and technical assistance of 
public investigation authorities.”115 The authorities had provided the necessary equipment 
and on at least one occasion gave specific instructions to obtain information. The ECtHR 
considered that this amounted to “a crucial contribution to executing the scheme” and was 
unpersuaded that the informant was in control.116 In both cases, the ECtHR reasoned that to 
treat the interference as one by a private actor would “be tantamount to allowing 
investigating authorities to evade their Convention responsibilities by the use of private 
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agents”.117 Both “active involvement” and “crucial contribution” imputation reflect a state-
restrictive approach. The doctrine is concerned with public authority involvement in 
interferences with Article 8 ECHR. The jurisprudence is intended to prevent public authorities 
circumventing Article 8(2) ECHR by using private actors. They reflect a fundamentally state-
restrictive logic, albeit one that looks past the private actor to the public authority behind their 
actions.  
The underlying approach in Craxi v Italy also implicitly affirms a State-restrictive public-
private divide in the doctrine of imputation.118 The case was one in which the ECtHR could 
have taken a broader approach to imputation if it had been motivated by an individual 
approach. Evidence concerning telephone tapping was released to the media during a 
criminal trial. It could not be determined whether the release was due to an error by the court 
or was the act of a party to the trial. This was because the parties and their lawyers were 
entitled to copies of the evidence from the court’s registry and had in fact obtained copies.119 
The ECtHR held that Italy had failed to fulfil its positive obligation to ensure the safe custody 
of such transcripts and to make effective enquiry into their release.120 Had a release of the 
information by the parties to the trial been imputed to the State, then the whole case could 
be resolved as a matter of negative obligation. Implicit in not taking this course is that the 
release of the evidence by the parties or their lawyers would not have been an interference 
by a public authority, crucially even if a public authority had provided them with the 
information. Instead, the ECtHR only considered positive obligations in the face of factual 
uncertainty as to who was responsible for the disclosure. This suggests that a narrow 
approach informed the question of imputation. That in turn shows the influence of a state-
restrictive approach to the question of imputation. Had an individual approach had more 
influence we might expect a more expansive interpretation instead. Indeed, the positive 
obligation in question is very much one focussed on the security and investigative duties of 
the public authority itself, which reinforces the conclusion that the ECtHR’s approach was 
state-restrictive.  
One explanation for the ECtHR’s narrow and state-restrictive approach to imputation might 
be that the ECtHR felt bound to reflect general international law on this point. It is necessary 
to address this because if the ECtHR was merely adopting the general approach in 
international law to imputation then this case law is of more limited value in evaluating the 
influences of state-restrictive or individual approaches to the public-private divide in 
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individual information law. The ECHR notion of crucial contribution to the execution of the 
scheme, involving control, equipment, aid, encouragement or instructions, does indeed 
closely mirror the general approach to attribution to the State for the purposes of State 
responsibility in international law. The International Law Commission Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts (DASRIWA) express the position in 
international law as it was at the time of the decisions in question. Attribution in international 
law included acts by persons who were in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the 
direction or control of, the State.121 Although attribution was acknowledged to be complex 
and fact sensitive, it contained similar tests to imputation in ECHR jurisprudence: 
Such conduct [by a private individual] will be attributable to the State only if 
[the State] directed or controlled the specific operation and the conduct 
complained of was an integral part of that operation.122 
The difficulty with this explanation of the doctrine of imputation is that the ECtHR did not 
expressly consider itself bound to reflect general international law on this point. In so far as 
reasons have been expressed by the ECtHR, those reasons reflect a desire to prevent 
public authorities circumventing their Article 8(2) ECHR duties. The desire was to make 
Article 8 ECHR effective against public authorities, rather than to mirror international law. 
One might also expect to see a clearer adoption of the language of instruction, direction and 
control from international law than is found in the cases if international law were so 
influential. I therefore conclude that the jurisprudence reflects a predominantly state-
restrictive approach to the public-private divide, rather than a mere mirroring of international 
law by the ECtHR.  
One case hints at a higher level of disagreement over the appropriate approach to the 
public-private divide in imputation than in other cases. In Masden v Denmark (Admissibility), 
the ECtHR assumed that the case concerned an interference by a public authority and 
therefore the negative obligation under Article 8(2) ECHR.123 However, the factual situation 
was more complex. In Danish industrial relations, rights normally granted by statutes in other 
countries were subject to collective agreements between labour market partners, with 
disputes determined by Courts of Arbitration. The complainant objected to random drug tests 
by his private employers under that scheme, after his civil challenge before the Courts of 
Arbitration had failed. It is not at all obvious that the absence of a remedy before the Courts 
of Arbitration for a drugs testing scheme agreed through a process of collective bargaining 
between private actors, then administered by a private employer, is an interference by a 
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public authority. This might be thought to point to an individual approach underlying the 
case. An apparently private arrangement was subjected to Article 8(2) ECHR. The ECtHR, 
however, gives no explanation for its assumption. One simple explanation might be that the 
ECtHR made the assumption because the case could be resolved satisfactorily without 
recourse to argument and judgment on the proper characterisation of the interference. 
Indeed, the claim failed on other grounds.124 However, if the ECtHR were motivated to 
expand the doctrine of imputation in line with a consensus around an individual model, this 
would be a surprising opportunity to miss. A related explanation might therefore be that there 
was sufficient disagreement over the proper approach to imputation within the ECtHR, but 
agreement as to the resolution of the case on other grounds, that the point was not 
developed in the judgment. The silence might therefore point towards a greater degree of 
internal disagreement and struggle over the appropriate approach, which was avoided rather 
than resolved. 
The ECtHR’s jurisprudence on imputation is therefore indicative of a largely State-restrictive 
approach adopted and sustained by the ECtHR, with some possible conceptual 
disagreement underlying the decision in Masden v Denmark. 
ELABORATING THE NEGATIVE OBLIGATION ON PUBLIC AUTHORITIES 
Although the development of positive obligations is evidence of the rising influence of an 
individual approach within the ECtHR, this must be viewed in light of a parallel trend to 
elaborate and intensify the requirements of the negative obligation on public authorities in 
Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence. The state-restrictive approach has not only remained present 
throughout the development of Article 8 ECHR, it has resurged. This is especially apparent 
in the jurisprudence on the meaning of “in accordance with the law”. It is also found in the 
substantive safeguards required by the ECtHR to ensure that interferences are “necessary in 
a democratic society”. The state-restrictive approach is still favoured in these cases, 
although interestingly some elements of a state-facilitative approach have also been 
adopted.  
Whereas the quality of the regulation of private actors by the State pursuant to the positive 
obligations under Article 8 ECHR is noticeably flexible, entailing a relatively low level of 
review, both in relation to the media and private employers, the ECtHR has elaborated more 
stringent standards for the law regulating public authorities, if interferences are to be “in 
accordance with the law”. This trend in legal development suggests that a state-restrictive 
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model remains influential and exists in parallel with elements of an individual approach 
underlying the development of positive obligations.  
The requirement for interferences by public authorities to be “in accordance with the law” has 
not merely developed as a result of the textual requirement of Article 8(2) ECHR. The 
ECtHR played an important role in these developments. It points to the ongoing influence of 
the state-restrictive approach: not merely its survival in the text of Article 8 ECHR. The 
ECtHR has gone beyond applying a simple definition of “in accordance with the law”, that is, 
bare legality according to national law, in favour of a more demanding conception of the 
negative obligation that also considers the “quality of the law”.125 In Silver v United Kingdom, 
the European Commission of Human Rights, drawing on principles developed in Sunday 
Times v United Kingdom,126 held that the principles applicable to conduct “prescribed by 
law/prévues par la loi” in Article 10 ECHR were applicable to “in accordance with the 
law/prévue par la loi” in Article 8 ECHR.127 Those principles required “some basis in 
domestic law”, which must be “adequately accessible” and “formulated with sufficient 
precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct”.128 The law had to indicate the scope 
of any discretion, although the Commission “recognised the impossibility of attaining 
absolute certainty in the framing of laws and the risk that the search for certainty may entail 
excessive rigidity”.129 Additionally, the Commission required “some form of safeguards” to 
subject interference to “effective control”, although it resisted the idea that the “safeguard 
must be enshrined in the very text which authorised the imposition of restrictions”.130 In 
Huvig v France, the ECtHR did accept that “law” should be understood “in a substantive not 
formal sense” to include both “enactments of lower rank than statutes and unwritten law… as 
interpreted by the court”.131 However, it was “essential to have clear, detailed rules” so that 
“extrapolation from general legislative provisions or by analogy from rules governing other 
investigative measures” lacked clarity.132 Although earlier cases required applicants to 
provide evidence that the relevant interference was not in accordance with law,133 later case 
law changed this position to hold that the respondent State must identify the legal basis for 
an interference.134 This itself could indicate an increased state-restrictive tendency. 
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The ECtHR held that an interference was not in accordance with the law because the law 
made the interference insufficiently foreseeable in Malone v United Kingdom.135 The UK’s 
reliance on common law powers, admittedly in the context of covert surveillance, was 
“obscure and open to differing interpretations” which failed to “indicate with reasonable 
clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the relevant discretion” and lacked sufficient 
guarantees against abuse so that it was not in accordance with the law.136 There was some 
blurring of in accordance with the law and proportionality. General powers to do “anything 
necessary or expedient”, the formula of implied statutory powers in the United Kingdom, 
were also held to be too vague to be in accordance with the law in the context of collecting, 
storing and monitoring employee internet use.137 The ECtHR has also held that “a broad 
interpretation of an exception to the general rule militating against the disclosure of personal 
data might not offer sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness” and so 
violates Article 8 ECHR.138 The ECtHR has also held that the law, or a court order conferring 
discretion,139 must specify the “scope or conditions of the exercise of discretionary power”140 
For example, an unduly wide discretion to stop and search was held to be insufficiently 
circumscribed and to have inadequate safeguards in Gillan and Quinton v United 
Kingdom.141 The ECtHR has held that it is “essential to have clear, detailed rules on the 
application of secret measures of surveillance, especially as the technology available for its 
use is continually becoming more sophisticated.”142 This is not merely the case in relation to 
surveillance. In relation to the creation and storage of data the ECHR has held that there 
must be a clear legal basis, not merely be drafted in general terms, which indicates the 
scope and conditions of the exercise of power to collect, record and store information.143 
Finally, the interpretation of necessity in a democratic society has also resulted in some 
more exacting substantive safeguards in relation to covert surveillance,144 search 
warrants,145 and the interception of communications,146 including judicial oversight and 
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standing, not merely limited to a civil remedy but including a review capable of annulling an 
impugned order.147  
These judgments point to a more exacting standard than bare legality. The ECtHR has 
required the national law to achieve standards of precision, detail, foreseeability and 
accessibility with substantive safeguards and effective controls. These requirements of 
national legislation are far more exacting than those expressed in relation to positive 
obligations and suggest the ongoing importance of the influence of a state-restrictive model 
in the ECtHR.  
On occasion, however, the ECtHR has shown greater flexibility in relation to public 
authorities, suggesting that a state-facilitative approach is sometimes adopted, especially in 
relation to national security. State-facilitative approaches have occasionally shaped the law, 
demonstrating a lack of one consistent approach within the ECtHR. For example, in Malone 
v United Kingdom, in an apparent concession to the practicalities of State surveillance, the 
ECtHR also noted that “foreseeability cannot mean that an individual should be enabled to 
foresee when the authorities are likely to intercept his communications so that he can adapt 
his conduct accordingly” but rather that the scope of discretion must be indicated.148 In 
Leander v Sweden, the ECtHR held foreseeability requirements differ in the control of 
national security vetting so that “account may be taken also of instructions or administrative 
practices” to provide sufficient clarity about the scope of discretion.149 The ECtHR noted that 
“absolute certainty” was both an impossibility and would lead to “excessive rigidity” in some 
contexts.150 Foreseeability was therefore judged in light of appropriate advice,151 provided 
the legal basis was sufficiently clear and detailed.152 State-facilitative considerations have 
therefore very occasionally been influential alongside the state-restrictive and individual 
approaches. There is no indication, however, that these isolated examples are part of a 
greater trend but show the complex interaction of approaches in this field. 
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THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE IN ARTICLE 8 ECHR: COMPLEX INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT 
APPROACHES 
State-restrictive and individual approaches to the public-private divide have been present in 
the thought of Article 8 ECHR from the beginning. There has not been a gradual evolution of 
thought over time. Rather, the history of Article 8 ECHR reveals the coexistence and 
influence of different approaches that go to the heart of the public-private divide in individual 
information law. Although there has been significant erosion of the public-private divide 
under the influence of the rising individual model, the state-restrictive approach has 
remained vibrant and influential in the thinking of the ECtHR, and indeed resurged in more 
recent case law. The state-facilitative approach has also occasionally played a small role.  
Accounts of the development of positive obligations that see the rejection of a state-
restrictive approach in favour of an individual approach neglect the state-restrictive 
elaboration of the negative obligation on public authorities that paralleled those 
developments. They also neglect the continuing state-restrictive approach to judicial rhetoric, 
state surveillance and the doctrine of imputation. Although an individual approach was 
important for the development of positive obligations to regulate private actors, these 
obligations have never been as demanding as those imposed on public authorities and 
never vindicated a pure individual approach, which found some advocates on the court. The 
public-private divide in Article 8 ECHR does not reflect a gradual shift in paradigm. Nor does 
it reflect a simple struggle of different approaches. Instead it reflects a vibrant and deep 
coexistence and interaction of different approaches to the public-private divide. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE AND UK HUMAN RIGHTS 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines how the right to private life in Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) has shaped the public-private divide in national human rights law. 
It demonstrates the key role of national actors, especially legislative and judicial, in 
responding to ECHR jurisprudence and fashioning national legislation and the common law. 
European human rights law has acted as a catalyst and influence on the development of 
national law. National human rights law has not straightforwardly mirrored the public-private 
divide in Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence, but has engaged with it, characterised at times by 
divergence and parallel development in which state-restrictive, state-facilitative and 
individual approaches have all played a role. There was neither a simple shift from a state-
restrictive towards an individual approach to the public-private divide, nor development that 
can be exclusively characterised in terms of struggle, but rather a set of complex 
interactions. 
Prior to 1998, the right to private life in relation to individual information was in fact protected, 
to some extent, by the law of confidentiality, though it was not conceived in such terms. 
Where the United Kingdom was held to be in violation of Article 8 ECHR, reforms were 
sometimes implemented through ad hoc legislation.1 The effect of Article 8 ECHR 
jurisprudence was therefore relatively limited. The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) marked a 
significant expansion in the protection afforded to many ECHR rights, and especially Article 
8 ECHR. In 1998, the UK Government and Parliament played an important role in the 
resurgence and strengthening of a state-restrictive approach to the public-private divide. 
Although influenced or catalysed by European law, these developments were driven by 
national institutions. The HRA was mainly concerned to control public authorities and render 
legislation human rights compliant, within the limitations of parliamentary sovereignty. The 
judiciary in the UK also reflected state-restrictive attitudes to the scope of section 6 HRA, 
which made it unlawful for “public authorities” to violate the Convention rights protected by 
the Act. However, in the review of legislation the judiciary demonstrated both state-restrictive 
and state-facilitative tendencies, in some respects diverging from ECHR jurisprudence. In 
parallel, the rise of a more individual approach, in fashioning tort of misuse of private 
information, was driven first by the courts, reflecting Article 8 ECHR values but also the 
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trajectory of national jurisprudence on breach of confidence, although the obligation on the 
national courts2 to develop a damages action was later clarified by the ECtHR. ECtHR 
jurisprudence therefore reinforced the need for the development of such a tort. European 
jurisprudence was an influence and catalyst but the UK judiciary have not merely mirrored 
ECHR jurisprudence.3  
The implementation of Article 8 ECHR in the United Kingdom by Government and 
Parliament brought about by the drafting of the HRA resulted in a broad shift in UK individual 
information law towards a state-restrictive approach to the public-private divide. Public 
authorities, in all they do, and those exercising public functions, when exercising those 
functions, were obliged to act compatibly with Article 8 ECHR.4 Although that approach was 
broader that required under the ECHR, it reflected a state-restrictive ambition to constrain 
governmental power, albeit flexible as to the precise status of the body that held such 
governmental power. The national courts interpreted section 6 HRA in line with state-
restrictive approaches, although admittedly not in the context of information privacy. Internal 
disagreements reflected tensions between rival conceptions of the public functions that 
required a state-restrictive approach. The national courts’ jurisprudence on sections 3 and 4 
HRA have required legislative regimes which interfere with Article 8 ECHR to adapt to ECHR 
concepts of “in accordance with law” and “proportionality”.5 The national jurisprudence has 
intensified the state-restrictive approach in the public-private divide regarding the right to 
respect for private life, prompted by repeated criticism from the ECtHR. However, aspects of 
the national implementation of the right to private life by the courts show a more state-
facilitative streak, diverging from the approach in European human rights law. The damages 
available against public authorities under section 8 HRA for violations6 have also been 
interpreted to take into account a state-facilitative understanding of the public interest, which 
has resulted in lower damages being awarded against public authorities for violations of 
Article 8 ECHR.7  
A major erosion of the public-private divide regarding the protection of private information by 
the national courts was caused by the recognition and incremental development of the tort of 
misuse of private information although public authorities continue to be subject to the more 
restrictive jurisprudence outlined above. The development of this tort reflects attitudes 
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characteristic of an individual approach.8 Not only did the tort protect the right to private life 
in the context of private individuals’ interference with Article 8 ECHR rights, but the national 
jurisprudence on vicarious liability in the context of the tort and public authority employees 
has gone some way to subject public authorities to more generous damages for violations of 
Article 8 ECHR by the wrongful disclosure of private information. In this way, an individual 
approach has mitigated the state-facilitative jurisprudence on section 8 HRA, at least in 
relation to the disclosure of private information.9 The rise of an individual approach therefore 
acted to neutralise the effect of other state-facilitative jurisprudence. 
State-restrictive, state-facilitative and individual approaches have all played a role in the 
shape of the public-private divide in national human rights law concerning individual 
information. Although influenced or catalysed by European law, these developments were 
driven by national institutions. The implementation of Article 8 ECHR at the national level did 
not simply replicate ECHR jurisprudence. The HRA itself was a rather late legislative 
intervention by the New Labour in 1998. The national courts had already started to develop 
remedies for misuse of private information before 1998 and arguably were not under a 
positive obligation to do so, as courts distinct from the state as a whole, until 2004, after 
major developments had already occurred.10 National judicial actors have resisted and 
diverged from ECHR jurisprudence as well as implemented it. 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 
The HRA was enacted by New Labour in 1998. It had a far-reaching effect on the 
implementation of Article 8 ECHR in the United Kingdom. Although the United Kingdom had 
sometimes responded legislatively to remedy particular violations of Article 8 ECHR 
following criticism from the ECtHR,11 the HRA represented a comprehensive scheme to give 
effect to the ECHR at the national level. This was an important political decision by New 
Labour. It was not a reform forced upon the United Kingdom by European pressure. The 
United Kingdom had been subject to the ECtHR since 1950 and a right of individual petition 
to the ECtHR had existed since 1966. Comprehensive national legislation had not been 
required in the intervening decades. The drafting and passage of the HRA was instead 
driven by New Labour as part of its programme of national constitutional reform. The HRA’s 
purpose was to “give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European 
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Convention on Human Rights”.12 It required the courts to “take into account any judgment, 
decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights”.13 It also 
imposed an interpretative obligation on the courts to read and give effect to primary and 
secondary legislation in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights to which it 
referred, “so far as it is possible to do so”,14 with a power to make declarations of 
incompatibility where it was not.15 The effect of the legislative scheme was to require the 
courts to weave Convention-compliant interpretations throughout statute law. As such 
legislation might empower or constrain both public or private actors, this reflected an 
individual approach to human rights, although admittedly information privacy was not its 
focus. In practical terms, its importance for Article 8 ECHR in the context of the right to 
privacy life was also the enable the review of legislation on state surveillance and police 
powers.16 Its practical focus was therefore more state-restrictive in the context of the right to 
private life. 
Section 6 HRA also importantly imposed a duty on all public authorities, including courts and 
tribunals,17 and to others in so far as they were carrying out a “public function”,18 to act 
compatibly with Convention rights. This statutory obligation had perhaps the most far-
reaching implications for the public-private divide as it imposed enforceable duties directly on 
public authorities to act compatibly with Convention rights, including Article 8 ECHR. This 
was subject to remedies and procedures in sections 7 and 8 HRA. As drafted, this key 
provision of the HRA reflected a state-restrictive approach. The HRA had clear remedies for 
breach of section 6 on its face, whereas a remedy against private actors had to be later 
developed by the courts.19  
However, this state-restrictive approach was not a mere mirror of ECHR jurisprudence. The 
HRA did not merely reflect the ECHR concept of a public authority.20 As Williams notes, in 
Strasbourg jurisprudence “there is no equivalent of the kind of ‘hybrid’ liability” resulting from 
the public function test, as Strasbourg focuses on the institution which is alleged to have 
violated a right.21 Although there are indications that the New Labour Government and 
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Parliament intended a wider definition than that used in ECHR jurisprudence, this does not 
reveal an individual approach to Convention rights. Instead, it reflects a state-restrictive 
ambition to prevent the circumvention of the Act through privatisation and contracting out. It 
is therefore state-restrictive, albeit that the “state” is cast in wider terms which captured 
some private actors. In 1997, the Government described its definition of “public authority” as 
being “in wide terms”, which included those “companies responsible for areas of activity 
which were previously within the public sector”.22 It therefore intended a wider direct 
application of human rights than the range of bodies that would be treated as public 
authorities under Strasbourg jurisprudence. Palmer argues that section 6 HRA was an 
attempt to “address… the reality of modern government and the increased delegation of 
public power to private entities”.23 This is certainly apparent from the comments by the Home 
Secretary Jack Straw MP in Parliament. He reflected on “the fact that many bodies, 
especially over the past 20 years, have performed public functions which are private, partly 
as a result of privatisation and partly as a result of contracting out”.24 The wording of section 
6(3)(b) was in part a response to such concerns. The choices made by New Labour in 
Government and Parliament therefore reflected a general state-restrictive approach, albeit 
one distinctive from European jurisprudence. 
THE DUTY ON PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND FUNCTIONS TO ACT COMPATIBLY WITH ARTICLE 8 ECHR 
It fell to the national courts to interpret the scope of section 6 HRA. As Williams noted, the 
scope of section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 is “one of the most controversial” 
aspects of the Act.25 Williams argued that Strasbourg jurisprudence could not in principle 
“provide the answer to the public-function question” because it did not apply a public function 
test itself.26 The debate over section 6 in the courts has shown a diversity of approach and 
illuminates ideological divides and concerns within the United Kingdom judiciary.27 Bamforth, 
writing in 1999, noted that the “courts may be faced with a choice between according priority 
to the Convention approach or to that favoured in domestic law”,28 at the heart of which were 
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normative issues concerning the nature of human rights and the role of the state.29 Although 
such jurisprudence was not developed exclusively in the context of cases considering 
individual information and Article 8 ECHR, it is nevertheless important to consider that 
jurisprudence here. That is because of the importance of the scope of section 6 as the key 
state-restrictive provision of the HRA. Even if the approach adopted by the national courts 
was not adopted in the context of individual information, it nevertheless shaped the public-
private divide in individual information law and the general approach adopted reinforces the 
importance of forms of state-restrictive reasoning. It is an important counterpoint to the 
influence exerted by an apparent individual approach in relation to the tort of misuse of 
private information. 
The national courts therefore arguably had considerable scope to accord a wide or narrow 
reading to section 6 HRA. A wider approach, seeking to extend human rights coverage as 
far as possible within the textual constraints of section 6, might have been suggestive of an 
underlying individual approach.30 However, the differences in approach found in the case law 
reflect conflict, not between a state-restrictive and a strained individual approach, but rather 
over the appropriate definition of the state and public functions. At root these various 
definitions reflect the different forms of a state-restrictive ambition.  
Early in the jurisprudence, the national courts interpreted section 6 to prevent the 
circumvention of the Act by public authorities. This marks a state-restrictive approach. For 
example, in London Regional Transport v Mayor of London,31 the court held that the 
obligation on public authorities under section 6 entailed that public authorities could “neither 
contract out of the Act nor use their powers to stifle the Convention rights of others”.32 
Preventing the state using its power of contract to avoid its obligations was influential in 
according a broad reach to human rights but it is fundamentally state-restrictive. It prohibits 
public authorities acting in ways that undermine rights protection in the performance of their 
tasks. This can also be seen in Avocet Hardware PLC v Morrison,33 which considered the 
admissibility of intercept evidence obtained by private investigators on behalf of private 
parties for use in civil proceedings. The Employment Appeals Tribunal emphasised the 
“clearly express[ed]… public nature of the approach to cases under Article 8”.34 It criticised 
the Employment Tribunal for assuming “to itself the wrongdoing of the [private] Respondent”, 
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which had led it to refuse to hear evidence that had been wrongfully obtained by a private 
party. The court emphasised that “it is not the Tribunal which has caused this intercept or a 
breach of the regulatory regime” and it had “erred in its approach to Article 8”.35 Courts and 
tribunals were subject to section 6 in admissibility decisions, but did not have to stand in the 
shoes of the private actors. The court therefore maintained a distinction between 
interferences by public and private actors. Section 6 was limited to a state-restrictive 
interpretation, whereas a court motivated by an individual approach might have upheld the 
broader approach to admissibility.  
The courts have also interpreted section 6 according to state-restrictive approaches more 
generally. Although the courts disagreed on the precise scope of the state-restrictive 
approach to be adopted, their jurisprudence does not reflect other approaches. It is therefore 
broadly consistent with the wider state-restrictive approach in the HRA itself. In Aston 
Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank,36 the House of 
Lords considered the interpretation of “public authority” and “public function” in section 6 
HRA. In that case, a Parochial Church Council sought to enforce a chancel repair liability. 
The core disagreement between the majority and minority was over different understandings 
of a Parochial Church Council’s functions, rather than a more fundamental difference of 
approach to the public-private divide. Although there was disagreement as to its scope, there 
was agreement as to a state-restrictive approach to section 6 HRA.  
The majority emphasised the state-restrictive nature of negative obligations on public 
authorities in the ECHR but accepted that the HRA was drafted in broader terms to account 
for privatisation. Lord Nicholls argued that the “broad purpose” of section 6 was to mirror the 
acts for which the state is answerable in Strasbourg and to make provision for national 
redress.37 “Public authority” therefore referred to bodies “whose nature is governmental in a 
broad sense of that expression”, clear examples of which were “government departments, 
local authorities, the police and the armed forces”.38 He observed that “possession of special 
powers, democratic accountability, public funding in whole or in part, an obligation to act only 
in the public interest, and a statutory constitution” was “behind the instinctive classification”.39 
However, he also went on to explain that section 6(3)(b) was intended to extend the concept 
of “public authority” to address the fact that “the manner in which wide ranging governmental 
functions are discharged varies considerably” and “functions of a governmental nature are 
frequently discharged by non-governmental bodies”, sometimes as a “consequence of 
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privatisation”.40 He noted that “in a modern developed state governmental functions extend 
far beyond maintenance of law and order and defence of the realm”.41 Lord Hope adopted a 
similar state-restrictive approach. He emphasised that “it [was] the nature of the person 
itself, not the functions which it may perform, that [was] determinative” of whether a body 
was a public authority.42 “Functions of a public nature”, by contrast, made no such 
assumption and was both of “much wider reach” and “sensitive to the facts of each case”.43 
“Public functions” were “clearly linked to the functions and powers, whether centralised or 
distributed, or government”,44 albeit that such powers could be held by private actors. The 
emphasis on the clear link to government highlights the state-restrictive nature of the 
approach, centrally concerned to control the state but conscious of a need to accommodate 
for cases where public functions had been placed in private hands. Lord Hobhouse, though 
differing in his definition, was similarly state-restrictive in approach. He emphasised that a 
Parochial Church Council “acts in the sectional not the public interest”45 and was not 
therefore discharging a public function.46 Although the rationale differed from Lord Nicholls 
and Lord Hope, the approach remained a state-restrictive one. It justified greater control of 
public authorities by reference to their lack of a private interest. This is state-restrictive 
reasoning, albeit different in focus from Lords Nicholls and Hope.  
Lord Scott’s dissent illustrates that the tension between the majority and minority was one of 
application of state-restrictive approaches, rather than a struggle between rival approaches 
to the public-private divide. He argued that the function of the Parochial Church Council was 
public because it was part of a “church by law established”.47 This entailed various rights and 
obligations that were not indicative of a private organisation. Anglicans, including the non-
practising, were entitled to various services and parishioners, or any religion or none, were 
entitled to burial in the churchyard.48 The Council’s decisions to enforce were “a decision 
taken in the interests of the parishioners as a whole… not… private interests.49 The fact of 
establishment as a state church was key to his reasoning. This was sufficient to link the 
Council to the state and reflects state-restrictive thinking.  
This tension between different approaches to defining the scope of the state, while 
maintaining state-restrictive approaches, was also evident in the case in YL v Birmingham 
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City Council.50  The case concerned whether a private-owned care home caring for residents 
placed in the home by a local authority was performing a “public function”. Palmer writes that 
the decision in YL “reflects different understandings of the operation of the Human Rights 
Act, the public-private distinction and, perhaps, more fundamentally, competing ideological 
stances.”51 Although this is true, the different understandings nevertheless do not reveal a 
fundamental departure from a state-restrictive approach but are rather variants within it. Lord 
Mance, in the majority, argued that the scope of section 6 was “linked to the scope of state 
responsibility in Strasbourg”52 and section 6(3)(b) “merely elucidates” section 6(1).53 This 
tightly and narrowly ties the concept of public function to public authority and therefore a 
state-restrictive approach. Lord Scott, this time in the majority, emphasised that the care 
home, was “simply carrying on its private business with a customer who happens to be a 
public authority” for a “commercial fee”.54 In his view, there was a “clear and fundamental 
difference” between a public authority and a private care home because the former’s 
“activities are carried out pursuant to statutory duties and responsibilities imposed by public 
law”, and “met by public funds”, whereas the latter the duties were “whether contractual or 
tortious, duties governed by private law” funded by “charges agreed under private law 
contracts”.55 The commercial/governmental distinction is a state-restrictive one, albeit 
different to Lord Mance’s conception.   
By contrast, in dissent, Lord Bingham argued that section 6 was “a measure intended to give 
effective domestic protection to Convention rights” and it was therefore “appropriate to give a 
generously wide scope” to “public function”.56 This might be thought to reveal an individual 
ambition behind his dissent, it in fact reflected an effort to ensure that the state remained 
accountable for areas of historic responsibility. The notion of an “assumption of 
responsibility” by the state underpinned his understanding of a public function, for example 
by asking, among other things, what was “the role and responsibility of the state in relation to 
the subject matter in question”,57 looking to evidence that might “throw light on the nature 
and extent of the state’s concern and of the responsibility (if any) undertaken”,58 and whether 
“as a matter of course or as a last resort, the state is… willing to pay”.59 This reflects a form 
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of state-restrictive logic, albeit wider than and in tension with the majority.60 Lord Bingham 
argued that section 6(3)(b) was intended to “embrace” functions that were “formerly carried 
out by public authorities that were now carried out by private bodies.”61 Baroness Hale, also 
in dissent, similarly argued that “it was envisaged that purely private bodies which were 
providing services which has previously been provided by the state would be covered” by the 
HRA.62 Public functions included “the exercise of the regulatory or coercive powers of the 
state”63 but also included other factors including “whether the state has assumed 
responsibility for seeing that this task is performed”.64 Again, the conflict was between 
appropriate conceptions of the state, rather than a rejection of a state-restrictive approach in 
favour of an individual approach.  
The HRA, as drafted, as interpreted by the courts, established a state-restrictive public-
private divide in United Kingdom human rights law. This applied as much to Article 8 ECHR 
as any other Convention right. What disagreement was apparent was conceptual in nature, 
reflecting different state-restrictive approaches, rather than driven by differences between 
state-restrictive and individual approaches. Those developments were not required by the 
ECHR but reflect national development of the public-private divide by Government, 
Parliament and the national courts. 
REVIEW OF LEGISLATION FOR COMPATIBILITY WITH ARTICLE 8 ECHR 
The review of national legislation for compatibility with Article 8 ECHR under the HRA 
demonstrates on the one hand the enhancement and strengthening of a state-restrictive 
approach to the public private divide by national courts, catalysed and influenced by 
pressure from the ECtHR, but also some aspects of a state-facilitative approach, divergent 
from ECHR jurisprudence and reflecting national constitutional norms. The state-restrictive 
approach of the ECHR to public authority interference “in accordance with the law”65 was 
embraced to an extent by the national courts, leading to a resurgence and growth in state-
restrictive thinking, but was also resisted in places, showing a divergent national approach. It 
therefore illustrates the complex interaction between approaches and between national and 
European levels. This runs counter to narratives of a gradual shift towards a more individual 
approach and a more complex dynamic than mere struggle, although struggle was a 
constituent part. 
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The HRA has had a significant impact on legislation regulating public authorities involved in 
crime and policing related activities. Taylor explains that the enactment of the Human Rights 
Act 1998, combined with repeated criticism from the ECHR over the UK’s surveillance laws, 
made new legislation “essential”.66 He identifies the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
2000 as “the first comprehensive attempt” to legislate compatibly for surveillance by public 
authorities, including an “emphasis on necessity and proportionality”.67 Powers of search and 
seizure have similarly responded to the need to be proportionate.68 Repeated criticism by the 
ECtHR of the UK’s approach to surveillance, databases, police stop and search, and other 
police information gathering practices prompted the national courts to produce a national 
jurisprudence more exacting in terms of proportionality and the review of legislation to 
ensure it is “in accordance with the law”.69 The UK public-private divide therefore became 
more state-restrictive as a result of this prompting. It shows the resurgence of state-
restrictive approaches in the UK, especially over the last 8 years, and the role of European 
jurisprudence in prompting that change. 
In 2011, the national courts accommodated ECHR jurisprudence at odds with its previous 
case law, and showed a willingness to interpret legislation in a way that ensured greater 
proportionality. The national courts thereby implemented a more state-restrictive approach. 
In R (GC) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,70 the UK Supreme Court considered 
proportionality in the context of the indefinite retention of DNA, including retention after the 
acquittal of suspects. In the earlier case of (R) Marper v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire 
Police, the House of Lords had held that such retention was a justified and proportionate 
interference with Article 8(1) ECHR.71 In R (GC),the Supreme Court held that indefinite 
retention was a breach of Article 8(1) ECHR, in response to the decision of the ECtHR in S 
and Marper v United Kingdom.72 As the relevant legislation could be read in a manner that 
was compatible with Article 8 ECHR, the court did so under section 3 HRA. The claimants 
argued that section 64(1A) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 could not be read 
compatibly with the decision in Marper. This was because it required indefinite retention 
save in exceptional cases.73 The Supreme Court disagreed. Lord Dyson commented that the 
statute was “silent as to how the statutory purposes [were] to be fulfilled” and that one could 
not “suppose that Parliament must have intended that this should be achieved in a 
                                               
66 Taylor (2003), p. 91. 
67 Ibid., pp. 91 to 92. 
68 Ibid., p. 95. 
69 See below, pp. 87 to 95. 
70 [2011] UKSC 21 
71 [2004] 1 WLR 2196. 
72 (2008) 48 EHRR 1169. 
73 [2011] UKSC 21, para. 20 
 89 
disproportionate way so as to be incompatible with the ECHR”.74 Section 64(1A) could be 
exercised through a “proportionate scheme which gives effect to the statutory purposes and 
is compatible with the ECHR”.75 Lord Phillips argued that it did not follow from Parliament’s 
lack of foresight of Article 8 ECHR’s requirements or the present Government’s intention to 
amend the legislation that “one must interpret section 64(1A) as requiring the police to 
exercise the power conferred by that section in a manner which infringes the requirements of 
the Convention”.76  Baroness Hale, pointing to the “clear intention of Parliament to legislate 
compatibly rather than incompatibly with the Convention rights”,77 denied that the 
subsequent criticism of the House of Lords by the ECtHR did not “inevitably” require the 
legislation to be read incompatibly but rather the “reverse”.78 Lord Kerr drew support from the 
flexible drafting of the provision to support the claim that section 64(1A) could be read 
otherwise than “to obtain a blanket, universally applied… policy”.79 Parliament had not 
attempted to “forecast comprehensively what those limits should be” and “must be taken to 
[intend to] to create a proportionate scheme which is compatible with the Convention”.80 The 
Supreme Court therefore read in a requirement for the scheme to be proportionate. In doing 
this, the Supreme Court took note of and responded to the criticism levelled at earlier 
judgments of the House of Lords regarding DNA retention in Marper.81 European 
jurisprudence therefore acted to encourage and strengthen a state-restrictive approach at 
the national level. The Supreme Court also declared that the Association of Chief Police 
Officers’ guidance was incompatible with Article 8 ECHR but, as Parliament was already 
considering new legislation, took no further action.82 This should not be understood as a 
state-facilitative element in the reasoning, however, because it was driven by considerations 
relating to the separation of powers: the court considered that the guidance should be 
replaced but left the replacement to Parliament.83   
In R (T) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police,84 the Supreme Court took further 
action to accommodate the resurgence of state-restrictive ECHR jurisprudence in national 
law. This was in response to the decision of the ECtHR in MM v United Kingdom, which had 
held that the relevant UK law was not “in accordance with the law” for the purposes of Article 
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8(2) ECHR.85 The case considered the inclusion of cautions, warnings or old minor 
convictions on criminal record checks under the Police Act 1997. T’s conviction concerned 
minor dishonesty offences committed as a child, which had remained on T’s criminal record 
check. The case demonstrates some disagreement as to the appropriate roles of concepts 
of proportionality and “in accordance with the law” but nevertheless held that the system 
under the Police Act 1997 was a violation of Article 8 ECHR. The majority readily 
incorporated state-restrictive ECHR jurisprudence into national law. Lord Reed, with whom 
the Lords Neuberger, Hale and Clarke agreed on the point,86 held that the Police Act 1997 
was not in accordance with the law. Lord Reed stated that “legislation which requires the 
indiscriminate disclosure by the state of personal data which it has collected and stored does 
not contain adequate safeguards against arbitrary interference” with Article 8 ECHR.87 No 
margin of appreciation was available for legislation which is not in accordance with the law:88  
Whether a system provides adequate safeguards against arbitrary treatment, 
and is therefore “in accordance with the law” within the meaning of the 
Convention, is not a question of proportionality, and is therefore not a matter 
in relation to which the court allows national authorities a margin of 
appreciation.89  
He reasoned that MM v United Kingdom had established  
that the legislation fails to meet the requirements for disclosure to constitute 
an interference ‘in accordance with the law’” because “of the failure to draw 
any distinction on the basis of the nature of the offence, the disposal in the 
case, the time which has elapsed since the offence took place or the 
relevance of the data to the employment sought, and the absence of any 
mechanism for independent review of a decision to disclose data.90  
Lord Reed further argued that, in any event, the disclosure of cautions “could not in any 
event be regarded as necessary in a democratic society”.91 The judgment therefore applied 
ECHR jurisprudence, with state-restrictive effect, to UK legislation. 
The minority judgment, does however, show some resistance to this approach and therefore 
a tension within the Supreme Court as to the proper scope of a state-restrictive approach. 
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Lord Wilson, in dissent, argued that “it could not be seriously argued” that the 1997 Act was 
not in accordance with the law.92 Lord Wilson considered that the appropriate safeguards 
were properly a matter of “necessity in a democratic society”, for which the state had a 
margin of appreciation.93 It should “not be resolved by reference to the principle of legality.94 
Lord Wilson was therefore resisted the conclusions of the ECtHR and would have diverged 
from ECHR jurisprudence is favour of a less restrictive, albeit still state-restrictive approach. 
Later, in Re Z (Children) (DNA Profiles: Disclosure),95 the Court of Appeal similarly went 
further to accommodate ECHR jurisprudence on public authority interferences “in 
accordance with the law” into national jurisprudence. The judgment was a further application 
of S and Marper v United Kingdom, which addressed the ECtHR’s criticisms of national law 
on the retention of biometric data.96 The Court of Appeal held that section 22 of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 only permitted the police to retain and use biometric 
material for criminal law enforcement. Samples could therefore not be ordered for use in 
care proceedings.97 The court developed its analysis of “in accordance with the law” and 
used it to construe the statute. Lord Dyson MR accepted that “the law must be as clear and 
certain as is practicable in all the circumstances”.98 He held that if the statute were 
interpreted so as to permit one class of biometric material to be used for other purposes but 
another class not to be, the law would treat the information in an “arbitrary” manner, because 
“there [was] no rational basis” for the difference in treatment.99 Additionally, section 22 had 
“no rules for the exercise of the discretion of retaining and using seized material other than it 
may be so exercised for the purposes [of criminal law enforcement]”.100 To avoid 
arbitrariness, which would not be in accordance with law, he interpreted the provision as 
limited to this one purpose in both categories:  
section 22 contains no express or implied rules in relation to the retention and 
use of such material for any other purpose. If… section 22 were construed as 
authorising the retention and use of biometric material for such wider 
purposes, then in my view it would lack the clarity and precision required to 
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make it ‘in accordance with the law’” as it would then be “unclear for what 
other purposes the material could be retained and use and for how long.101  
Lord Dyson MR acknowledged that “the degree of precision and certainty demanded” was 
context-dependent and took into account practicability,102 but that “an arbitrary and 
unjustified distinction between Part II biometric material and Part V biometric material”… “the 
exercise of discretion given by section 22 would be indeterminate and unclear”.103 State-
restrictive ECHR jurisprudence on interferences “in accordance with the law” therefore 
prompted a more state-restrictive approach at the national level.   
However, there is also some evidence of national resistance and divergence from this state-
restrictive shift in response to ECtHR criticism. The UK Supreme Court at times softened the 
state-restrictive approach to “in accordance with the law” with more state-facilitative aspects 
of proportionality. For example, in R (Catt) v Association of Chief Police Officers of England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland,104 the Supreme Court elaborated the requirements of “in 
accordance with the law” for the purposes of national law. The Supreme Court considered a 
challenge to the retention of personal information about an individual’s attendance at 
demonstrations on a “domestic extremism” database by the National Public Order 
Intelligence Unit. The relevant information was the fact of attendance, data of birth, address 
and physical description as incidental references on the nominal records of other people of 
interest to the police. The database was based on common law powers to obtain and store 
information likely to assist police functions. The second claimant complained of the retention 
of a warning notice letter concerning an allegation of harassment. The judgment contains 
much that reflects the accommodation of ECHR state-restrictive jurisprudence on “in 
accordance with the law”. Lord Sumption noted that at “common law the police have the 
power to obtain and store information for policing purposes”, although this did not extend to 
intrusive methods.105 It was subject to “an intensive regime of statutory and administrative 
regulation”, principally the Data Protection Act 1998.106 He defined “in accordance with the 
law” as “not limited to requiring an ascertainable legal basis for the interference as a matter 
of domestic law… also ensures that the law is not so wide or indefinite as to permit 
interference with the right on an arbitrary or abusive basis”.107 He noted earlier national 
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authority before quoting the ECHR Grand Chamber in S and Marper v UK at paragraph 99, 
which required:  
clear, detailed rules governing the scope and application of measures, as well 
as minimum safeguards concerning, inter alia, duration, storage, usage, 
access of third parties, procedures for preserving the integrity and 
confidentiality of data and procedures for its destruction, thus providing 
sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness. 
Lord Sumption observed that “rules need not be statutory, provided that they operate within 
a framework of law and that there are effective means of enforcing them” and their 
application is “reasonably predictable, if necessary with the assistance of expert advice”, 
including “principles which are capable of being predictably applied to any situation”.108 The 
Data Protection Act 1998 “lays down principles which are germane and directly applicable to 
police information, and contains a framework for their enforcement on the police among 
others through the Information Commissioner and the courts”.109 The Police Code of 
Conduct provided further guidance.110 Lord Sumption held that the domestic extremism 
database was “in accordance with the law”.111 This was because the relevant information 
was not “discreditable”112 and was used for “proper policing purposes”.113 Information 
gathered for intelligence was “necessarily in the first instance indiscriminately” because “its 
value can only be judged in hindsight, as subsequent analysis for particular purposes 
discloses a relevant pattern.”114  
The judgment did however soften the state-restrictive approach in some respects. For 
example, it highlighted that disproportionate labour would be required to remove the 
references.115 The interference was therefore “justified by the legitimate requirements of 
police intelligence-gathering in the interests of the maintenance of public order and the 
prevention of crime”.116 This is a more state-facilitative strand of thinking. ECHR 
jurisprudence, by contrast, requires no interference without justification. It does not take into 
account the resources of a public authority when determining whether interference is 
proportionate. By contrast, the Supreme Court took the importance of the state’s functions in 
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relation to the maintenance of public order and the prevention of crime to justify a more 
generous approach to proportionality, a state-facilitative softening of approach.  
Under criticism from the ECHR, the national courts have developed and applied more 
vigorous interpretations of proportionality and the requirement that interference be “in 
accordance with the law”. This development marks a more state-restrictive approach in the 
UK to information held by public authorities, especially the police. It is an example of change 
occurring through pressure from the ECHR, although it also shows some evidence of an 
occasional state-facilitative approach and tensions within the UK Supreme Court as to how 
far to accommodate ECHR jurisprudence. Two further cases give additional cause to doubt 
how thorough this change was and suggest a level of national resistance to strict state-
restrictive interpretations within the courts. 
First, in General Dental Council v Savery,117 concerning the dissemination of patient records 
within the Council without consent for the purpose of professional disciplinary 
proceedings,118 the High Court held that the disclosures were in accordance with law either 
because the power was implied at common law or because it was implied from the 1984 Act 
which gave the General Dental Council its disciplinary powers.119 This was a remarkably 
relaxed approach to identifying the legal ground for interfering with the Article 8 rights of the 
claimants. It is not clear that such broad implied powers can be “in accordance with the law” 
in ECHR jurisprudence.120 The decision therefore indicates a level of judicial divergence from 
ECHR jurisprudence away from a state-restrictive approach. 
Secondly, in R (Ali) v Minister for the Cabinet Office,121 the High Court considered the 
interpretation of “in accordance with the law” for the purposes of Article 8 ECHR in the 
context of section 39 of the Statistics and Registration Act 2007, which permitted disclosures 
of census personal information for the purpose of criminal investigations. The claimants 
accepted that “it [was] not necessary for the interference to be prescribed in primary or 
secondary legislation” but rather that it could “be prescribed in guidance or statements of 
policy issued by the relevant public body”.122 The High Court also held that it was necessary 
to consider “the rules, principles and procedures in the DPA 1998… section 6 of the Human 
Rights Act, and… the Board’s policies and operational procedures and arrangements”.123 It 
held that “notwithstanding the number of legal sources governing this matter, the complexity 
                                               
117 [2011] EWHC 3011 (Admin). 
118 Each additional disclosure of which was held to engage Article 8(1): Ibid., para. 50. 
119 Ibid., para. 45 
120 See chapter 2. 
121 [2012] EWHC 1943 (Admin). 
122 Ibid., para. 18. 
123 Ibid., para. 63. 
 95 
of some of some of those sources, and the fact that the whole picture can only be 
determined by putting together the different fragments, the position is sufficiently certain to 
[be in accordance with the law].”124 The High Court further observed that “it is clear that law 
contained in decisions of the courts can satisfy the requirement”, citing Sunday Times v 
UK.125 The court’s acceptance of guidance and policy as acceptable sources to make an 
interference “in accordance with the law” is a surprising conclusion in light of the later ECHR 
jurisprudence,126 which was significantly more demanding than Sunday Times v United 
Kingdom and which suggests a lighter touch in the decision. This might reflect divergence in 
line with a state-facilitative approach. 
These relatively anomalous cases point to instances where the national courts might have 
been gentler than the full ECHR approach to “in accordance with law”. However, across 
surveillance, stop and search and police databases, the HRA and ECHR criticism has 
resulted in a much more robust state-restrictive approach more generally. It does however 
suggest a degree of national divergence and resistance to the resurgence of a state-
restrictive approach to Article 8(1) ECHR, albeit that the national courts did a great deal to 
accommodate it, especially in the Supreme Court, in response to ECtHR prompting.  
DAMAGES AND PUBLIC AUTHORITIES 
Other aspects of a more state-facilitative approach can also be identified in the decisions of 
the national courts. The national courts have adopted a more forgiving approach to the 
assessment of damages for a breach of section 6 by public authorities, albeit this was later 
blunted by the development of the tort of misuse of private information.127 Damages under 
the Human Rights Act 1998 are calculated in light of the public interest inherent in public 
authority activities, reflecting a state-facilitative approach. On such an approach, the inherent 
value of the state’s tasks justify subjecting it to reduced damages on a state-facilitative 
approach. The HRA requires a court to award damages only where, taking account of all the 
circumstances including “any other relief or remedy granted, or order made” and the 
:consequences of any decision”, the court is “satisfied that the award is necessary to afford 
just satisfaction”.128 The courts have therefore held that damages are not recoverable as of 
right under the HRA.129 The courts’ approach to such compensation is to treat it as “of 
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secondary, if any, importance” to ending the infringement in question.130 It is therefore 
subject to a balance between “the interests of the victim and those of the public as a whole”, 
in which the court had a “wide discretion”.131 Damages were considered to be “a remedy of 
last resort” in Anufrijeva v Southwark Borough Council.132 As Steele observes: “It will always 
be in the individual’s interest to receive damages. It may or may not be in the public interest 
for damages to be paid.”133 The remedies available to protect individual interests against 
public authorities are therefore tempered by a state-facilitative approach, which is not true of 
private parties claiming damages for misuse of private information.134 Lester and Pannick 
observe that “there is no obvious need to adopt the ‘all-or-nothing’ approach of tort law, 
whereby the individual receives either full compensation for all foreseeable and causally 
connected loss or no compensation at all… a lesser amount of compensation… may 
legitimately be taken” to reflect that full damages might not be in the public interest.135 The 
result of this reasoning is ultimately state-facilitative, in so far as a claim cannot be pursued 
as misuse of private information, because in such cases a public authority may be subject to 
a damages assessment that does not fully reflect the claimants’ loss. Alongside the state-
restrictive approach that characterises the HRA, the courts have therefore also promoted 
pockets of state-facilitative reasoning which diverge from ECHR jurisprudence at the national 
level in relation to remedies such as damages under the HRA. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TORT OF MISUSE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION: THE RISE OF AN 
INDIVIDUAL APPROACH 
Parallel to accommodating resurgent state-restrictive ECHR jurisprudence in the context of 
public authority interferences with Article 8 ECHR, the national courts have also played a 
major role in advancing an individual approach through the development of the tort of misuse 
of private information. The common law did not protect privacy directly. In Wainwright v 
Home Office, the House of Lords held that the common law had no comprehensive tort of 
invasion of privacy.136 The lack of remedies for breach of privacy was also noted in Kaye v 
Robertson.137 The development of the tort of misuse of private information demonstrates the 
rise of individual approaches under the influence of Europe, catalysed by the HRA, but 
driven primarily by the national courts. The individual approach therefore runs parallel to 
                                               
130 Ibid., para. 53. 
131 Ibid., para. 56. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Iain Steele, Public Law Liability - The Human Rights Act and Beyond (2005) CLJ 8, 9. 
134 See below, pp. 109 to 110. 
135 Anthony Lester and David Pannick, The Impact of the Human Rights Act on Private Law: The 
Knight’s Move (2000) 116 LQR 380, pp. 389 and 390. 
136 [2003] 3 WLR 1137. 
137 [1991] FSR 62 
 97 
state-restrictive and state-facilitative developments in relation to the HRA, although it has 
acted to erode the public-private divide by strengthening remedies against private actors, 
which can in principle be brought also against public authorities, thereby undercutting 
section 8 HRA damages in some contexts. 
First given its name by Lord Nicholls in Campbell v MGN Ltd,138 and now a fully freestanding 
cause of action,139 the tort of misuse of private information emerged out of breach of 
confidence. The tort had no requirement of a confidential relationship140 and it protected the 
values enshrined in articles 8 and 10 ECHR.141 In the most recent Supreme Court case of 
PJS v News Group Newspapers,142 the Supreme Court confirmed that the tort of misuse of 
private information protected a distinctive interest from breach of confidence: protection from 
intrusion rather than of secrecy. In PJS, the claimant sought to preserve an order prohibiting 
News Group Newspapers from publishing private information in England and Wales, despite 
the widespread disclosure of that information on the internet by foreign news sources. Lord 
Mance, with whom Lords Neuberger, Hale and Reed agreed, explained that the tort of 
misuse of private information protected individuals against intrusion. It did not merely protect 
secrecy. This confirmed earlier authority in the lower courts. Repetition could constitute a tort 
of invasion of privacy.143 This was especially so if the disclosure was through “a different 
medium”.144 There was a “qualitative difference in intrusiveness and distress likely to be 
involved in what [was] proposed by way of unrestricted publication by the English media in 
hard copy as well as on their own internet sites”.145 The proposed use was “would add a 
different and in some respects more enduring dimension to the existing invasions of privacy” 
so that a continuing injunction would have value.146 The tort of misuse of private information 
represents an expansion of the scope of regulation for private information in the hands of 
private individuals and a closing of the public-private divide in national human rights law. The 
tort is now so well established that PJS v News Group Newspapers contained no further 
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discussion of its historical root or basis.147 This erosion of the public-private divide reflects an 
individual approach. 
The courts have considered the values protected by Article 8 ECHR equally applicable to 
public and private bodies.148 In Campbell v MGN Ltd,149 the House of Lords addressed the 
development of the tort of misuse of private information. Lord Nicholls noted that the 
“protection of various aspects of privacy is a fast developing area of the law”, the 
development of which has been “spurred” by the HRA.150 Although the courts of equity had 
long protected information through breach of confidence, Lord Nicholls argued that the 
“nomenclature is misleading” because the “cause of action has now firmly shaken off the 
limiting constraint of the need for an initial confidential relationship”.151 However, as he 
observed, it had changed its nature as early as AG v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2).152 
He argued that the “essence of the tort was better encapsulated as misuse of private 
information”.153 Individual information privacy was “the value underlying this cause of 
action”.154 For Lord Nicholls, Article 8 and 10 ECHR jurisprudence had “prompted the courts 
of this country to identify more clearly the different factors involved in cases where one or 
another of these two interests is present”.155 Lord Nicholls considered that the “values 
enshrined in articles 8 and 10 [were] now part of the cause of action for breach of 
confidence”.156  Lord Nicholls argued that “it should now be recognised that for this purpose 
these values are of general application… as much applicable in disputes between individuals 
or between an individual and a non-governmental body… as… between individuals and a 
public authority”.157 Lord Nicholls limited his observations to “the values underlying articles 8 
and 10” and did not take a view on whether the ECHR had a wider effect or whether section 
6 “extends to questions of substantive law”.158 The argument was clearly individual in 
approach to the extent that Article 8 and Article 10 ECHR values were concerned. In 
particular, Lord Hoffmann asked “why it should be worth protecting against the state but not 
against a private person” and answered that there was “no logical ground for saying that a 
person should have less protection against a private individual than he would have against 
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the state for the publication of personal information for which there is no justification”.159 In 
this the driving attitude was one of an individual approach. 
CATALYSED OR CAUSED BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 AND ECHR? 
The incremental development of the tort of misuse of private information by the national 
courts was catalysed by the Human Rights Act 1998 and the ECHR jurisprudence on 
positive obligations but it was not required or compelled by those developments, at least not 
initially. The rise of an individual approach in this area was not the result of a dynamic of 
struggle but a more cooperative and creative interaction between emerging ECHR 
jurisprudence and the trajectory already taken by the national courts in relation to breach of 
confidence.160 More broadly, there was a lively debate surrounding the passage of the 
Human Rights Act concerning the extent to which the Act should have horizontal effect.161 
Over 17 years later, the Human Rights Act can be seen to have had little horizontal effect 
outside the development of the tort of misuse of private information. Wright observes that the 
absorption of ECHR principles into the common law occurred little outside the context of 
privacy and defamation.162 This is one indication that the rise of an individual approach in the 
common law was driven by national courts. If it were driven by ECHR jurisprudence or the 
Human Rights Act, we might expect the absorption of ECHR principles in other contexts as 
well. 
Several commentators argued that the development of the tort was not compelled by the 
HRA. For Lester and Pannick, although “the Act and the Convention rights… exert a 
powerful magnetic force”, it was the case that “nothing in the Act prevents or inhibits the 
courts from developing new private law causes of action, but equally, nothing in the Act 
authorises the courts to do so”.163 The HRA was neutral and left development to the national 
courts. Quane considered that “the UK courts [were] free to extend even greater levels of 
protection to the Convention rights than the ECHR”.164 Bamforth argued that because the 
ECHR lacks a doctrine of direct effect the question “depends crucially upon the attitudes of 
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national courts”.165 Buxton accepted that the debate over human rights “may act as a 
catalyst” in the process of developing the common law, but that it “would be a singular 
exercise in judicial activism”.166 For such writers, the development of the tort of misuse of 
private information was driven by the national courts.  
Wright, by contrast, was critical of these early debates, which she argues suggested the 
development of horizontal effect “was a matter of judicial choice”, a claim which she believes 
neglected “both the structure, wording and aim of the HRA itself, as well as the Strasbourg 
case law”.167 Hunt similarly argued in 1998 that it was irresistible that the “Human Rights Act 
should tend towards the horizontal end of the spectrum”,168 pointing to positive obligations in 
ECHR jurisprudence.169 He argued that there was “nothing particularly novel” about the 
development of the common law to “achieve consistency with the Convention”.170 He also 
argued that section 6 precluded direct horizontal effect without requiring vertical effect 
because it applied the duty only to public authorities and functions.171 However, the duty on 
the courts required the courts to act compatibly when developing the common law.172 Wade 
argued, stronger still, that the national courts were required by the Human Rights Act to 
extend full horizontal effect through the “literal argument” that the obligation on the courts 
would act in every adjudication to require the enforcement of human rights.173 For these 
writers, the national courts had little choice and were bound by broader commitments, 
although there was little agreement on what the effect of that would be. Such arguments 
would point instead to the conclusion that Europe, the UK Government and Parliament were 
responsible for the rise of the individual approach in UK law. I argue that the former 
interpretation is more convincing: the courts played a decisive role in the rise of an individual 
approach in individual information in this field, whereas Government and Parliament pursued 
a more state-restrictive approach within the Human Rights Act. 
Phillipson and Williams argue persuasively that “deep constitutional norms” required the 
national courts to adopt an incremental approach to the development of the common law in 
response to section 6(3) HRA174 and, additionally, that section 2 HRA only required Article 8 
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ECHR to be “taken into account” as a principle or value rather than a right.175 They argue 
that their “constitutional constraint model” reflects the “instinctive” approach of the national 
courts to the horizontal effect of the HRA.176 Phillipson and Williams emphasised that only 
the State can violate Article 8 ECHR where a private actor “interferes with the interests” it 
protects, by failing to carry out its positive obligation to regulate the private actor.177 The 
positive obligation on the State, however, does “not lead to the conclusion that the 
Convention rights apply horizontally”178 but rather section 6 HRA “translated” the positive 
obligation of the State into the “developmental obligation of domestic courts”.179 This 
required incremental judicial development of the common law but not “legislative-style 
common law development”.180 The effect of section 6 HRA was therefore to “alter the pre-
HRA position by requiring the courts to accord a greater weight to Convention principles in 
private common law than they previously did”.181 They argue that the HRA showed no 
“enacted intent” to displace the “constraint of incrementalism” on the judiciary that derives 
from “central features of the UK constitutional order”,182 such as democracy, the rule of law 
and the separation of powers.183 Phillipson and Williams argue that Article 8 ECHR is “under-
determinate”,184 an example of John Griffith’s statements of “political conflict pretending to be 
a resolution of it”.185 Such rights were therefore “only capable of functioning in the private 
sphere as broad values” and not as rights, in the absence of Strasbourg jurisprudence on a 
particular point.186 The HRA was therefore incapable of imposing on the national courts an 
“absolutely obligation” to implement Article 8 ECHR through national common law.187 
The development of the tort of misuse of private information should be viewed in light of a 
broader continuity in the breach of confidence case law. Changes in breach of confidence 
were already occurring before 1998. Phillipson observes that the “previous stricter 
requirements of prior relationships of confidence and identifiable detriment had already been 
jettisoned” in the law of confidentiality.188 In the 1990s, the courts were moving breach of 
confidence away from its basis in a relationship of confidence towards information that was 
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confidential itself in Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2).189 This fact was 
viewed as highly important by the judges who developed the tort of misuse of private 
information, placing the development in historical continuity.190 Lord Walker in Douglas v 
Hello! (No 3) went so far as to describe it as the “most important single step” in the 
development of the case law.191 As discussed in chapter 2, the national courts were already 
adopting a more individual approach in relation to breach of confidence from 1968 without 
ECHR influence. Wright acknowledges that the decision in Campbell “could not plausibly be 
argued” to be “required by the HRA”.192  She considers that “it is arguable that the changes 
that have occurred… were foreshadowed long before… in [AG v Guardian Newspapers (No 
2)]”.193 In A v B plc Lord Woolf CJ also stressed the historical origins of the tort, arguing that 
“the equitable origins of the action for breach of confidence” helped the court develop misuse 
of private information.194 The tort was in continuity with earlier national trends drive by the 
national courts. In Campbell, Lord Nicholls similarly emphasised historical continuity in the 
development of the tort when he noted that the “common law or, more precisely, courts of 
equity have long afforded protection to the wrongful use of private information by means of 
the cause of action which became known as breach of confidence”.195 
The need to stress historical continuity is important. The courts have not felt free to create 
new causes of action,196 as it was advocated by William Wade.197 Baroness Hale, in 
Campbell v MGN Ltd, commenting on Wainwright v Home Office, emphasised that “our law 
cannot, even if it wanted to, develop a general tort of invasion of privacy”,198 a power that 
Lord Hoffmann considered previous authority was “flat against” the development of a general 
privacy tort as it would “distort the common law”.199 The argument and importance of 
historical continuity speaks to an important felt limitation on the power of the judiciary to 
develop the common law in an incremental fashion.200 It also points away from a 
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straightforward conclusion that the Human Rights Act 1998 required the development of the 
tort. The courts did not say that the Human Rights Act required legal change. The national 
courts were already so acting before the HRA came into force. This helps to demonstrate 
that the development of the tort and its individual approach was primarily a national judicial 
project. Judicial understandings of the nature of the common law were both facilitator and 
limit. The common law was variously described by judges as continuing “to evolve, as it has 
done for centuries”,201 “not immutable”202 and with the “capacity... to adapt itself to the needs 
of contemporary life”.203 Lord Dyson MR, in Vidal-Hall v Google, recognising the extent of 
judicial development by 2015, nevertheless commented on “the common law’s perennial 
need (for the best of reasons, that of legal certainty) to appear not to be doing anything for 
the first time”.204 
Judicial development was also encouraged by reflection on the expectations of the drafters 
of the Human Rights Act and the low likelihood of Parliamentary legislation. Phillipson notes 
that the potential of the HRA to lead to a right to privacy against private actors was “one of 
[the Act’s] most controversial aspects”, which became a “primary focus of concern in 
Parliament”.205 The public-private divide was therefore explicitly considered during the 
legislative process. Lord Irvine explained in Parliament that section 6 HRA was to “apply only 
to public authorities… and not private individuals” because the “Convention had in its origins 
a desire to protect people from the misuse of power by the state”.206 The Home Secretary 
Jack Straw also explained that Convention rights “would not be directly justiciable in actions 
between private individuals”.207 However, an amendment to ensure that the courts were not 
treated as a “public authority” where “the parties to the proceedings before it do not include 
any public authority” was rejected in favour of a freedom to development the common law.208 
Lord Phillips MR in Douglas v Hello! (No 3) noted that the “Government made it clear that it 
does not intend to introduce legislation in relation to this area of law, but anticipates that the 
judges will develop the law appropriately.”209 However, Lord Phillips MR also commented 
that the courts did not accept the role described for them by Lord Irvine LC to develop the 
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law in line with human rights “with whole-hearted enthusiasm”.210 Although this points to 
greater internal disagreement within national courts, despite the trajectory of the case law, 
the broader point of importance is the understanding that there was an expectation, but not a 
requirement, of development in this area by the judiciary. 
ECHR jurisprudence encouraged, but similarly did not require the courts to develop the tort 
of misuse of private information, at least initially. The approach of the ECHR in Earl Spencer 
v UK encouraged the development of the tort, as that the ECHR held in that case that 
Spencer had failed to exhaust his domestic remedies by failing to seek a remedy for breach 
of confidence.211 This implied recognition that the common law already provided a 
mechanism to remedy violations of Article 8(1) ECHR was an encouragement to shape the 
common law. Phillipson argues that Peck v United Kingdom, which found that the right to an 
effective remedy to protect Article 8 ECHR was violated by a “lack of legal power… to award 
damages”,212 demonstrated that a “specific remedy” of damages was required by the ECHR 
and in the absence of legislative action this fell to the courts.213 
One further cause of historical discontinuity with the common law was in fact practical. The 
proliferation of case law on breach of confidence, the strain placed on civil procedure for 
interim injunctions and the disproportionate legal costs this entailed was one factor that 
encouraged the courts to consolidate the law in an effort to shed the citation of historical 
authority in A v B plc.214 This played an important role in freeing the tort of misuse of private 
information from historical precedent,215 leading Lord Woolf CJ to state that “authorities 
which relate to the action for breach of confidence prior to the coming into force of the 1998 
Act then they are largely of historic interest only.”216  
The Human Rights Act 1998 played an important role but few judges accepted that section 
6(3), the duty of the courts not to act incompatibly with convention rights, required the 
development of the tort, at least initially. Rather there was mixed judicial comment and a 
wide variety of vague judicial dicta. The effect of the Human Rights Act was variously 
described by judges as providing “new parameters”,217 informing the prior approach,218 
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illuminating the law of breach of confidence,219 having had an “undoubtedly.. significant 
influence”,220 prompting “the courts of this country to identify more clearly the different factors 
involved”,221 influencing “the acceptance… of the privacy of personal information as 
something worthy of protection in its own right”,222 and a “more subtle” development than 
that of the protection of Article 8 ECHR against public authorities under section 6.223 Some 
doubted any greater influence could be attributed to the Human Rights Act. For example, 
Lord Hope in Campbell commented that while the “language has changed following the 
coming into operation of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the incorporation into domestic law 
of article 8 and article 10 of the Convention” he doubted whether the “centre of gravity” had 
really shifted what was “essentially the same” balancing exercise.224 For some, the Human 
Rights Act was a “stimulus”225 for developments, whereas for others the “1998 statute… 
requires these values to be acknowledged”.226 In Mosley v NGN Ltd,227 Eady J commented 
that the law of confidence had been “extended in recent years under the stimulus of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and the content of the Convention itself”.228 While some judgments 
focused on the section 6 obligation of the court,229 Lord Hoffmann favoured the term 
mediation to describe the courts relationship with Article 8 ECHR: 
English law has adapted the action for breach of confidence to provide a 
remedy for the unauthorised disclosure of personal information… mediated by 
analogy to the right of privacy conferred by article 8.230 
Much judicial commentary in the case law is by way of introduction to the real points of 
disagreement between the parties. Focus on the resolution of the immediate case might 
preclude detailed examination of the precise relationship between the common law and the 
Human Rights Act, especially when it did not determine the outcome between the parties. 
However, two points might be made. The first is that there was judicial appetite to develop 
the common law. We might expect a more detailed explanation of why section 6(3) required 
the courts to develop the common law if there were reluctance. The second is that where 
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section 6(3) did impose a clearer obligation on the courts not to act in a way that was 
incompatible with convention rights, such as Article 10(2) negative obligations on the courts 
in injunction cases, the courts addressed this explicitly.231 The way the courts addressed 
questions of the negative obligation under Article 10(2) stands in contrast with the reaction of 
the courts to any positive obligations under Article 8(1).232 This suggests that the courts did 
not feel compelled by the Human Rights Act to develop the law as they did, at least initially. 
The national courts have also been willing to diverge from ECHR jurisprudence. This both 
indicates their role in shaping the common law and lack of felt obligation to implement Article 
8 ECHR jurisprudence. As Phillipson argues, the “courts do no in practice make themselves 
mere conduits of Strasbourg case law”.233 Phillipson points out that the national courts 
“appear reluctant fully to implement Strasbourg’s finding in a number of decisions from Von 
Hannover”234 and the development of the tort of misuse of private information included “a 
marked degree of equivocation between the values of privacy and confidentiality”.235 
Phillipson doubts whether the test of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” is as broad as the 
information covered by Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence236 and more broadly notes that the 
national courts “continue to exhibit [a] deep ambivalence towards the place and value of 
privacy in English law” by giving it a more narrow scope that Article 8 ECHR 
jurisprudence.237 Although this does not directly address the public-private divide, it does 
indicate the national courts’ willingness to diverge from ECHR jurisprudence. Phillipson 
argues that the national courts did not adopt the “extremely broad scope for Article 8” ECHR 
found in Von Hannover.238 To that extent, the national courts’ adoption of an individual 
approach is not as comprehensive as that found in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on positive 
obligations and demonstrates a degree of national divergence or resistance.  
Wright argued that as the positive obligation on the state was not targeted at the national 
courts and could, perhaps more appropriately, have been left to Parliament, nothing in the 
ECHR jurisprudence required the development of the tort of misuse of private information.239 
However, the situation changed following the ECHR decision is Von Hannover v Germany in 
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2004.240 In Douglas v Hello! (No 3), Lord Phillips MR explained that Von Hannover v 
Germany241 now placed an “obligation on member states to protect one individual from an 
unjustified invasion of private life by another individual and an obligation on the courts of a 
member state to interpret legislation in a way which will achieve that result”.242 He concluded 
that “so far as private information is concerned, we are required to adopt, as the vehicle for 
performing such duty as falls on the courts in relation to Convention rights, the cause of 
action formerly described as breach of confidence” to “give effect to both article 8 and 10 
rights”.243 However, he was critical of this requirement: “We cannot pretend that we find it 
satisfactory to be required to shoehorn within the cause of action of breach of confidence 
claims for publication of unauthorised photographs of a private occasion”.244 Following this 
case the courts were more willing to suggest that the positive obligation of the State under 
Article 8(1) was not something that could be left to Parliament but was an obligation on the 
court.245 The courts were therefore, to that extent, “required to adapt” breach of confidence 
to fulfil their positive obligations and therefore comply with their section 6(3) duty.246 
However, the development of the tort before 2004 suggests that national judicial 
development played a more significant role in the rise of the individual approach in the UK 
before this became the case. A stronger obligation on the national courts, rather than the 
United Kingdom as a whole, was a later development and cannot explain the developing 
jurisprudence of the courts before 2004.  
THE TORT OF MISUSE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION AND PUBLIC AUTHORITIES  
One further and important feature of the development of tort of misuse of private information 
is that it does much to undermine the state-facilitative approach to damages against public 
authorities under section 8 HRA. This is because the assessment of damages under the tort 
is generous and fully compensatory to claimants. As a tort, in principle it can be brought 
against public authorities either directly or, more likely, through the vicarious liability of their 
employees. Axon v Ministry of Defence suggests that the majority of employees of public 
authorities who are in a position to obtain private information will trigger the vicarious liability 
of their employer.247 These developments undermine the earlier state-facilitative approach to 
section 8 damages. 
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Damages for the tort of misuse of private information are much more generous than section 
8 HRA damages. In Representative Claimants v MGN Ltd,248 the Court of Appeal held that 
damages for misuse of private information could be awarded not only for distress but also 
the loss or diminution of the right to control the information. The Court of Appeal adopted 
general principles for the award of damages, including that “certain types of information are 
likely to be more significant than others… [depending] on the nature of the information”;249 
“the nature of the information, its significance as private information, and the effect on the 
victim of its disclosure” are relevant, “the effect of repeated intrusions by publication can be 
cumulative”, and that “the extent of the damage may be claimant-specific”.250 In Burrell v 
Clifford,251 the court added “the extent of the misuse”252 to this list and suggested that the 
assessment “takes account of all the circumstances of the case” including “the nature of the 
information, the nature and extent and purpose of the misuse…, the consequences of the 
misuse…, whether the misuse cause the claimant financial loss or provided financial gain to 
the defendant, any relevant policy considerations… any mitigating factors… or aggravating 
factors”.253 In J20 v Facebook Ireland Limited, the court considered the nature, extent and 
duration of the breaches and indicated that damages should “vindicate his rights and reflect 
the undoubted injury to his feelings”.254 The damages available under the tort of misuse of 
private information are therefore fully compensatory and include the vindication of the right 
itself. As a tort, it may be brought directly against a public authority, thereby undermining the 
state-facilitative approach to section 8 damages.255 Further, the vicarious liability of 
employees may ground the tort and allow damages against a public authority. 
In Axon v Ministry of Defence,256 the High Court ruled on the vicarious liability of the Ministry 
of Defence for a tort of misuse of private information committed by an employee. The court 
applied the law on vicarious liability as decided by the Supreme Court in Mohamud v WM 
Morrison Supermarkets plc257 and Cox v Ministry of Justice.258 Those cases required by a 
relationship between the tortfeasor and the defendant and between that relationship and the 
tortious act.259 An employee was straightforwardly in such a relationship.260 Although the 
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employee was acting in her own interests,261 her connection was greater than “mere 
opportunity”262 because the employee worked “in a security sensitive environment”, with 
access to Top Secret classifications, and her job included “the task to preserve that 
confidentiality”.263 There was “a clear and obvious connection between that wrong and that 
part of her job which required her to keep such information confidential”.264 The court 
therefore imposed vicarious liability on the Ministry of Defence.265 It will commonly be the 
case that employees of public authorities work in a security sensitive environment and are 
tasked with preserving the confidentiality of private information in the course of their 
employment.266 It will frequently be the case then that misuse of private information by civil 
servants or other employees of public authorities will result in vicarious liability. The effect is 
to reduce the public-private divide and establish more equal protection according to an 
individual approach. The development of the tort has therefore had another important impact 
on the public-private divide by undermining an earlier state-facilitative approach to damages, 
to the extent that the tort is available.267 
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE IN NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
The decision of New Labour to pass the HRA resulted in a significant expansion of a state-
restrictive approach to Article 8 ECHR in the UK. This was especially so in relation to the 
duties of public authorities, those carrying out public functions, and in relation to public 
authority surveillance, information gathering, databases and stop and search. The courts 
adopted a similar state-restrictive approach, both regarding the scope of section 6 and the 
application of concepts of proportionality and “in accordance with the law”, prompted by and 
in response to ECtHR criticism of national jurisprudence. Despite this, some aspects of 
national jurisprudence show a more state-facilitative approach, including in relation to 
damages under the HRA. This shows national resistance and divergence from the ECHR 
jurisprudence and approach. The development of the tort of misuse of private information, 
including its generous damages provision and in light of vicarious liability, has done much to 
erode the public-private divide at the national level by providing remedies against private 
actors. An individual approach underpinned that development and was driven by the national 
courts, influenced and inspired but not compelled by Europe, certainly not until after the tort 
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had been substantially established. Nor was it, before 2004, clearly required by the positive 
obligations of the court under Article 8, given effect by section 6 HRA. Judicial development 
predated such developments and suggested a more cooperative role of the courts, 
encouraged by legislative inaction but tempered by existing attitudes towards the proper role 
of the courts in the UK constitution before the developing ECHR jurisprudence validated and 
required what was already occurring. The development of the tort of misuse of private 
information can be seen as in continuity with earlier case law on breach of confidence. This 
has undoubtedly done much to close the public-private divide and shows the role of the 
national courts in shaping the public-private divide in UK information law and the rise of the 
individual approach, including by undermining the national state-facilitative approach to 
damages under the HRA. 
The national law on human rights therefore demonstrates a complex interaction between 
different approaches. Government and Parliament pursued variations on the state-restrictive 
approach, while national courts adopted state-restrictive approaches with some state-
facilitative tendencies in their interpretation of the HRA. Those courts also contributed to a 
parallel development of the common law in accordance with an individual approach. This 
area of law demonstrates the rise of an individual approach must be understood alongside 
the resurgence and enhancement of a state-restrictive approach and the endurance of state-
facilitative tendencies. The development is more complex than a mere struggle between 
different approaches. Nor does it show a straightforward shift from a state-restrictive to an 
individual approach to individual information law. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE AND EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION 
INTRODUCTION 
The history of the public-private divide in European data protection reflects the influence of a 
variety of approaches to the public-private divide: market approaches concerned to facilitate 
the free flow of information, individual approaches jealous to protect personal data and 
defend information rights against both public and private actors, state-restrictive approaches 
that emphasise the additional limits and legality requirements that must be placed on 
legitimate public authority processing; and state-facilitative approaches seeking flexibility and 
exemptions for public authorities in the discharge of their duties and exercise of their 
authority. European data protection’s history gives a clear demonstration of the complex 
interaction of the four approaches and diverse actors in the public-private divide in individual 
information law. The diverse actors who shaped the public-private divide in European data 
protection ranged from European State governments and legislatures to networks of data 
protection authorities and several European and international institutions, including judicial 
actors. It illustrates the complexity of the projects and objectives that shaped the public-
private divide.  
Rather than an inevitable, inexorable shift from a state-restrictive approach and towards the 
individual approach, a more complex set of interactions occurred. Neither was the 
development of the public-private divide the result merely of struggle, although struggle 
undoubtedly played a role. Instead, the development of European data protection was a 
reaction against the state-restrictive approach in the early jurisprudence on the right to 
respect for private life in Article 8 ECHR. That reaction was motivated by the concerns of an 
individual approach. This catalysed market concerns in turn. Those market and individual 
concerns cooperated to drive the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data in 1981 (1981 Convention) and Data Protection 
Directive 46/95 EC, tempered by state-facilitative resistance from European states. 
European courts and latterly the European Parliament have showed more state-restrictive 
tendencies alongside parallel individual tendencies.  
The state-restrictive approach was present in the thought of the ECJ and CJEU as it 
interpreted the Data Protection Directive 1995 and clearly resurged in the drafting of the 
GDPR. State-facilitative tendencies endured across all major legislative attempts to regulate 
for data protection and market approaches remained an ever present, even foundational, 
concern in this field. Early European data protection can only be understood as a reaction to 
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problems created by the deeper rejection of the state-restrictive early jurisprudence of the 
ECHR in favour of a more individual approach. The market approach this catalysed was 
concerned about the barriers to the free flow of information which were threatened by ad hoc 
national legislative developments across Europe.1  
This complex picture is also found in EC and EU data protection. European data protection 
under the Data Protection Directive was catalysed by the individual approach favoured by a 
transnational network of data protection authorities but was ultimately shaped by the market 
approach favoured by the European Community (EC) and its institutions. At the same time, 
Member State governments efforts to secure state-facilitative exemptions tempered the Data 
Protection Directive. This was followed by a more state-restrictive model pursued by the 
CJEU and its predecessors under the influence of fundamental rights. The CJEU also acted 
ultimately to regulate private actors more robustly under the influence of fundamental rights 
reasoning, although this was not as comprehensive.2 CJEU jurisprudence therefore reflects 
shifting or parallel state-restrictive and individual themes in its jurisprudence, similar to that 
found in the ECHR jurisprudence. European data protection, after the Lisbon Treaty, saw the 
market approach well established but transcended by individual and state-restrictive 
approaches driven by renewed fears about technology, globalisation and public authorities’ 
data processing. Once again, Member States were successful in extracting many state-
facilitative exemptions to key provisions as concessions.3 
The history of the public-private divide in European data protection demonstrates the role of 
complex interactions between diverse approaches. It does not show any simple shift in 
thinking along deterministic trajectories from a state-restrictive towards an individual 
approach but neither does it reflect a dynamic of mere struggle. The interactions of the four 
approaches identified played an important role in shaping individual information law in this 
field. 
THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION  
In the 1970s, the Council of Europe became the first international organisation to seek to 
regulate data processing. This culminated in the 1981 Convention. The Council of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) similarly made 
recommendations in 1981 concerning guidelines governing the protection of privacy and 
trans-border flows of personal data. Neither of these projects sought to establish extensive 
rights and were drafted in abstract and general terms, with significant flexibility for national 
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implementation and some state-facilitative exemptions, reflecting the veto power of national 
Governments in those negotiations. The resulting low standards and broad uniformity across 
the public-private divide, albeit with state-facilitative exemptions, was consistent with a 
market approach seeking to promote trans-border data flows. 
However, to understand the rise of such projects, which reflected a market approach, albeit 
tempered by national state-facilitative elements, it is necessary to see them in the context of 
a deeper rejection of the state-restrictive approach of the ECHR by some national and sub-
national European legislatures in the late 1960s and 1970s. This resulted in an uneven 
regulation of public and private actors across Europe. The rejection reflected a variety of 
attempts to secure rights consistent with an individual approach. It was this piecemeal 
rejection of a state-restrictive approach at the national and sub-national level, which resulted 
in piecemeal regulation of the private sector across Europe in particular, that generated a 
response from international organisations driven by a market approach. The development of 
European data protection was therefore the result of a complex interaction between these 
different approaches to the public-private divide.  
Pressure from advocates of an individual approach explains the existence of market-driven 
responses in the first place. Indeed, without such pressure, a market approach might 
otherwise have simply supported an absence of regulation. The development of the public-
private divide in European data protection therefore reflects a more complex interaction of 
approaches: neither linear progress towards the individual approach nor a mere struggle. 
The development of European data protection did not occur within a core set of institutions, 
as in the case in the ECHR, but across national and sub-national European legislatures in 
response to the perceived inadequacy of ECHR jurisprudence. This produced apparently 
unintended consequences for European data flows and markets. The choices made by 
national and sub-national European legislatures thereby created a structural problem, which 
provided the context for the international response of the Council of Europe and the OECD. 
In this, preferences for individual, state-facilitative and market approaches interacted. 
Although the limited institutional mechanisms available, especially the prevalence of state 
vetoes, prevented detailed harmonisation of data protection in European markets and 
enabled state-facilitative exemptions to be extracted, the very existence of such responses 
at least points to consensus among European governments around the need for a market 
approach, if only at a relatively high level of abstraction and subject to state-facilitative 
exemptions.  
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REJECTION OF THE STATE-RESTRICTIVE APPROACH IN EARLY ARTICLE 8 ECHR JURISPRUDENCE 
In the 1960s, privacy concerns arose alongside technological developments.4 The “computer 
revolution” enabled private actors to infringe privacy in ways that were historically only 
available to large public authorities.5 By the 1970s and 1980s, these fears were articulated 
as threats to human rights.6 Although few actual abuses were identified,7 policy makers 
feared that large private bureaucracies could use computer technology to harm individuals.8 
This encouraged an individual approach in thinking about the public-private divide in relation 
to personal data. Hondius considers that early government action at the national level was 
largely a response to such concerns.9 Paradoxically, he observes that in many cases public 
authority projects were in fact the catalyst for data protection debates10 and the “ill feeling” 
directed at private uses of technology manifested itself against “actual and proposed 
applications in the public sector.”11 Greater urgency met regulation in the public than the 
private sector, although a number of States introduced data protection legislation targeting 
private bodies as well.12  
The development of data protection in Europe did not occur primarily within the framework of 
European human rights, which might seem a natural candidate for an individual approach. 
National legislatures instead responded to demand for regulation from the late 1960s 
because there was a widespread conviction, supported by contemporaneous human rights 
jurisprudence, that international human rights were inadequate as a means to address new 
technological privacy concerns.13 First and foremost, Article 8 EHCR was at that time 
understood to impose only negative obligations on the state in relation to public authorities. It 
therefore lacked an adequate response to concerns about threats to privacy from the private 
sector.14 The recognition of positive obligations to regulate private actors’ use of private 
information did not start to develop until the late 1990s. The Committee of Experts on 
Human Rights made such criticisms of Article 8 ECHR in 1970.15 A 1980 Recommendation 
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of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe similarly considered Article 8 ECHR 
lacking,16 although its proposed solution was that data protection should be added as a 
Protocol to the ECHR. This recommendation was supported by the European Parliament in 
1982.17 
The perceived inadequacies of Article 8 ECHR were not exclusively limited to the public-
private divide. Hondius observes that the failure of Article 8 ECHR to produce the “detailed 
instructions” needed for effective data protection was another aspect of its inadequacy.18 
This was firstly because it was drafted in only “very general terms”.19 Furthermore, the 
development of ECHR jurisprudence was cumbersome and could not match “the rapid 
process of computerisation”.20 Finally, the ECHR was a “closed” Convention, incapable 
accepting members from outside Europe as the world became more global. This concern 
influenced the adoption of the 1981 Convention, which could address global information 
flows.21   
The action of national legislatures produced a variety of responses, which reflected national 
concerns, priorities and agendas, as well as differing data protection and privacy traditions.22 
There was also very little by way of a coherent approach to data protection in the UK in the 
1970s, although individual laws had some application in relation to particular privacy 
issues.23 This rejection of the state-restrictive approach in Article 8 ECHR and resultant 
proliferation of diverse national responses generated concern for the flow of information in 
European markets and the barriers to trade that national legislation could create. National 
Governments did not, however, abandon their concern for state-facilitative approaches 
regarding national public authorities. This resulted in individual and market approaches 
increasing in influence, albeit tempered by state-facilitative concerns in early European data 
protection.  
THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION 
In the early 1970s, the Council of Europe made calls for the harmonisation of laws on data 
protection. On 26 September 1973, it adopted Resolution (73) 22 on the protection of the 
privacy of individuals vis-à-vis electronic data banks in the private sector. Although the 
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Resolution was only directed at the private sector, it was understood as attempting to effect 
a reconciliation of the individual and market concerns. The Preamble to the Resolution 
recognised the need for legislation to “prevent abuses in the storing, processing and 
classification of personal information by means of electronic data banks in the private sector” 
but also stressed that it was “urgent” to “prevent further divergences between the laws of 
member States in this field”, at least until international agreement was reached on a more 
extensive form of regulation. The thinking behind the Resolution was not motivated by a 
desire to create a public-private divide. 
Further support for this can be found in the explanatory note to the Resolution, which 
commented that the use of computers in the public and private sectors was “not basically 
different.”24 The decision to prioritise the private sector in the Resolution was made by the 
Sub-Committee of the European Committee on Legal Co-operation in 1971, which prioritised 
the private sector because it was “distinctly international” and “a lack of efficient national 
controls might weaken the position of individuals”.25 To the extent that the earlier Resolution 
created a public-private divide, it was therefore one based on priority and perceived urgency 
rather than substance. 
On 29 September 1974, the Council of Europe adopted Resolution (74) 29, which elaborated 
a set of principles for the public sector. The principles in the two Resolutions are 
substantially similar, albeit with some differences of scope. When considered together, the 
Resolutions reflect a market approach.  
The key exception to this is the third principle of Resolution (74) 29, which sought to impose 
constraints on legislation permitting public authorities to carry out data processing, where 
processing was of “information relating to the intimate private life of individuals” or where the 
processing might result in unfair discrimination. Resolution (73) 22, by contrast, banned 
processing of such data by the private sector entirely. The third principle of Resolution (74) 
29 by contrast permitted the processing of such data, subject to a requirement to make 
provision by law, special regulation or public statement, clearly stating the purpose of 
storage and use of the information and the circumstances in which it could be 
“communicated either within the public administration or to private persons or bodies”. Such 
data could not be used for other purposes without explicit legal permission. To that extent, 
therefore, it also contained a state-restrictive element in the context of an overall more state-
facilitative approach to processing data, when compared to the total ban in the private 
sector. 
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The explanatory note to the Resolution noted that it was “prudent only to formulate general 
principles and to leave it to the discretion of member States to decide in which fields and in 
what manner these principles should be implemented.”26 The Resolutions reflect a broadly 
market approach tempered and limited by a state-facilitative approach. This reflects the 
dominance of State governments and their ability to veto more extensive or detailed 
regulation. However, the very fact these Resolutions were passed in the early 1970s also 
reflects a mixture market and individual concerns. Different approaches therefore interacted, 
finding much common ground in the shape of the resolutions, rather than being in 
straightforward conflict or showing a simple rise of an individual approach. The individual 
approach was deeply connected to market concerns and both state-restrictive and state-
facilitative elements coexisted alongside it. 
THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THE 1981 CONVENTION 
The Council of Europe achieved a more extensive treaty with the 1981 Convention, which 
was opened for signature in January 1981 and signed by the United Kingdom in May 1981.27 
It was the first legally binding measure of several international attempts to harmonise data 
protection provisions across Europe. It shows evidence of a further attempt to reconcile 
individual and market considerations, and a more limited scope for potentially state-
facilitative derogations.  
The Preamble emphasised that it was “desirable to extend the safeguards for everyone’s 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular the right to the respect for privacy, taking 
account of the increasing flow across frontiers of personal data undergoing automatic 
processing” while “reaffirming at the same time their commitment to freedom of information 
regardless of frontiers” and “recognising that it is necessary to reconcile the fundamental 
values of the respect for privacy and the free flow of information between peoples”. The 
1981 Convention included public authorities within its definition of persons and bodies who 
were capable of being a “controller of the file”.28 It expressly provided that its scope extended 
to both public and private sectors.29 Article 9 of the 1981 Convention did, however, make 
provision for derogations with potential application to public authorities, such as State 
security, public safety, the monetary interest of the State, the suppression of criminal 
offences, where this was provided by law and necessary in a democratic society. It sought a 
                                               
26 Ibid., para. 11. 
27 Home Office, Data Protection: The Government’s Proposals for Legislation (April 1982) 1981/82 
Cmnd. 8539, para. 5. 
28 Article 2(d) CPIAPD. 
29 Article 3(1) CPIAPD. 
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reconciliation of individual and market approaches with a more limited state-facilitative 
exception than Resolution (74) 29.  
THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT AND PERSONAL DATA 
In September 1981, the United Kingdom endorsed the Recommendation of the Council of 
the OECD concerning guidelines governing the protection of privacy and trans-border flows 
of personal data. The OECD was more clearly driven by market concerns.30 The preamble to 
the Recommendation made the removal of trade barriers central to its purpose, recognising 
“a common interest” in “reconciling fundamental but competing values such as privacy and 
the free flow of information”. The free flow of information required “the development of 
compatible rules and practices” and could be hindered by national legislation. The 
Recommendation determined “to advance the free flow of information between Member 
countries and to avoid the creation of unjustified obstacles to the development of economic 
and social relations among Member countries.” The Recommendation’s guidelines extended 
to “personal data, whether in the public or private sectors, which, because of the manner in 
which they are processed or because their nature or the context in which they are used, 
pose a danger to privacy and individual liberties.”31 The guidelines were neutral in their 
application to the public and private sectors: an absence of a public-private divide which is 
consistent with its market logic. 
EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION: DRAFTING DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE 46/95 EC  
MARKET APPROACHES TEMPERED BY STATE-FACILITATIVE EXEMPTIONS 
The Data Protection Directive (DPD) shared similar concerns to early European data 
protection. Jay attributes the Directive to the internal market’s need for the free flow of 
information.32 The  Directive was shaped profoundly by the market approach. Its principles 
applied to data controllers irrespective of whether they were public authorities or private 
actors, unless Member States made use of derogations in the implementation of the Data 
Protection Directive or otherwise legislated consistently with the Data Protection Directive to 
introduce a national public-private divide. 
A state-facilitative influence is also apparent in the text of the Directive. Article 3(2) DPD, on 
the scope of the Directive, provided that the Directive did not apply to activities “concerning 
public security, defence, State security (including the economic well-being of the State when 
                                               
30 Home Office, Data Protection: The Government’s Proposals for Legislation (April 1982) 1981/82 
Cmnd. 8539, para. 5. 
31 OECD Recommendation, guideline 2. 
32 Jay (2012), p. 13. 
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the processing operation relates to State security matters) and the activities of the State in 
areas of criminal law”. This limitation on scope fulfilled a clear state-facilitative objective. 
Similarly, derogations available under Article 8(4) DPD enabled Member States to make 
exemptions to the prohibition on processing sensitive personal data for “reasons of 
substantial public interest”. This provision was substantially state-facilitative in application, 
although of course it was also applicable to processing activities by private data controllers. 
Article 8(5) DPD made special provision for official control of criminal conviction data. Article 
13(1) DPD permitted certain other derogations necessary to safeguard national security; 
defence; public security; the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal 
offences, or of breaches of ethics for regulated professions; an important economic or 
financial interest of a Member State or of the European Union, including monetary, 
budgetary and taxation matters; or a monitoring, inspection or regulatory function connected, 
even occasionally, with the exercise of official authority in certain cases. Although these 
various derogations are not explicitly limited to public authorities, a state-facilitative approach 
underpins them. They were drafted primarily with state-facilitative objectives in mind.33 
All the legal bases for processing data in Article 7 DPD appeared equally available to both 
public authorities and private actors. There was an additional basis in Article 7(e) DPD for 
processing “necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in 
the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party to whom the data 
are disclosed.” Recital 32 DPD provided a state-facilitative explanation for the silence as to 
the status of such a controller: “it is for national legislation to determine whether the 
controller performing a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official 
authority should be a public administration or another natural or legal person governed by 
public law, or by private law such as a professional association.” Although Article 7(e) DPD 
was therefore available to certain private actors, its underlying purpose was to make lawful 
processing in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority. It was ultimately state-
facilitative, although it acknowledged that private actors may contribute to such processing 
on behalf of the state.  
THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL APPROACH IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DATA PROTECTION 
DIRECTIVE 
A history of the  Directive that emphasised only a market approach, tempered by state-
facilitative aspects, would neglect the key role of advocates of an individual approach in the 
                                               
33 However, there was also a derogation permitting Member States to adopt legislative measures to 
restrict the scope of certain Articles of the Directive where it was a necessary measure to safeguard 
“the protection of the data subject or of the rights and freedoms of others”: Article 13(1)(g) DPD.   
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development of the Directive. Pearce and Platten argue that the Directive combined internal 
market and human rights concerns,34 although they do argue that it was primarily a response 
to the failure of early European data protection attempts to “bring about sufficient 
equivalence to guarantee the free movement of data”.35 Article 1 DPD and the Recitals 
certainly reflected an attempted reconciliation between privacy and the free flow of 
information, and with that both individual and market concerns. 
However, it is necessary to explain the cause of this “evolution” in the EC’s approach to the 
internal market.36 As Simitis observes, the Data Protection Directive marked a change in the 
European Commission’s attitude from resistance to support for data protection in order to 
assist the development of information technology in the internal market.37 Newman similarly 
noted that there was resistance at the level of the EC before the 1990s to harmonised data 
protection.38 Part of the explanation for this change in attitude was certainly perceived 
failures of early European data protection to go far enough to harmonise data protection 
across Europe. However, a fuller explanation also should also note the important role played 
by advocates of an individual approach in producing this change in the Commission. The 
strategy of transnational data protection authorities was an important catalyst for the 
Directive. In this way an individual approach worked to promote legislation which ultimately 
adopted a more market logic. 
Newman argues that national data protection authorities played an “innovative role… in 
motivating and maintaining supranational action”.39 He argues that this process, rather than 
integration driven by the interests of firms and States or the Commission, as neoliberal or 
neofunctional accounts might emphasise respectively, was responsible for the development 
of the Directive.40 He argues that the construction of a “European agenda” was the work of a 
transnational network of data protection authorities, which emerged from bodies created by 
national legislation in the 1970s.41 This network was fearful that those countries which then 
lacked data protection, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, would become “data 
havens” and undercut the regulatory effectiveness of national data protection authorities.42 
                                               
34 Pearce and Platten (1998), p. 532. 
35 Ibid., p. 531. 
36 Ibid., p. 532. 
37 Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on the Protection of Personal Data 
(1994-1995) 80 Iowa L Rev 445, 446 
38 Abraham Newman, Building Transnational Civil Liberties: Transgovernmental Entrepreneurs and 
the European Data Privacy Directive (2008) 62(1) International Organization 103, p. 105. 
39 Abraham Newman, “Privacy Protection in Europe: Administrative Feedbacks and Regional Politics”, 
in Meunier and McNamara (eds.) The State of the European Union (2007), pp. 124 to 125. 
40 Newman (2007), pp. 125 to 126. 
41 Ibid., p. 137. 
42 Ibid., p. 132. 
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This was because the single internal market permitted greater mobility for data controllers 
who could choose a more favourable regulatory regime.43 National data protection 
authorities therefore lobbied for legislation from the EC.44 They were concerned about the 
effectiveness of national regulation in defending individual information rights. 
Significantly, on several occasions regulators used national powers to block the flow of 
information from France and in relation to the Schengen Area,45 actions that “demonstrated 
that they could disrupt critical Community goals of integrating the European market and 
creating a European public administration.”46 The Commission’s 1990 proposal for the Data 
Protection Directive was made in the context of this actual and potential disruption. These 
threats both to the market and to public administration that were motivated by concerns of 
the individual approach. It is this further interaction between different approaches that more 
fully explains the Commission’s motivation to initiate legislation at the EC level and to 
attempt a reconciliation of market and individual approaches. 
However, Newman’s view is still only a partial explanation for the timing of the Directive 
proposal. The role of the transnational data protection network and the EC institutions was 
also facilitated by an earlier reforms in the EC. These reforms themselves reflected a 
broader market-orientated ambition, albeit not directed at information law in particular. The 
legal basis for the Directive was Article 100a EC Treaty. This was a new provision 
introduced three years earlier by the Single European Act 1987 (SEA), an instrument which 
was aimed at the creation of a truly single internal market in Europe.47 This was important for 
European data protection in two respects. First, unanimous voting required by Article 100 
Treaty of Rome was replaced with qualified majority voting. Secondly, Article 100a EC 
Treaty only required measures to “have as their object the establishing and functioning of the 
internal market”, whereas Article 100 Treaty of Rome had required harmonisation to “directly 
affect the establishment or functioning of the common market”. This loosening of the direct 
link to the internal market helped secure the legal basis for data protection legislation in the 
EC, although this claim was nevertheless contested and questioned during negotiations.48 
Unanimous voting and a requirement for a direct link would have made the Directive either 
politically impossible, given opposition to the Directive from some Member States and the 
questions raised about its legality even under Article 100a EC Treaty, or would have 
                                               
43 Newman (2008), p. 113. 
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45 Newman (2008), pp. 103 to 105 and 114 to 116. 
46 Newman (2007), p. 134. 
47 Jay (2012) p. 24. 
48 See, for example, Meetings of the Working Party on Economic Questions (Data Protection), 25 
February 1991, para. 9 (Ireland); 27 and 28 March 1991, para. 3 (Belgium); and 2 and 3 May 1991, 
para. 9. 
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seriously weakened its provisions. The existence of a broader market focus in the EC 
therefore framed the ability of national and transnational actors to pursue or resist change in 
the 1990s. The reform of the EC Treaties to facilitate more legislation directed towards the 
single market was crucial for the Directive. Such changes were most likely not remotely 
motivated by concern for data protection but had an important, if unintended or unforeseen, 
impact on the shape of the law in this field. The Directive was a development that could only 
have occurred after the SEA 1987. 
The influence of data protection authorities, and their agenda with its individual approach, 
waned during the passage of the Directive. The influence of transnational data protection 
authorities was much reduced in the negotiations that followed the 1990 Commission 
proposal itself. These negotiations featured a far greater role for Member State 
governments, for whom national concerns played a greater role. This tempered the Directive  
with the state-facilitative demands of Member States. Meanwhile, European institutions, who 
also played a substantial role, were motivated by a market approach, as were some Member 
States.49 Structurally and institutionally, the EC focused more on a market approach once it 
had been galvanised into action by advocates of an individual approach. 
THE 1990 PROPOSAL: A RECONCILIATION OF INDIVIDUAL AND MARKET APPROACHES WITHIN A 
STATE-RESTRICTIVE FRAMEWORK 
Although the 1990 Proposal from the Commission contained a pronounced public-private 
divide in its structure, reflecting a German model of data protection,50 it did not survive into 
the final draft. The resistance to the proposal apparent from Member States and the 
European Parliament reflects the concerns of a market approach to data protection. Other 
efforts to temper the Directive with state-facilitative elements were made by some Member 
State governments. Despite being catalysed by individual and market approaches, the initial 
proposal was in fact surprisingly state-restrictive, an approach that was fiercely resisted by 
Member States and European institutions, whose motivations did not lie in state-restrictive or 
individual approaches but in a mixture of state-facilitative and market concerns. 
The recitals to the proposed Directive explained that “the establishment and the functioning 
of an internal market” required both the free flow of personal data and the safeguarding of 
fundamental rights.51 The recitals considered that the “wide variety” of data protection laws 
and different levels of data protection between Member States “may prevent the 
                                               
49 See below, pp. 124 to 125. 
50 Pearce and Platten (1998), p. 533; Gloria Gonzalez Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data 
Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU (2014), p. 126. 
51 Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the protection of individuals in relation to the processing 
of personal data COM (90) 314 final – SYN 287 90/C 277/03 (27 July 1990), recital 1. 
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transmission” of data and so ““constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of a number of economic 
activities at Community level, distort competition and impede authorities in the discharge of 
their responsibilities under Community law”.52 However, the Directive clearly recognised the 
importance of the fundamental rights objective of those laws, so that their “approximation… 
must not result in any lessening of the protection they afford but must, on the contrary, seek 
to ensure a high level of protection in the Community”.53 
Although the initial proposal applied to “files in the public and private sectors” to the extent 
that they were within the scope of EC law,54 it distinguished between the public and private 
sectors.55 This distinction turned on whether the activities were governed by public law, 
including the exercise of official authority by an entity governed by private law, or were 
“industrial or commerce [activities]”, including that of public authorities carrying out such 
activities.56 Public sector processing was only lawful “in so far as… necessary for the 
performance of the tasks of the public authority in control of the file”, with consent, where 
pursuant to law, or “in order to ward off an imminent threat to public order or a serious 
infringement of the rights of others”.57 The communication of personal data from the public 
sector to the private sector was also lawful for the legitimate interests of a private sector 
actor which prevailed over the data subject’s interest in non-disclosure. This was not 
available in the context of public sector processing.58 Requirements of notification and 
registration with a supervisory authority were limited to the public sector.59 Processing in the 
private sector was lawful with consent, carried out under contract or quasi-contract, in the 
pursuit of a legitimate interest and for using generally accessible data for correspondence.60 
Notification of the data subject was required of private sector actors, unless the 
communication was required by law,61 but no registration with a supervisory authority was 
required.  
The original proposal was therefore much more state-restrictive: the public sector could not 
rely on contract or its own legitimate interests to process, which was not the case in the final 
Directive. The public sector was limited to public tasks and legal powers even in relation to 
generally accessible information. Only the public sector was subject to registration with a 
supervisory authority. This appears to have reflected the position in German law which was 
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56 See Ibid., Article 2(g) and (h). 
57 See Ibid., Article 5, 6(1)(a) and 6(2). 
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59 Ibid., Article 7. 
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considered to be a leader in data protection.62 Some exceptions did, however, apply in 
favour of the public sector in relation to the requirement to provide information at the time of 
collection for certain public functions and the maintenance of public order63 and to the data 
subject’s right of access to public sector files.64 Public interest derogations were permitted 
from the prohibition of processing certain sensitive personal data.65 The original proposal 
also sought to confine data concerning criminal convictions to only public sector files, so that 
only public sector bodies could benefit from it.66 State-facilitative elements were therefore 
present even in the Commission’s original state-restrictive proposal.  
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S MARKET APPROACH 
There is little evidence beyond the draft of the proposed Directive that shows the 
Commission sought a state-restrictive approach. Its other actions point to a market approach 
to the public-private divide. The Commission explained that the 1981 Convention’s “large 
number of options for… implementation” made it inadequate as a harmonisation measure, 
especially as only seven Member States had ratified it and only six had implemented it with 
national legislation.67 The Commission recalled its earlier recommendation to ratify the 1981 
Convention,68 which reserved the option to “adopt an instrument on the basis of the EEC 
Treaty” should Member States fail to ratify the 1981 Convention.69 The resultant diversity 
had caused “an obstacle to completion of the internal market”,70 although the Commission 
was silent about the actions of national data protection authorities and their expressed desire 
to push for such legislation with a commitment to an individual approach. The Commission 
was also persuaded that harmonisation should go further than the available EC legal powers 
would permit. The Commission proposed a draft resolution to extend the coverage of the 
Directive to the public sector when it would not otherwise apply as being outside the scope 
of the Directive for “the sake of consistency”.71 This was to be implemented via Member 
States taking national legislative action not otherwise required by the Directive.72 This 
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reflects a market approach. It is not clear why a state-restrictive approach was prominent in 
the 1990 proposal beyond the influence of German data protection law.73 
RESISTANCE TO THE PROPOSED DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE 
Pearce and Platten note that the proposed Directive was controversial and received 
sustained criticism, especially in relation to the proposed public-private divide.74 
Commentators have suggested that this criticism, and the removal of the public-private 
divide from the proposed Directive in 1992, was the result of Member State attempts to avoid 
excessive implementation costs. For example, Pearce and Platten argue that Member 
States criticism embodied a strategic desire on the part of Member States to ensure that the 
resulting Directive reflected something of their pre-existing practices and data protection 
traditions.75 Simitis similarly argues that the Directive did not reflect a genuine attempt at 
harmonisation for the sake of common rules but rather reflected Member State interests in 
preserving their own regulatory traditions.76 The effect of this political logic was, in his view, 
to limit the capacity of the Directive to adopt radical changes.77 They suggest that this 
struggle limited the development of data protection law: the multiple veto points created by 
needing to secure Member State support for the proposed Directive resulted in a change in 
approach. Such narratives align with broader accounts of the role of struggle in the 
development of information law. 
Commenting on the Commission’s 1992 revised proposal, Pearce and Platten note that the 
new text emphasised “the fundamental and more familiar provisions of the [1981 
Convention]”.78 It also represented a rebalancing of the influence of different data protection 
traditions including France, the Netherlands and the UK.79 Pearce and Platten suggest that 
the greater French influence was in part the result of CNIL secondments to the Commission 
as part of a strategy to shape the evolving proposal.80 This revised proposal met with greater 
success and support.81  
I do not doubt that the strategic desire to avoid too drastic a change in the structure of 
national law motivated some resistance to the original proposal for a Directive. However, an 
analysis of the preparatory materials for the Directive also reveal substantive criticism of the 
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76 Simitis (1994-1995), p. 449. 
77 Ibid., p. 451. 
78 Pearce and Platten (1998), p. 533. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
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public-private divide, rooted in a deeper set of concerns about the workability of the Directive 
as a market measure and the defensibility of the public-private divide it sought to draw. This 
points to the role of a market approach adopted by some Member States and in the 
European Parliament as an explanation for the criticism and revision of the original proposal 
in later drafts. It is therefore mistaken to characterise the 1992 rewrite as the result purely of 
a clash of Member State interests, based on their pre-existing approach. Instead there was 
disagreement over the substantive approach itself.82 
The diversity of Member States’ political economies, with a variety different models for the 
role of public authorities and private actors in providing public services, would mean that a 
strong public-private divide in data protection at the European level would have produced a 
lack of harmonisation in different sectors across Europe, depending on whether that sector 
was a public, private or mixed sector in different Member States. There was also a fear that 
such a divide would produce uncertainty in application and so undermine harmonisation 
across Europe. Simitis argues that a clear delineation or limitation to the private sector was 
impossible, although he considered that the “true area of activity”  of the Directive was the 
market rather than the public sector.83 These concerns are those of a market approach. 
At early meetings of the Working Party on Economic Questions (Data Protection), several 
Member State delegations questioned the structural public-private divide in the proposed 
Data Protection Directive.84 Various delegations pointed to conceptual difficulties in the 
distinction between public and private sectors and doubted its appropriateness.85 Some 
delegations, who did not object to the public-private divide proposed, nevertheless agreed 
that it should be left to Member States during implementation.86 However, this view was not 
universally shared and other Member State delegations supported the divide, arguing that 
different considerations had to be taken into account in the public and private sectors.87 
There was some diversity of approach and a tension between state-restrictive and market 
approaches in those discussions. It was not merely an interest-based clash. Principled 
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objections were advanced for different approaches. Several objections were made that the 
measure as proposed could harm the free flow of information and the market more 
generally. The UK delegation argued that the distinction could cause “practical problems” 
and interpretation issues in “borderline cases”.88 The French delegation argued that the 
limits between the public and private sectors were “often unclear”, which “would lead to 
different distinctions being drawn in the different Member States with a consequential 
distortion of competition”.89  
The European Parliament entirely removed the public-private divide from the structure of the 
proposed Directive in its proposed amendments of 11 March 1992. In the debates of the 
European Parliament on 10 February 1992, Geoff Hoon MEP, the rapporteur, explained that 
there seemed “no good reason to maintain a separation, particularly where in one Member 
State an organisation might be in the public sector and yet in another Member State an 
organisation might well be private.”90 He argued that a “common standard for both” was 
therefore needed.91 This reflects a market approach to data protection, as it was workability 
in light of the diversity in European markets and the needs of harmonisation that drove the 
criticism. On 15 October 1992, the Amended Proposal of the Commission removed the 
formal public-private distinction from the structure of the proposal and made clear that the 
level of protection was the same in each sector “at Parliament’s request”.92 In this, we can 
see an acceptance of the principled and practical arguments being advanced by delegations 
and the European Parliament in favour of a market approach to the Data Protection 
Directive. 
THE ROLE OF MEMBER STATES AND STATE-FACILITATIVE CONCERNS 
The Directive was also tempered by a state-facilitative approach in the negotiations. There 
were repeated attempts by Member State delegations to broaden Article 3(2) DPD, which 
provided exemptions from the scope of the Directive, and also other derogations that protect 
core areas of state interest.93 Struggle therefore played a role here in tempering the Directive 
according to a state-facilitative approach. 
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The UK delegation expressed discomfort with the proposal to only exclude activities outside 
the scope of EC law because the UK was concerned that this could result in areas of data 
processing necessary for national security falling within the shifting definition of EC law.94 
The UK therefore proposed an amendment to add 
without prejudice to the foregoing, it shall not in any event apply to processing 
which relates to, or otherwise affects, State security, public safety, the 
monetary interests of the State (including the assessment or collection of 
public revenues) or law enforcement.95 
Similar requests were made or supported by some Member States,96 but opposed by the 
Commission and others who argued that such provision was too broad.97 In response to 
such requests, the Greek Presidency expanded the list of exemptions and restrictions in 
Article 14 DPD,98 but resisted the attempt to broaden Article 3(2) and instead proposed a 
return to wording similar to the original proposal: “in the course of an activity outside the 
scope of Community law such as data to which Titles V and VI of the Treaty of European 
Union apply.”99 This proposal was not accepted with various further attempts to substitute 
alternative wording that excluded public safety, defence, State security, criminal 
proceedings, State monetary and budgetary interests and public registers.100 Ultimately, the 
Greek Presidency indicated a willingness to make concessions despite considering the 
amendments unnecessary, given the derogations available under Article 14.101 The 
Commission also indicated a willingness to agree to many of the exemptions.102 The 
consolidated draft of 12 October 1994 adopted new wording in Article 3(2) DPD: “and in any 
case to processing concerning public safety, defence, State security and the activities of the 
State in an area of criminal law, excepting the areas which come within Community law”.103 
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Several Member States,104 including the UK, objected to this formulation and both Denmark 
and the UK made further requests for the inclusion of the “economic well-being of the 
State”.105 The Commission once again resisted and considered that the relevant interests 
were adequately covered by Article 14 DPD.106 On 20th February 1995, the Common 
Position Adopted by the Council adopted wording excluding many areas of State interest 
from the proposed DPD entirely, including the economic well-being of the State as part of 
State security under Article 3(2) DPD. This drafting was accepted by the European 
Parliament on the Data Protection Directive’s second reading on 15th June 1995.  
In sum, an extensive process of negotiation thereby resulted in the broadening and 
sharpening of Article 3(2) DPD as part of a reaction by some Member States to protect 
certain areas of State interest with the potential to cross over with activities within 
Community law. The wording reflects compromise on the part of those States who felt it 
unnecessary and reflects the concern of other Member States to protect areas of State 
interest where the complexity of public-private interaction in those areas made harmonised 
data protection a threat. The result was a public-private divide shaped in favour of a state-
facilitative approach in this regard. It shows a complex interaction between the broader 
market approach and state-facilitative exemptions preserved in particular areas. 
EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECJ AND CJEU  
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) and Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
have moved from a broad market approach to the interpretation of the Directive to an 
increasingly state-restrictive approach to data protection with a more muted individual 
approach in relation to processing in the legitimate interests of a (private) data controller 
where those interests seriously impinge upon Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (CFR). The ECJ and CJEU jurisprudence therefore 
demonstrates shifts in emphasis between different approaches over time. Although elements 
of an individual approach have recently arisen, and the courts adopted an earlier market 
logic, the courts were responsible for a significant sharpening of the public-private divide 
informed by the resurgence of a state-restrictive approach. This jurisprudential development 
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predates the CFR and was based on the reception of Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence into 
European data protection as a general principle of law. It therefore resembles the 
developments identified in chapter 3 on European human rights. The effect of fundamental 
rights in European data protection has been strikingly similar to European human rights. 
First, the early jurisprudence concerning the scope of the Data Protection Directive in Article 
3(2) DPD reflected clear concerns of the market approach, albeit more at peace with the 
individual approach aspirations of the Data Protection Directive than Advocate General 
Tizzano.107 His Opinions reflected a narrower approach to EC market harmonisation, less 
influenced by an individual approach. The effect of this early case law was a broad 
application of the Data Protection Directive to public authorities and private actors, limited 
only by the express words of Article 3(2) DPD, narrowly construing the state-facilitative 
exemptions argued for by Member States in the Data Protection Directive negotiations. The 
sharp public-private divide at the edge of the Data Protection Directive’s scope was more a 
function of the constraint imposed by Article 3(2) DPD’s text than of a principled 
endorsement of that limit by the courts. 
Secondly, the jurisprudence developed a state-restrictive approach to processing pursuant 
to law or in the exercise of official authority, first by subjecting processing under Articles 7(c) 
and (e) DPD to Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence as a “general principle of law” and later by 
subjecting such processing to review based on in Articles 7 and 8 CFR, although both share 
a common structure. This introduced more exacting review of the proportionality of such 
processing. 
Thirdly, the CJEU’s recent jurisprudence has extended CFR review to private entities 
processing data in their legitimate interests under Article 7(f) DPD. Although this reflects the 
growing importance of an individual approach to the CFR, it lacks the structured approach 
applied to public authorities. It is more limited in scope.  
A MARKET APPROACH TO THE DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE BUT COMFORTABLE WITH AN 
INDIVIDUAL APPROACH 
In C-465/00 Rechnugshof v Osterreichischer Rundfunk,108 the ECJ held that processing by a 
public audit body was not exempt from the DPD under Article 3(2) DPD. This was because it 
neither concerned an activity that fell outside the scope of EC law nor was it a “processing 
operation concerning public security, defence, State security or the activities of the State in 
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areas of criminal law.”109 The ECJ rejected the suggestion that Article 100a EC Treaty 
required each situation within the scope of the Data Protection Directive to demonstrate an 
actual link with the object of the establishment and functioning of the internal market in 
favour of a more general legislative intention.110 Therefore, the Data Protection Directive did 
not require “specific situations” to have a “sufficient link” to the internal market because this 
would “make the limits of the field of application of the [Data Protection Directive] particularly 
unsure and uncertain” which was contrary to the “essential objective” of harmonisation to 
“eliminate obstacles to the functioning of the internal market deriving precisely from 
disparities between national legislations”.111 The reasoning was fundamentally one of a 
market approach to justify the broad application of the Directive to public authorities and 
private actors. The ECJ was confirmed in its view by the breadth of Article 3(1) DPD, the 
wording of the exemption in first indent of Article 3(2) DPD, and derogations available in 
Article 8(2) DPD. The ECJ argued that these would not be necessary if the Directive only 
applied to “situations where there is a sufficient link” with the internal market.112 No 
consideration was given to the fact that such wording was only adopted by Member States in 
fear of such a broad application of the Data Protection Directive.113 
In C-101/01 Criminal Proceedings Against Bodil Lindqvist,114 the ECJ explained further that 
the activities listed in Article 3(2) were “in any event, activities of the State or of State 
authorities and unrelated to the fields of activity of individuals”. As a result the “exception 
applies only to the activities which are expressly listed there or which can be classified in the 
same category (ejusdem generis)”.115 It could not therefore apply to the charitable or 
religious activities of Lindqvist. The ECJ applied this reasoning in C-524/06 Heinz Huber v 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland to hold that processing with an “objective… connected with the 
fight against crime” fell under the first indent of Article 3(2).116 
The Data Protection Directive therefore applied to all bodies, public or private, with the 
narrow exception of those state activities listed in Article 3(2) DPD. This broad reading of the 
Data Protection Directive’s scope, and narrow interpretation of its exemptions, reflected a 
market approach constrained only by the explicit wording of Article 3(2) DPD, which was 
narrowly interpreted. This represents a narrow textual limit on the ECJ’s otherwise market 
approach jurisprudence, reflecting some Member State’s State-facilitative approach in that 
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hard fought for exemption. However, despite stating a clear market approach in its 
reasoning, there is also reason to think that the ECJ was also comparatively relaxed about 
the individual approach that catalysed the Data Protection Directive and was reinforced by 
its broad application by the ECJ. This can be seen when the ECJ jurisprudence is contrasted 
with Advocate General Tizzano’s Opinions in Lindqvist and Rundfunk. 
Those Opinions were far more concerned to avoid the broad interpretation of Article 100a 
EC Treaty that grounded the ECJ’s expansive approach to the scope of the Data Protection 
Directive, although both Opinions shared a commitment to market harmonisation.117 In 
Lindqvist, the Advocate General’s Opinion argued that Lindqvist’s processing was outside 
the scope of EC law because it was “without any intention of economic gain” and was solely 
ancillary to voluntary work.118 This non-economic activity had no or no direct connection with 
fundamental market freedoms, nor was it governed by specific EC laws, and so it fell within 
Article 3(2) DPD.119 
Notably, the Opinion also rejected the Commission’s argument that “the Directive is not 
confined to pursuing economic objectives but also has objectives connected with social 
imperatives and the protection of fundamental rights”.120 The Opinion argued that this was 
contrived.121 Advocate General Tizzano argued that to do otherwise than to interpret the 
Directive in light of its Article 100a EC Treaty legal basis of the establishment and 
functioning of the single market would call into question the Directive’s “very validity”.122 In 
this regard, the Opinion noted that “no Treaty provision confers on the Community 
institutions any general power to enact rules on human rights.”123 
In Rundfunk, Advocate General Tizzano’s Opinion held that a public audit activity did not fall 
within the scope of the Directive because it was “prescribed and regulated by the Austrian 
authorities (and in fact in a constitutional law) on the basis of a choice of a policy and 
institutional nature made by them autonomously and not intended to give effect to a 
Community obligation,” so that it could “only fall within the competence of the Member 
States.”124 The Advocate General rejected the suggested link argued between Article 141 
(sex discrimination), Articles 136 EC and 137 EC (social policy) and the audit activity.125 He 
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also rejected the link between freedom of movement and audit.126 The Advocate General 
concluded that the processing was not covered by the Directive because it was “effected in 
the course of a public activity of audit of accounts which falls outside the scope of 
Community law within the meaning of Article 3(2) [DPD].”127 To go any further would entail “a 
danger of compromising the validity of the [Data Protection Directive] itself, because, in such 
a case, its legal basis [Article 100a EC Treaty] would clearly be inappropriate.”128 
The Advocate General Opinion in each case showed a clear discomfort with broad 
interpretations of the Data Protection Directive that would cover a range of non-economic 
and State activity, considering that to do so would reflect an individual approach to data 
protection that would call the very legal basis of the Data Protection Directive, and a pure 
market approach, into question. In light of the contrast with the ECJ’s decisions, I suggest 
that the materials show at least that the ECJ was at peace with the individual approach 
implicit in such a broad application of the Data Protection Directive, even if the formal 
reasons given are fundamentally of the market approach. The two approaches are therefore 
both at work in its reasoning.  
A STATE-RESTRICTIVE APPROACH AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
Rundfunk was also significant not only for its explicit market approach to scope but for 
introducing a more state-restrictive approach to processing in compliance with a legal 
obligation imposed by the State or in the exercise of official authority. The ECJ held that the 
Data Protection Directive “must necessarily be interpreted in light of fundamental freedoms, 
which… form an integral part of the general principles of law”.129 It therefore applied Article 8 
ECHR to processing undertaken in relation to Articles 6(1)(c), 7(c) and (e) and 13 DPD,130 
albeit that whether the processing was “both necessary for and appropriate” to the aim of the 
public authority was “a matter for the national courts to examine.”131  
This trend was continued in C-524/06 Heinz Huber v Bundesrepublik Deutschland.132 The 
ECJ held that the concept of necessity in Article 7(e) DPD, though it had “its own 
independent meaning in Community law”,133 incorporated the detailed proportionality review 
characteristic of Article 8 ECHR.134 The case concerned the processing of personal data 
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relating to foreign EU citizens resident in Germany by the Federal Office of Migration and 
Refugees in a central register to which other public authorities had access.135 The ECJ held 
that the “storage and processing of personal data containing individualised personal 
information… for statistical purposes cannot, on any basis, be considered to be necessary 
within the meaning of Article 7(e)” because the aim could be achieved with anonymised data 
alone.136  
Similarly, in C-92/09 Volker and Markus Schecke GbR v Land Hessen, the CJEU applied 
CFR jurisprudence to Article 7(c) DPD.137 The case concerned legislation which required the 
disclosure of personal information relating to the recipients of funds under the Common 
Agricultural Policy and the balance between transparency and data protection. The judgment 
marks the first case in which greater emphasis was given to the CFR than Article 8 ECHR. 
The CFR was signed at Nice in 2000, alongside but not as part of the Treaty of Nice. Articles 
7 and 8 CFR address privacy and data protection. This was the result, at least in part, of a 
“successful lobbying effort” by a former chair of the Article 29 Working Party, Stefano 
Rodota.138 The Lisbon Treaty, signed on 13th December 2007 and entering into force on 1st 
January 2009, gave the CFR the same legal value as the Treaties.139 Although Article 8 
ECHR was cited as legal context,140 the CJEU held that the national legislation’s validity 
“must be assessed in light of the provisions of the Charter”.141 Article 8(1) CFR was not an 
“absolute right” but was conditioned by Article 8(2) CFR and could be limited by Article 52 
CFR.142 The CJEU highlighted that “the meaning or scope” of “rights which correspond to 
rights guaranteed by the [ECHR]” were the same and the CFR did not restrict or adversely 
affect EHCR rights,143 so that “the limitations which may be lawfully be imposed on the right 
to the protection of personal data correspond to those tolerated in Article 8 [ECHR].”144 The 
CJEU found that the national legislation interfered with Articles 7 and 8 CFR,145 and then 
analysed whether it was justified under Article 52 CFR, which required any interference to 
be146 
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provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights and freedoms, and, 
subject to the principle of proportionality, necessary and genuinely meet 
objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union or the need 
to protect the rights and freedoms of others.147 
Increased transparency could be “an objective of general interest recognised by the 
European Union”148 but the measure was not proportionate.149 Less intrusive ways of 
achieving the aim had not been considered, “such as limiting the publication by name 
relating to those beneficiaries according to the periods for which they received aid, or the 
frequency or nature and amount of aid received.”150 An appropriate balance had not 
therefore been struck.151 
All these cases focus on Article 7(c) or 7(e) processing and therefore only on processing 
which is compelled by a legal obligation imposed on the data controller by the state or is 
processing in for public tasks or in the exercise of official authority. To introduce greater 
scrutiny in this manner, based on fundamental rights, and not to do so for other grounds of 
processing under Article 7 DPD, reflects a state-restrictive approach.  
Other aspects of European thought reflect a state-restrictive approach. Schecke is also 
notable for the state-restrictive doubts expressed by Advocate General Sharpston about the 
ability of public authorities to rely on consent as a ground for processing under Article 7(a) 
DPD.  Although the CJEU did not ultimately address this point, Advocate General Sharpston 
stated that  
as a matter of principle a person applying for funding from a public body such 
as the European Union (whether the Union is acting alone or jointly with the 
Member States) cannot be required, solely as a condition of obtaining that 
funding, to forgo a fundamental right from which he would otherwise derive 
protection.152 
As a result, it was irrelevant whether the data subjects had signed application forms on that 
basis.153 
The clearest examples of a state-restrictive approach in Articles 7, 8 and 52 CFR 
jurisprudence can be seen in C-293/12 Digital Rights Ireland and C-203/15 Tele2 Sverige 
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AB.154 Although the CJEU has also applied fundamental rights to private data controller 
processing that infringes Articles 7 and 8 CFR,155 what is significant is the greater detail and 
rigour with which these rights were applied to public authority derogations from data 
protection standards.  
In C-293/12 Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU considered the validity of the Data Retention 
Directive 2006/24/EC (DRD) in light of Articles 7, 8 and 52 CFR.156 The Data Retention 
Directive had been proposed in September 2005 following consultation with national law 
enforcement and sought to harmonise Member State data retention laws for the prevention, 
investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences.157 The CJEU noted that this 
was a “wide-ranging” and “particularly serious infringement” of the rights to private life and 
data protection,158 as the traffic and location data required to be retained would “allow very 
precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data had 
been retained”.159 The CJEU held that the legislation in question must “lay down clear and 
precise rules governing the scope and application of the measure… imposing minimum 
safeguards… to effectively protect… personal data against the risk of abuse and against any 
unlawful access or use”.160 The CJEU criticised the comprehensive and generalised nature 
of retention,161 applicable where there was “no evidence capable of suggesting… a link, 
even an indirect or remote one, with serious crime” and without exceptions for professional 
secrecy.162 The Data Retention Directive was also criticised for lacking a link between the 
retained data and “a threat to public security”, defined by time period, geography, involved 
persons, or persons whose retained data could contribute to fighting serious crime.163 It was 
also criticised for its failure to set “any objective criterion by which to determine the limits of 
the access of the competent national authorities to the data and their subsequent use”,164 
including “substantive and procedural conditions” relating to that access or use,165 or limiting 
the number of persons so authorised “to what is strictly necessary”.166 The absence of “prior 
review carried out by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision 
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seeks to limit” access or use “to what is strictly necessary” was also criticised.167 The CJEU 
held that the lack of distinction between categories of data based on “possible usefulness for 
the purposes of the objective pursued or according to the persons concerned” contributed to 
the Data Protection Directive’s failure to be proportionate.168 Finally, the CJEU held that “the 
determination of the period of retention must be based on objective criteria in order to ensure 
that it is limited to what is strictly necessary”.169 The CJEU concluded that the Data Retention 
Directive did not “lay down clear and precise rules”,170 contain “sufficient safeguards”,171 
define the scope of the Data Retention Directive in a “clear and strict manner”, or impose “a 
specific obligation on Member States to establish such rules”.172 Neither did it “ensure the 
irreversible destruction of the data at the end of the data retention period”,173 or “require the 
data… to be retained within the European Union”.174 The Data Retention Directive therefore 
“exceeded the limits imposed by compliance with the principle of proportionality in the light of 
Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) [CFR]”.175  
In C-203/15 Tele2 Sverige AB and C-698/15 Secretary of State for the Home Department v 
Watson, the CJEU addressed the validity of national legislation requiring the retention of 
data in light of Digital Rights Ireland, including the UK Data Retention and Investigatory 
Powers Act 2014. The CJEU held that the scope of EU law extended to legislative measures 
“that require… providers to retain traffic and location data, since to do so necessarily 
involves the processing, by those providers, of personal data”176 or which relate “to the 
access of the national authorities to the data retained by the providers of electronic 
communications services”.177 Such national data retention legislation was a derogation from 
data protection standards under Article 15 of the Privacy and Electronic Communications 
Directive 2002/58/EC, which elaborated the requirements of the Data Protection Directive in 
the electronic communications sector. As with the DRD, derogations applied only “in so far 
as strictly necessary”178 and “clear and precise rules” were required on scope and 
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safeguards.179 “General and indiscriminate” retention was precluded for the same reasons as 
in Digital Rights Ireland.180 
What is significant about these judgments is the detailed and demanding nature of the 
review of legislation they contain. Although the CFR has played a greater role in constraining 
private data controller processing, private actors procedures and safeguards are not held to 
similar levels of scrutiny. The CJEU has adopted a state-restrictive approach in its 
jurisprudence by applying Article 8 ECHR and later Articles 7, 8 and 52 CFR to the Data 
Protection Directive and more broadly to legislation that enables public authorities to 
interfere with those rights. Public authorities and private bodies processing at the behest of 
the state had to undergo a structured and detailed fundamental rights analysis to process 
data.  
THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND PROCESSING IN THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF 
THE DATA CONTROLLER 
Although the CJEU subsequently brought Articles 7 and 8 CFR to bear on processing for the 
legitimate interests of private actors under Article 7(f) DPD in its more recent decisions, 
indicating some element of an individual approach, this has not matched the rigorous and 
structured approach that applies to public authorities, which must also comply with Article 52 
CFR. 
In C-468/10 ASNEF v Administracion de Estado,181, the CJEU considered whether additional 
restrictions could be imposed by Member States in relation to Article 7(f) DPD processing in 
the legitimate interests of the data controller and concluded that they could not,182 but went 
on to observe that Article 7(f) DPD still “necessitates a balancing of the opposing rights and 
interests concerned” and “must take account of the significance of the data subject’s rights 
rising from Articles 7 and 8 [CFR]”.183 Private data controllers reliance on Article 7(f) DPD as 
a ground of processing was therefore to be tempered by a balancing of their rights and 
interests with the data subjects’ rights in the CFR. However, this is no indication that this is 
as rigorous or structured as that imposed on public authorities. 
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The CJEU revisited the relationship between Article 7(f) DPD and the CFR in C-131/12 
Google Spain SL v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD).184 The CJEU took a 
more robust approach to the protection of fundamental rights against private data processing 
and characterised the objective of the DPD as “ensuring effective and complete protection of 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to 
privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data” so that the Data Protection Directive 
could not be “interpreted restrictively”.185 The Data Protection Directive was to “ensure a high 
level of protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons,”186 and  
in so far as they govern the processing of personal data liable to infringe 
fundamental freedoms, in particular the right to privacy, must necessarily be 
interpreted in light of fundamental rights, which, according to settled case-law, 
form an integral part of the general principles of law whose observance the 
Court ensures and which are now set out in the Charter.187 
 The CJEU observed that search indexing and disclosure to third parties on a personal name 
search by a search engine operator could significantly affect individual privacy and data 
protection rights, an effect “heightened on account of the important role played by the 
internet and search engines in modern society, which render the information contained in 
such a list of results ubiquitous.”188 This led the CJEU to hold that “it is clear that it cannot be 
justified by merely the economic interest which the operator of such an engine has in that 
processing.”189 The CJEU furthermore concluded that the data subject’s rights in such a 
context overrode, “as a rule, not only the economic interest of the operator of the search 
engine but also the interest of the general public in finding that information upon a search 
relating to the data subject's name”, subject to certain instances of “preponderant” public 
interest.190 
This undoubtedly marks a new phase in the CJEU’s jurisprudence, whereby a more robust 
approach has been adopted to secure the fundamental rights of the data subject, not merely 
against public authorities, but also against powerful private data controllers acting in their 
legitimate interests. However, there remains a difference in that the analysis is one of 
balancing rights rather than the more detailed and structured analysis applied to processing 
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pursuant to public power. Although the individual approach has become more influential in 
the CJEU jurisprudence, there is a more significant ongoing role for state-restrictive thinking. 
EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION: LEGISLATIVE REFORMS AFTER LISBON  
A General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was proposed by the European Commission 
in 2012 as part of a package of data protection reforms in the EU. It made use of the new 
legal basis in Article 16 TEU created by the Treaty of Lisbon.191 The GDPR was passed on 
25th May 2016 to come into force on 25th May 2018. The GDPR and its negotiations indicate 
the increased role of an individual approach, building upon the market approach, but with 
both state-restrictive and state-facilitative approaches more influential in the final text. The 
GDPR is therefore the result of the interaction of all four approaches. It does not represent 
straightforwardly the rise of an individual approach, nor a mere struggle between different 
approaches. In particular, the GDPR introduces a much starker state-restrictive public-
private divide in the lawful bases for processing. It marks a resurgence of the state-restrictive 
approach alongside the acceptance of a baseline market approach, the endurance of state-
facilitative exemptions and significant increases in protections for individuals.  
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARKET AND INDIVIDUAL APPROACHES 
Jay observes that Article 16 TEU marked the moment at which a clear legal basis came into 
existence for data protection in its own right “rather than as a single market measure”.192 
However, although the way was open to adopt an individual approach openly, considerations 
of a market approach remained highly influential. In 2012, the Commission sought greater 
harmonisation, arguing that the Data Protection Directive had “not prevented fragmentation 
in the way personal data protection is implemented across the Union”.193 Reform was 
needed to build “trust in the online environment”,194 as there was a “widespread public 
perception that there are significant risks associated notably with online activity”, which was 
a key reason for “a stronger and more coherent data protection framework in the EU”.195  
The GDPR continued the market harmonising project of the Data Protection Directive, 
considering its objectives and principles “sound” though the Directive had failed to prevent 
“fragmentation” in the implementation of data protection across the EU.196 It was feared that 
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this “may prevent the free flow of information” and “constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of 
economic activities at the level of the Union, distort competition and impede authorities in the 
discharge of their responsibilities”.197 The GDPR indicated that building the “trust that will 
allow the digital economy to develop across the internal market” was an important 
objective.198 
On the other hand, an individual approach is far more explicit in the GDPR. The Recitals to 
the proposed draft GDPR highlighted its basis in fundamental rights.199	 The final GDPR 
emphasised the protection of personal data as a “fundamental right”,200 in the context of the 
“exchange of data between public and private actors”201 and technological change and 
globalisation that enable “both private companies and public authorities to make use of 
personal data on an unprecedented scale”.202 The notion of fundamental rights of 
individuals, relevant against both public and private actors reflects thinking associated with 
an individual approach. The GDPR puts in place an extremely strong set of enforcement 
powers, especially in relation to large private undertakings. The GDPR provides for 
administrative fines of the highest of 10 million203 or 20 million euro204 or, for undertakings, 
2%205 and 4%206 respectively of total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial 
year, depending on the provision of the Regulation breached. These levels are significantly 
higher than in the original draft and target large private companies. An undertaking would 
need a total worldwide annual turnover of 500 million euro to be affected by the higher limit 
provided for by the percentage provisions. This marks a significant shift towards an 
individual approach, especially in respect of substantial enforcement powers against both 
public and private actors. 
STATE-FACILITATIVE DIMENSIONS OF THE GDPR 
Several state-facilitative exemptions in the GDPR mirror those in the Data Protection 
Directive. Article 2(2)(a)(c) GDPR excluded processing “by the Member State when carrying 
out activities which fall within the scope of Chapter 2 or Title V of the Treaty on European 
Union”. Various exemptions and restrictions in the GDPR concern crime and public 
                                               
197 Ibid. 
198 Recital 6 GDPR. 
199 Recital 1 GDPR. 
200 Recital 1 GDPR. 
201 Recital 4 GDPR. 
202 Recital 5 GDPR. 
203 Article 79(3) GDPR. 
204 Articles 79(3)(a) and 79(3)(aa) GDPR. 
205 Article 79(3) GDPR. 
206 Articles 79(3)(a) and 79(3)(aa) GDPR. See also Recital 120 GDPR. 
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security,207 the independence of the judiciary,208 tax, finance, regulation.209 GDPR provides 
for various derogations subject to detailed legislation and necessity and provided they are 
proportionate in a democratic society, many of which are state-facilitative in nature, although 
derogations for the safeguarding of the rights and freedoms of others are also listed.210  
The GDPR also contains a number of other state-facilitative exemptions that were not 
present in the Data Protection Directive. Many of these exemptions function to protect public 
authorities from the full force of the Regulation’s provisions and were not in either the 
Commission’s proposal or the European Parliament’s position document following the first 
reading. Instead, they were introduced as part of the Council’s General Approach on 15th 
July 2015, late in the negotiations. This suggests that they were concessions to obtain 
Member State support for the GDPR. To that extent, state-facilitative exemptions reflect 
struggles by Member State governments, as they did in the Data Protection Directive. For 
example, the right to erasure does not apply to the extent that processing is based on Article 
6(c) or (e) GDPR.211 Neither does the right to data portability apply to such processing,212 as 
that right “by its very nature… should not be exercised against controller processing data in 
the exercise of their public duties”.213 Nor does the right to object apply to certain processing 
necessary for a task carried out in the public interest.214 Measures relating to profiling do not 
apply if the decision is “authorized by Union or Member state law to which the controller is 
subject and which also lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights 
and freedoms and legitimate interests”,215 although exemptions also apply in the case of 
contract or explicit consent.216 The monitoring of approved codes of conduct under Article 
38a GDPR does not apply to processing carried out by public authorities and bodies.217 The 
obligation to have representatives where a controller is not established in the Union does not 
                                               
207 See Recital 16 GDPR. 
208 See Recital 16a GDPR. 
209 See Recital 24c GDPR. See also Recitals 42 and 59 GDPR. 
210 Article 23 GDPR. The areas that may be safeguarded in this way are national security, defence, 
public security, the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences, or the 
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apply to a public authority or body.218 The GDPR also permits Member States to lay down 
rules on “whether and to what extent administrative fines may be imposed on public 
authorities and bodies established in that Member State”,219 creating a substantial 
opportunity for Member States to remove the most powerful enforcement measure from 
application to public authorities.  
Other State-facilitative elements are directed towards shielding public bodies from the 
regulatory or judicial oversight of the supervisory authorities or courts of other Member 
States, reflecting the potential political sensitivities that accompanied a more integrated 
enforcement apparatus. Only the supervisory authority of the Member State is competent 
where processing is carried out by a public authority or private bodies acting on the basis of 
Article 6(1)(c) or (e) GDPR220 and provisions on lead supervisory authorities do not apply.221 
The right to a judicial remedy against a controller or processor “may be brought before the 
courts of the Member State where the data subject has his or her habitual residence, unless 
the controller or processor is a public authority of a Member State acting in the exercise of its 
public powers”,222 in which case it must be done in the State of the public authority. 
Finally, other differences in treatment reflect the differences between the legislative process 
for public authorities and decision-making in private bodies. Data protection impact 
assessments are not required where processing is pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) and (e) GDPR 
and a “data protection impact assessment has already been made as part of a general 
impact assessment in the context of the adoption of this legal basis… unless Member States 
deem it necessary to carry out such assessment prior to the processing activities.”223 The 
GDPR therefore contains a substantial number of provisions, beyond those found in the 
GDPR, which reflect the state-facilitative agenda of Member States. 
STATE-RESTRICTIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GDPR 
The GDPR also attempted to elaborate and sharpen the requirements of the public-private 
divide to reflect a more state-restrictive approach, although this did not survive the 
negotiation process in all respects. For example, a Recital in the original proposal stated that 
consent could not be used as a basis for processing where a “clear imbalance” existed, 
which would be the case where the controller was a public authority and could “impose an 
obligation by virtue of its relevant public powers and the consent cannot be deemed as freely 
                                               
218 Article 25(2)(c) GDPR. 
219 Article 79(3)(b) GDPR. 
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222 Article 75(2) GDPR; see also Recital 116 GDPR. 
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given, taking into account the interest of the data subject”.224 However, in the final draft, this 
was changed to “where the controller is a public authority and this makes it unlikely that 
consent was freely given in all the circumstances of that specific situation.”225   
The state-restrictive approach is clearest in Article 6 GDPR. The provision sets out on the 
grounds for lawful processing. Articles 6(1)(c), (e) and (f) GDPR replicate Articles 7(1)(c), (e) 
and (f) DPD respectively. Article 6 GDPR expressly provides that Article 6(1)(f) “shall not 
apply to processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks”. 
Recital 38 GDPR clarified that this was because “it is for the legislator to provide by law the 
legal basis for public authorities to process data”. Public authorities therefore cannot rely on 
their legitimate interests to process personal data without a legal basis. There is some 
uncertainty over whether this means that public authorities can never rely on legitimate 
interests, as was the case in the rejected 1990 proposal for the Data Protection Directive, or 
whether this is limited to public authorities when carrying out their tasks qua public 
authorities.226   Article 6(3) GDPR elaborates that the legal basis “may contain specific 
provisions to adapt the application of rules of this Regulation”, including “general conditions 
governing lawfulness”; the types of data, data subject, recipients and purposes that may be 
disclosed; “purpose limitation”; “storage periods and processing operations and processing 
procedures”. Article 6(3) GDPR also requires that the relevant law “meet an objective of 
public interest and be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”. The GDPR does much to 
subject public authorities to tighter standards of legality by removing the option to rely on the 
open-ended legitimate interests clause when carrying out public authority tasks. 
The GDPR also creates a more extensive role for data protection officers in the public 
sector. Data protection officers are required in any case where processing is carried out by a 
public authority or body, except for courts in their judicial capacity,227 and only where the 
processor is a private body in more circumstances, where a controller’s or processor’s core 
activities required “regular and systematic monitoring of data subjects on  large scale” or 
consisted large scale processing of special category personal data or personal data relating 
to criminal convictions and offences.228  
                                               
224 See original Recital 34 GDPR in Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) COM(2012) 11 final (25 January 2012). 
225 Recital 34 GDPR. 
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The GDPR therefore restricts to some extent processing by public authorities based on 
consent, although not as much as in the original draft, and completely based on legitimate 
interests, which had been a widespread ground, if controversial, for public sector processing 
under the 1995 Directive. The effect was to insist much more clearly on detailed legislation 
as the basis for processing by public authorities, following a state-restrictive approach to 
public authorities’ processing.  
THE EXPANSION OF EU DATA PROTECTION IN THE FIELD OF POLICE AND CRIMINAL MATTERS 
In December 2015, political agreement was reached on a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, 
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the 
free movement of such data (PCMD). Such processing was exempted from the GDPR under 
Article 2(2)(a)(e) GDPR. The PCMD applies to the processing of competent authorities for 
the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the 
execution of criminal penalties, including safeguarding against and the prevention of threats 
to public security.229 It extends in substance many of the provisions of the Data Protection 
Directive to such competent authorities, although it does not preclude higher safeguards.230 
Competent authorities include “any other body or entity entrusted by national law to exercise 
public authority and public powers for the purposes of this Directive”231 and so is not limited 
to traditional public authorities, such as the police, but potentially private bodies entrusted 
with such functions. It does not apply to activity falling outside the scope of Union law, 
expressly national security activities and issues.232 These developments show the expansion 
of EU data protection in relation to police and criminal matters over time to activities that 
were exempt from the scope of the Data Protection Directive. It therefore marks a more 
state-restrictive approach to police and criminal matters in European data protection. 
COMPLEX INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT APPROACHES: THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE IN 
EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION 
The history of the public-private divide in European data protection law is a complex one in 
which the four approaches to the public-private divide have interacted, resulting in various 
compromises and mixed approaches.  
                                               
229 Articles 1(1) and 2(1) GDPR. 
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An individual approach has undoubtedly risen in importance. A market approach has 
subsisted throughout the history of the public-private divide in data protection. State-
facilitative approaches have endured in the exemptions afforded to public authorities. A 
state-restrictive approach, both through the courts and GDPR, has resurged in importance 
alongside greater concern for individual rights against private actors. European data 
protection is important in demonstrating the complex interactions between the approaches 
that have shaped the public-private divide. The rejection of state-restrictive approaches to 
respect for private life in ECHR jurisprudence, motivated by an individual approach, gave 
rise to threats to the free flow of data that produced market-driven data protection. This was 
true of both the 1981 Convention and the Data Protection Directive. Market and state-
facilitative approaches prevailed over state-restrictive drafting and individual ambitions in the 
Data Protection Directive. The state-restrictive, and to a lesser extent individual, approaches 
influenced the later jurisprudence of the ECJ and CJEU. Finally, the individual approach was 
a major influence on the GDPR which nevertheless contains a resurgence of state-restrictive 
and endurance of state-facilitative elements.  
Throughout, the enduring and complex interaction of market, individual, state-restrictive and 
state-facilitative approaches is apparent and important for understanding the shape of the 
public-private divide in European data protection law. It contradicts the suggestion that data 
protection is inevitably converging on a single individual approach to the public-private divide 
or is the mere fruit of struggle between different approaches. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE AND UK DATA PROTECTION 
INTRODUCTION 
National data protection law developed in the United Kingdom in response to developments 
at the European level, although the UK was a reluctant adopter of European data protection 
norms and frequently diverged from the European approach. This chapter examines the 
development of the public-private divide in UK data protection law. It argues that national 
data protection, though broadly driven by European developments, also demonstrates 
divergence of approach. Complex interactions between the four approaches to the public-
private divide can be identified in the development of this field. It does not show a gradual 
shift from a state-restrictive to an individual approach and, although tensions and struggles 
sometimes produce divergence, a picture more complex than struggle alone emerges.  
Although UK data protection law to 2017 was largely driven by European developments, 
there were important examples of divergence in national implementation driven by 
differences in approach to the public-private divide.1 Parliament legislated in response to 
European data protection law in 1984 and 1998. The UK was a relatively reluctant adopter of 
European data protection law. Its implementation of that law demonstrated a stronger 
emphasis on a market approach than European law. UK Governments were also 
                                               
1 In 2018, Parliament passed the Data Protection Act 2018, which repealed the Data Protection Act 
1998 in preparation for the coming into force of the General Data Protection Regulation on 25 May 
2018. The Data Protection Act 2018 falls outside the scope of this thesis, which analyses the period 
from 1948 to 2017. As it was drafted after the decision had been taken to notify the EU of the UK’s 
intention to withdraw, Brexit-related considerations, which are still evolving and uncertain at the time 
of writing, shaped the drafting of the Act and mark it as a development outside the distinctive period of 
European influence examined in this thesis. See chapter 1, p. 9. Two significant aspects of state-
facilitative development related to implementing the GDPR may be briefly noted. First, Parliament 
sought to soften the effect of Article 6 GDPR by narrowly defining a body as a “public authority” only 
when “performing a task in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority”: Data Protection 
Act 2018, s. 7(2). For a recent analysis of this development, see Oliver Butler, Obligations Imposed 
on Private Parties by the GDPR and UK Data Protection Law: Blurring the Public-Private Divide 
(2018) 24(3) European Public Law 555. Secondly, the Act exempted a number of provisions of the 
GDPR where the provisions are “likely to prejudice” either “the maintenance of effective immigration 
control” or “the investigation or detection of activities that would undermine effective immigration 
control”: Data Protection Act 2018, Sch. 2, para. 4. This represents a very broad state-facilitative 
exemption that was not present in the Data Protection Act 1984 or Data Protection Act 1998. It 
received substantial criticism and is likely to be the subject of a judicial review challenge for 
incompatibility with the GDPR. See Liberty, Abridged Briefing on the Data Protection Bill 2017: The 
Immigration Control Exemption (December 2017); see also Open Rights Group, What is at Stake with 
the Immigration Exemption Legal Challenge?,https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2018/what-is-at-
stake-with-the-immigration-exemption-legal-challenge (3 August 2018). The Data Protection Act 2018 
was therefore used as an opportunity to soften the state-restrictive provisions of the GDPR. It was, 
however, more restrictive of processing by the state outside the scope of European law, including new 
provisions on intelligence services processing: see Data Protection Act 2018, Part 4.     
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unpersuaded by individual and state-restrictive approaches in this field and have pursued 
state-facilitative and market approaches to national implementation. Although 
Europeanisation required an increasingly individual approach, there is little evidence that it 
was important to most UK institutions, with the exception of the Information Commissioner’s 
Office (ICO). However, the UK also developed a public-private divide divergent from 
European data protection law with a state-restrictive approach in two particular areas. The 
main causes of this were a state-restrictive approach inherent in freedom of information 
jurisprudence and the national response to major data breaches by public authorities in 
2008. The market approach, albeit present in European data protection, has been stronger 
at the national level. Successive UK Governments have also pursued state-facilitative 
objectives, although these have largely been resisted by Parliament. 
National data protection law in the UK largely owes its existence and shape to European 
developments but, within the broad outline set by those developments, distinctive national 
trends have emerged in the public-private divide. Attempts to increase transparency2 and 
restore public trust in the public sector3 both contributed to the development of the public-
private divide in national law. These trends contradict analyses which anticipate the erosion 
of a state-restrictive public-private divide in favour of an individual approach. They also show 
the resurgence of state-restrictive concerns at the national level after 2008, diverging from 
European data protection law. Relatively unwelcome to business or Government interests, 
development of data protection law has also been grudging and more market-orientated 
outside these pockets of state-restrictive development. Government, Parliament and the 
national courts have all contributed to such developments, creating a public-private divide 
that diverged from European data protection law both by being more firmly market-orientated 
and later by introducing features which reflect a more State-restrictive approach.  
Initially, UK Governments were resistant to data protection in the public sector and apathetic 
to regulation in the private sphere. This reflected a set of state-facilitative and market 
approaches. Regulation was considered unnecessary in the public sector and a threat to 
developing technologies in the private sector. Several attempts to pass legislation in the 
1970s failed to secure parliamentary backing and Government support. However, there was 
sufficient concern to commission reports on the regulation of information, which reflected the 
existence of more individual approaches to the public-private divide, although these failed to 
shape the law. The UK Government’s limited embrace of data protection in 1984 reflected, in 
large part, a strong acceptance of the market approach in European data protection. It 
                                               
2 See below, pp. 160 to 165. 
3 See below, pp. 165 to 166. 
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sought to fulfil its international obligations under the 1981 Convention of the Council of 
Europe. The development of European law drove UK law, which followed a similar approach. 
The later Data Protection Act 1998 implemented the European Communities Data Protection 
Directive 1995. It broadly reflected the approach developed in the 1995 Directive and 
contained exemptions as permitted by the Directive, but in several respects was more 
market-friendly. This points to a greater market approach in UK implementation than the 
Directive and divergence of approach. 
By contrast, developments after 2000 show more divergence from this approach in two 
important respects, each marking the resurgence of a more state-restrictive approach. First, 
freedom of information legislation extended subject access request rights against public 
authorities and resulted in the greater disclosure of official personal data. The national courts 
and the Information Tribunal developed the public-private divide in information law in their 
jurisprudence on fair processing in the context of the application of section 40(2) Freedom of 
Information Act 2000. This provides an absolute exemption from FOI disclosure for personal 
data where the release of the data would violate one or more of the data protection 
principles. Fair processing, which is the first data protection principle, was interpreted in light 
of notions of transparency and accountability to introduce a state-restrictive divide in relation 
to public officials’ personal data.4 In elaborating the detail of data protection, this resulted in 
divergence from the broader approach seen in the Data Protection Directive and the Data 
Protection Act 1998. Secondly, a public-private divide in the Information Commissioner’s 
Office’s (ICO) enforcement powers was also developed in line with a state-restrictive 
approach by both Government and Parliament. In large part, those reforms were a 
Government response to a major HMRC data breach in late 2007 and other breaches in the 
public sector. Failures of public authorities prompted the introduction of more state-restrictive 
enforcement powers in Parliament. Advocates of other approaches shaped this law or 
engaged in struggles over it. The Government’s approach also reflected the resistance of 
business leaders to increased regulatory burdens. These reforms considered and rejected 
the ICO’s individual approach to its enforcement powers. The reforms were driven by a 
perception that public trust needed to be restored in public bodies’ data handling to facilitate 
their wider activities. However, the reforms in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 were 
themselves part and parcel of a wider set of reforms promoted by the Government with a 
state-facilitative ambition. It was parliamentary resistance to the breadth of those reforms 
that resulted in the Government abandoning the state-facilitative aspects, leaving the state-
                                               
4 See below, pp. 162 to 164. 
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restrictive approach behind.5 This is an important example of multiple approaches interacting 
in complex ways across diverse actors in order to produce the public-private divide found in 
UK information law. The ultimately state-restrictive amendments were in fact part of a 
broader state-facilitative legislative agenda of UK Governments, which Parliament 
successfully resisted. 
Although the ICO pushed for greater transparency in the public sector, with some impact on 
data protection, it consistently rejected the notion that a public-private divide was justified in 
the scope of its enforcement powers. It argued to remove any such divide.6 However, this 
individual approach failed to influence the two major developments identified in this chapter. 
These later developments in the history of the public-private divide in UK data protection 
mark something of a later resurgence of state-restrictive elements driven by a wider concern 
for transparency in the public sector and reactions to prominent public-sector data protection 
failures. Different approaches have been favoured or prioritised by Government, Parliament, 
the courts and the ICO. The existing data protection framework therefore reflects complex 
interactions between different approaches adopted by diverse national actors, albeit 
somewhat constrained by the broader framework designed by European institutions. In the 
history of the public-private divide in UK data protection law we therefore see the tensions, 
conflicts and changing fortunes of the four approaches that have shaped the law in this area.  
EARLY GOVERNMENT RESISTANCE TO DATA PROTECTION 
There were attempts by Members of Parliament in the late 1960s and 1970s to pass data 
protection legislation. These attempts usually took the form of Private Member Bills. They 
reflected individual approaches to the public-private divide, motivated by a concern to protect 
individual rights from developing technologies. However, they failed to attract Government 
support. For example, the Data Surveillance Bill 1969 sought to “prevent the invasion of 
privacy through the misuse of computer information” by establishing a register of data banks 
and a right to apply for the amendment of or expunging data,7 backed by both criminal 
penalties and damages liability.8 The Personal Records (Computers) Bill 1969 and Control of 
Personal Information Bill 1971 both made further attempts to control data banks and protect 
individuals. As Jay notes, these attempts had “no real hopes of success”.9 None of the 
attempts came to fruition because Governments were either indifferent or hostile to data 
                                               
5 See below, pp. 165 to 170. 
6 See below, pp. 170 to 173. 
7 See Data Surveillance Bill 1969, cl. 5. 
8 See Data Surveillance Bill 1969, cls. 6 and 7 respectively. 
9 Rosemary Jay, Data Protection Law and Practice (2012), pp. 4 to 5. 
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protection regulation, for reasons that reflected the logic of either state-facilitative or market 
approaches to the public-private divide.  
Although this minority of concerned advocates made little legislative impact, their efforts 
helped to promote research and reports in the field of data protection and privacy. Jay notes 
that it was the “impetus” of these early attempts that led the Wilson Labour Government to 
appoint Kenneth Younger in May 1970 to lead a Committee on Privacy.10 The Wilson 
Government lost the General Election in June 1970 and as a result the Younger Committee 
reported to the Heath Conservative Government in 1972.11 
There were attempts by the Government to limit the ability of the Younger Committee to 
propose reforms that would affect the public sector. This reflected a state-facilitative attitude 
within Government. The Younger Committee’s terms of reference were expressly limited to 
data protection in the private sector.12 The Government gave three reasons for shielding the 
public sector in this way. The first was a view that the public sector was sufficiently regulated 
by existing law: “the scope of [local authority and public corporation] operations was already 
governed by statute”.13 The second was that the public sector was subject to political control 
and so had less need for additional legal controls because “they were already answerable 
for their conduct either directly or indirectly to the electorate”.14 The final reason was that 
separate reforms were “being contemplated in relation to public authorities”.15 These 
reasons have in common a desire on the part of the executive to maintain political control 
over the regulation of information in the public sector. The reasons resisted leaving open the 
possibility of recommendations by an independent Committee, which could propose further 
legal controls on the public sector. I therefore suggest that the motivation behind these 
limited terms of reference was a state-facilitative approach on the part of the Government.  
The Younger Report was inhibited but not defeated by its terms of reference. In this, a more 
individual approach may be discerned. It made detailed recommendations including a series 
of reforms to press regulation, broadcasting, credit reference agencies, banks, employment, 
universities, medicine, private detectives, technical surveillance devices, computers and 
confidentiality, including personal information principles for computer use.16 The Younger 
Committee could not give similarly detailed proposals for the public sector but nevertheless 
recommended that the “Government should consider the possibility of including both the 
                                               
10 Ibid. 
11 Home Office, Data Protection: The Government’s Proposals for Legislation (April 1982) 1981/82 
Cmnd. 8539, para. 2. 
12 Younger Report, para 1; Jay (2012), p. 5. 
13 Younger Report, para. 4. 
14 Ibid., para. 4. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., paras. 45 to 55. 
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public and private sectors within the purview of a standing commission to receive complaints 
about violations of privacy”.17 The Younger Committee’s concern to protect individuals 
across the public-private divide demonstrates an individual approach in tension with the 
state-facilitative approach of the Government.  
In part in response to the Younger Report, the second Wilson Labour Government in 1975 
addressed the regulation of information in two papers: Computers and Privacy18 and 
Computers: Safeguards for Privacy.19 Computers: Safeguards for Privacy was a small 
supplementary report on the public sector in the UK written to “parallel” the Younger 
Committee’s review of the private sector, with the work conducted by an interdepartmental 
working party made up of government officials.20 Again, this suggests an attempt to shield 
the public sector from the independent Younger Committee in favour of executive control 
over policy formation and a state-facilitative motive at work. Turning to the Computers: 
Safeguards for Privacy White Paper, the Government stated that it was not persuaded that a 
significant problem existed in relation to information generally, and certainly not in the public 
sector, which it strenuously defended. In adopting this perspective, it demonstrated at 
highest support for a weak market approach underpinning its conclusions. This was 
supported by a strong state-facilitative ambition that found common cause with the low level 
of regulation promoted by a weak market approach. First, the Government doubted the 
significance of purported problems with information law in the public sector. For example, the 
Government emphasised that development in information technology had resulted in merely 
“increasing concern… about actual or potential threats to the privacy of the individual”.21 It 
did not acknowledge the validity of such concerns but rather questioned their evidential 
basis. The Government argued that the White Paper’s research “discloses no evidence to 
suggest that fears about the improper use of computers in the public sector are justified by 
present practice”.22 The Government also doubted the possibility of potential threats to 
individual privacy and argued that “substantial safeguards against the realisation of any such 
fears” existed.23 The Government’s position did not accept that computers posed a risk to 
privacy in the public sector. It noted that computers reduced the number of potential human 
contacts with the data, reduced errors and opportunities for information to be inadvertently 
disclosed and in fact “concluded that the introduction of computer systems would in no way 
increase the threat to privacy by unauthorised disclosure of personal information held in the 
                                               
17 Ibid., paras. 54 and 628. 
18 Home Department, Computers and Privacy, Cmnd 6353 (1975). 
19 Home Department, Computers: Safeguards for Privacy, Cmnd 6354 (1975). 
20 Ibid., para. 3. 
21 Home Department, Computers and Privacy, Cmnd 6353 (1975), para. 1 (emphasis added). 
22 Ibid., para. 2. 
23 Ibid. 
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systems.”24 The Government also commented that the “quality of record keeping in a 
computer system is almost always higher than in a manual system.”25 It was similarly 
confident about the ability of local government to protect information,26 considering that 
effective safeguards were in place.27 However, despite this, the Government ultimately 
accepted the need for legislation to “seek to secure that all existing and future computer 
systems in which personal information is held, in both the private and public sectors, are 
operated with appropriate safeguards for the privacy of the subject of that information”.28 
This response was consistent with the market approach, conceding a low level of protection 
for the sake of promoting sufficient trust in new technologies. This approach of the 
Government in 1975, generally sceptical of the need for data protection but willing to 
countenance a low level of protection to secure confidence in both the public and private 
sector, was an attitude that reflects a market approach consistent with state-facilitative aims.  
A policy focus on both public and private sectors was reinforced by the Lindop Committee. In 
July 1976, during the Callaghan Labour Government, the Lindop Committee was established 
to consider both the public and private sectors.29 In December 1978, the final report30 of the 
Lindop Committee recommended regulation in both sectors.31 The Lindop Report 
recommended a “Data Protection Act” to cover the “automatic handling of… personal data”, 
requiring data handlers to ensure “adequate safeguards for the interests of data subjects”, 
and to comply with a set of data principles and a scheme of registration.32  
The pressure of growing concerns for data protection, which favoured an individual 
approach, therefore resulted in a weaker market-orientated compromise from Governments 
in the 1970s at the level of policy formation. However, no legislative action was successful to 
implement these recommendations in the 1970s. It was in fact the activity of European 
institutions and market pressure that was to cause the Thatcher Conservative Government 
to first legislate for national data protection in the 1980s, in line with a market approach, 
rather than national pressure to legislate.  
                                               
24 Home Department, Computers: Safeguards for Privacy, Cmnd 6354 (1975), para. 11. 
25 Ibid., para. 13. 
26 Ibid., para. 54. 
27 Ibid., para. 57. 
28 Home Department, Computers and Privacy, Cmnd 6353 (1975), para. 4 (emphasis added). 
29 Jay (2012), p. 6. 
30 Lindop Committee Report Cmnd 7341 (1978). 
31 Jay (2012), p. 6. 
32 Lindop (1978), Ch. 38. 
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ACCEPTANCE OF DATA PROTECTION: ESTABLISHING A MARKET APPROACH 
National pressure to adopt data protection legislation was ultimately overtaken by the 
concern that a lack of harmonised regulation risked creating barriers to trade, both in Europe 
and internationally. Jay writes that in the 1980s “the threat of trade barriers galvanised the 
government of the day into action”.33 The development of European data protection, notably 
the 1981 Council of Europe Convention, and fears that individual States would block UK 
data flows, encouraged the Conservative Government to propose legislation.34  
The 1982 White Paper, Data Protection: The Government’s Proposals for Legislation,35 
followed a statement of the Home Secretary on 19 March 1981 announcing the UK 
Government’s intention to introduce legislation on data protection. The Government claimed 
that the legislation was both a response to “the threat to privacy posed by the rapid growth in 
the use of computers” and was needed “in order to conform with international standards of 
privacy protection and to avoid possible barriers to trade”.36 However, the Government was 
quick to observe that there were “few reported instances” of the misuse of personal data in 
the UK.37 Ongoing scepticism about data protection was apparent in the White Paper. 
Equally, the view that the public sector was already subject to other safeguards was present 
in the document. For example, the White Paper noted that complaints against public sector 
data systems could be better investigated by ombudsmen.38 This suggests that it was a 
more market approach, rather than an individual approach, that drove the Government’s 
decision to legislate for both the public and private sectors in 1984. 
The Government sought to adapt the Younger Committee Report in light of the 1981 Council 
of Europe Convention to produce “enforceable rules of law applying to both the private and 
public sectors.”39 At this point, although 11 states had signed the Convention, none had yet 
ratified it and the Convention itself had therefore not yet come into force, which was to follow 
ratification by 5 states.40 The Government clearly anticipated that the 1981 Convention 
would be ratified. The 1982 White Paper expressly stated that registration requirements 
would extend to “central Government, local authorities, the police, nationalised industries 
                                               
33 Jay (2012), p. 10. 
34 See chapter 5, pp. 114 to 118. 
35 Home Office, Data Protection: The Government’s Proposals for Legislation (April 1982) 1981/82 
Cmnd. 8539. 
36 Ibid., para. 2 (emphasis added). 
37 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
38 Ibid., para. 21. 
39 Ibid., para. 3. 
40 Ibid., para. 5; 1981 Convention, Article 22(2). 
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and other public sector bodies”,41 subject to exemptions as permitted by derogations from 
the 1981 Convention, for the “purposes of national security”, “the prevention and detection of 
crime” and in relation to “medical records” and “sensitive information recorded by social 
workers”.42  
The Data Protection Act 1984 was passed on 12 July 1984. It made provision for the 
application of a set of data protection principles43 and established a Registrar and Tribunal44 
to oversee a scheme of registration and supervision of “data users” and “computer 
bureaux”.45 The “data users” and “computer bureaux” were defined in relation to data held or 
services provided in respect of data and therefore created no public-private divide.46 The 
1984 Act provided for individual rights to subject access,47 compensation for inaccuracy,48 
compensation for loss or unauthorised disclosure,49 and rectification and erasure.50 Section 
38(1) of the Act also stated that “a government department shall be subject to the same 
obligations and liabilities under this Act as a private person”, save that a government 
department was not liable to prosecution under the Act,51 although certain provisions would 
apply to civil servants directly.52 In its core framework and definitions, therefore, the Act 
contained almost no public-private divide.  
The 1984 Act did regulate data processing pursuant to statute with a lighter touch, reflecting 
state-facilitative derogations in keeping with the 1981 Convention. Data was obtained fairly 
“if it [was] obtained from a person who (a) is authorised by or under any enactment to supply 
it; or (b) is required to supply it by or under any enactment or by any convention or other 
instrument imposing an international obligation on the United Kingdom.”53 The Act also made 
exemptions the rights of data subjects “if the data consist of information which that person is 
required by or under any enactment to make available to the public, whether by publishing it, 
making it available for inspection or otherwise and whether gratuitously or on payment of a 
fee”.54 The Secretary of State had a power to exempt by order from the subject access 
                                               
41 Home Office, Data Protection: The Government’s Proposals for Legislation (April 1982) 1981/82 
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42 Ibid., para. 17. 
43 Data Protection Act 1984, s. 2; Sch. 1. 
44 Ibid., s. 3. 
45 Ibid., ss. 4 to 12.  
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49 Ibid., s. 23. 
50 Ibid., s. 24. 
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statutory functions on behalf of the Crown. 
52 Data Protection Act 1984, s. 38(2). 
53 Ibid., Sch. 1(2). 
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provisions where the disclosure of personal data was “prohibited or restricted by or under 
any enactment if he considers that the prohibition or restriction ought to prevail over those 
provisions in the interests of the data subject or of any other individual.”55 The Act also 
exempted personal data from the non-disclosure provisions “in any case in which the 
disclosure is… required by or under any enactment, by any rule of law or by the order of a 
court”.56 Statutory uses of data, therefore, enjoyed many advantages over private uses, 
reflecting the role of state-facilitative thought in the design of the legislation which sat 
alongside a broader market ambition. 
The general provisions of the 1984 Act were also subject to a list of exemptions, many of 
which had special application to the public sector or state functions. This included 
exemptions for national security,57 the prevention or detection of crime,58 the apprehension 
or prosecution of offenders,59 the assessment or collection of any tax or duty,60 personal 
data held for the purpose of discharging statutory functions which had been obtained under 
the security or crime exemptions,61 data held or acquired in the course of social work,62 
where subject access may prejudice the discharge of certain statutory functions relating to 
the regulation of financial and other services,63 and certain information relating to judicial 
appointments.64  
The 1984 Act did, however, contain a variety of other exemptions that addressed personal 
data consisting of information as to the physical or mental health of the data subject,65 legal 
professional privilege,66 payrolls and accounts,67 personal, family or household affairs or 
information held only for recreational purposes,68 backups,69 preventing injury or other 
damage to the health of any person,70 self-incrimination,71 and examinations marks.72 These 
served a variety of market and individual objectives, all sitting within the scheme of the 1981 
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Convention. This demonstrates the role of a variety of strands of approach which together 
gave full shape to the public-private divide. 
Ultimately, the 1984 Act was therefore broadly reflective of a market-approach with state-
facilitative exemptions following the pattern of the 1981 European Convention. National 
implementation of these obligations did not significantly challenge that approach, albeit that 
Government had voiced scepticism about the need for such legislation save where such 
legislation itself presented the risk of creating barriers to trade. In light of this scepticism, I 
suggest that the Government’s implementation reflects an acceptance of the approaches 
developing in European data protection and little divergence through the agency of national 
actors, save state-facilitative exemptions as permitted by the 1981 Convention. European 
data protection was therefore an important influence and driver of national data protection 
law in 1984. 
THE DATA PROTECTION ACT 1998 
The Data Protection Act 1998 was introduced by the New Labour Government and then 
passed by Parliament on 16th July 1998.73 The Act implemented the Data Protection 
Directive 1995. It reflected the broad market approach of that Directive. However, whereas 
the Directive showed heighted concern for individual rights, the Data Protection Act 1998 
was arguably less onerous in several respects, reflecting a continuing and greater emphasis 
on a market approach, diverging from the European approach.  
The implementation of the 1998 Act arguably reflected a more lenient approach to data 
protection than the 1995 Directive, reflecting a less individual and more market approach. 
This was the subject of an ongoing dispute between the UK Government and the European 
Commission, which considered infringement proceedings. This was on the basis that the 
Commission considered that the definition of ‘filing system’ in the 1998 Act was narrower 
than Article 2 DPD; the inclusion of ‘recreational purposes’ in the 1998 Act was broader than 
Article 3 DPD’s household activities exemption; the 1998 Act treated criminal offences 
differently from other special categories of personal data; it exempted information required to 
be provided  to data subjects under Articles 10 and 11 DPD; it made court remedies in 
regard to Article 12 DPD data subject rights discretionary; it exempted confidential 
references from the right to access under Article 13 DPD; it contained a narrower scope for 
non-material damage than Article 23 DPD required; the extent of monitoring assessments of 
international data transfer adequacy under Article 25 DPD was not satisfactory; and the 
                                               
73 Data Protection Act 1998, preamble. 
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investigative powers of the supervisory authority under Article 28 DPD were insufficient.74 
The Commission’s complaint reflects the more market-friendly implementation of the 
Directive in the UK. 
Similar to the Data Protection Act 1984, the 1998 Act contained key definitions based on the 
relationship of the actor to data rather than the public or private status of the actor. The 1998 
Act used concepts of data controller, data processor and data subject, as in the 1995 
Directive.75 The data protection regime continued to grant rights to data subjects and 
others.76 It continued to use a system of registration and notification.77 The 1998 Act also 
contained an extended list of exemptions. Like the 1984 Act, many of these focussed on 
activity related to the public sector, including national security,78 crime and taxation,79 health, 
education and social work,80 regulatory activity,81 information available to the public by or 
under any enactment,82 and disclosures required by law,83 the armed forces, judicial 
appointments and honours, and Crown employment and Crown and Ministerial 
appointments.84 To this extent, the endurance of a set of state-facilitative aspects is evident.  
Equally, however, many exemptions under the Act protected other areas of activity, some of 
which concerned matters where disclosure could harm important aspects of commercial 
activity: journalism, literature and art,85 research, history and statistics,86 legal proceedings, 
legal advice and establishing or defending legal rights,87 references, management forecasts, 
corporate finance, negotiations, examinations marks and scripts, and legal professional 
privilege.88 The market logic inherent in many of these exemptions is apparent, permitting 
practices necessary for various activities to operate effectively.  
The 1998 Act’s enforcement provisions,89 functions of the Commissioner,90 an offence of 
unlawful obtaining of data,91 and other provisions of the Act contained no aspect of a public-
                                               
74 Letter of 16.12.2010 to Dr Chris Pounder from the European Commission in response to Complaint 
3196/2007/(BEH)VL to the European Ombudsman. 
75 Data Protection Act 1998, s. 1. 
76 Ibid., ss. 7 to 15. 
77 Ibid., ss. 16 to 26. 
78 Ibid., s. 28. 
79 Ibid., s. 29. 
80 Ibid., s. 30. 
81 Ibid., s. 31. 
82 Ibid., s. 34. 
83 Ibid., s. 35(1). 
84 Ibid., s. 37, Sch. 7. Recreational purposes were exempt under Data Protection Act 1998, s. 36. 
85 Ibid., s. 32. 
86 Ibid., s. 33. 
87 Ibid., s. 35. 
88 Ibid., s. 37, Sch. 7. 
89 Ibid., ss. 40 to 50. 
90 Ibid., ss. 51 to 54. 
91 Ibid., s. 55. 
 159 
private divide at the time the Act was passed. Some small differences existed, reflecting 
historic attitudes towards the liability of the Crown for criminal offences, as had been the 
case in the 1984 Act. Whereas corporate bodies could be liable of offences under the Act in 
certain circumstances,92 the Act, in its application to the Crown, provided that  
Neither a government department nor a person who is a data controller by 
virtue of subsection (3) shall be liable to prosecution under this Act, but 
section 55 and paragraph 12 of Schedule 9 shall apply to a person in the 
service of the Crown as they apply to any other person.93 
The first data protection principle required data processing to be fair and lawful.94 Statutory 
authorisation or requirement would be sufficient to justify processing as fair.95 The 1998 Act 
provided that data “are to be treated as obtained fairly if they consist of information obtained 
from a person who – (a) is authorised by or under any enactment to supply it, or (b) is 
required to supply it by or under any enactment or by any convention or other instrument 
imposing an international obligation on the United Kingdom.”96 To be fair, processing also 
had to meet a condition in Schedule 2 and, when processing sensitive personal data,97  a 
condition in Schedule 3. Processing could satisfy Schedule 2 of the Act where it was 
necessary “(a) for the administration of justice, (b) for the exercise of any functions conferred 
on any person by or under any enactment, (c) for the exercise of any functions of the Crown, 
a Minister of the Crown or a government department, or (d) for the exercise of any other 
functions of a public nature exercised in the public interest by any person.”98 Schedule 3 
7(1), which applied to sensitive personal data, was similarly satisfied where the processing 
was necessary “(a) for the administration of justice, (b) for the exercise of any functions 
conferred on any person by or under an enactment, or (c) for the exercise of any functions of 
the Crown, a Minister of the Crown or a government department.” The breadth of this 
provision is such as to introduce a significantly more state-facilitative approach within the 
legislation, diverging from the approaches found in the Directive.  
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96 Data Protection Act 1998, Sch. 1, Part 2, para. 2(2). 
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The importance of this must be viewed against the ease with which public or private bodies 
could rely on their legitimate interests to process personal data fairly.99 However, legitimate 
interests alone were insufficient for processing sensitive personal data.100 Data processing 
pursuant to statutory functions or the functions of central government was therefore subject 
to less control than legitimate interest processing. This was state-facilitative in relation to 
sensitive personal data.  
The 1998 Act, therefore, as initially passed, broadly reflected the European approach to the 
1995 Directive, but took significant advantage of the opportunity to introduce state-facilitative 
exemptions. Although the implementation of the Directive was required by European law, we 
should not overlook the more market-friendly implementation of several provisions of the 
Directive in the Data Protection Act 1998. It therefore diverged from European law, driven by 
both market and state-facilitative approaches.  
TRANSPARENCY AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR: STATE-RESTRICTIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
As national data protection matured, even greater national divergence developed in the 
public-private divide. Governments, Parliament, and the courts all played a role in that 
process. The developments were not mandated by European data protection and reflect the 
role played by national actors and events, developing a more state-restrictive divergent 
approach in some areas. 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AMENDMENTS TO THE DATA PROTECTION ACT 1998 
The Freedom of Information Act 2000 and Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 
made various amendments to the Data Protection Act 1998. The Freedom of Information Act 
2000 was passed on 30th November 2000. In relation to public authorities only, the effect of 
these amendments was to broaden the right to subject access by analogy with FOIA rights 
and to create additional protections for the accuracy of personal data. These rights therefore 
became broader against such bodies than against the private sector. This was done to 
enhance transparency and accuracy, reflecting a limited extension of the state-restrictive 
approach to data protection.  
Reforms in the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 
2002 extended subject access request rights against public authorities, with similarities to 
Freedom of Information requests. It did this by expanding the definition of personal data to 
                                               
99 Ibid., Sch. 2, para. 6. 
100 Sensitive personal data could only be processed fairly where a condition in Schedule 3 was met, in 
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include any “recorded information held by a public authority” which was not otherwise 
defined as personal data by section 1(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998.101 The definitions 
of both “public authority” and “held” followed the definitions in the 2000 and 2002 Acts.102 
More information held by public authorities was therefore personal data than if the same 
information were held by private actors. 
Where the additional personal data was “unstructured personal data”, meaning it was not 
“recorded as part of, or with the intention that it should form part of, any set of information 
relating to individuals to the extent that the set is structured by reference to individuals or by 
reference to criteria relating to individuals”,103 a public authority was not required to comply 
with a subject access request unless the request contained a description of the data,104 or if 
the estimated cost of compliance exceeded the limit set for FOI requests.105 In this way, 
subject access requests regarding unstructured personal data mirrored FOI requests. The 
expansion of the subject access right against public authorities was driven by an approach 
that sought transparency from public authorities. 
The expanded category of personal data was, however, exempt from all the data protection 
principles save the fourth principle (accurate and up to date) and sixth principle (the rights of 
data subjects but only to the extent of subject access rights and rights to rectification, 
blocking, erasure or destruction in cases of inaccuracy).106 Rights to prevent processing 
likely to cause damage or distress, rights in relation to automated decision-taking, and rights 
to compensation, save where damage was caused by the violation of subject access rights 
or accuracy, were also exempted in relation to this personal data, as were notification 
requirements and the offence of unlawfully obtaining personal data.107 In addition to 
transparency, the legislation therefore also enhanced legal protections of accuracy in the 
context of public authorities, although it did not extend other data protection rights. The 
reform was therefore a narrow extension of data protection, albeit reflecting a state-
restrictive approach. 
Limited categories of personal data held in purely unstructured manual format was exempted 
from the subject access and accuracy provisions.  These categories comprised information 
related to “appointments or removals, pay, discipline, superannuation or other personnel 
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matters” in relation to service in the armed forces, in any Crown or public authority office or 
employment, or in an office, employment or contract for services where the power to take, 
determine or approve action in relation to appointments etc. was vested in the Crown, 
various Ministers or public authorities, was further exempt from all data protection principles 
and the rights of data subjects.108 To this extent, a state-facilitative tendency can also be 
seen, tempering the expansion of data protection against public authorities in the Freedom 
of Information Acts. 
The Freedom of Information Act 2000 also contributed to the development of a public-private 
divide in data protection in a second way. The Information Tribunal and national courts 
elaborated the definition of fair processing in the context of public authorities, where the 
processing entailed the disclosure of personal data pursuant to an FOI request. This 
jurisprudence recognised that for reasons of transparency in the public sector, a state-
restrictive analysis, there were factors that make the disclosure of certain personal 
information held by public authorities about their senior officials and employees more likely 
to be fairly processed than similar processing in the private sector. 
The Freedom of Information Act 2000 Act gave a general right of access to information held 
by public authorities.109 This was subject to various exemptions. Of greatest importance for 
data protection was section 40(2). This provision conferred an exemption in relation to 
information that constituted personal data of individuals other than the FOI requester. It only 
applied where disclosure of such personal data to a member of the public would contravene 
“any of the data protection principles” or the right to prevent processing likely to cause 
damage or distress.110 Section 40(2) conferred an absolute exemption in respect of 
disclosures that would breach the data protection principles, apparently removing any 
consideration of the public interest in disclosure.111  
The first data protection principle, which included the requirement that processing must be 
“fair”, therefore became important for determining whether a disclosure of personal data 
about officials was exempt from FOI requests. Subsequent case law therefore developed 
jurisprudence on fair processing in the context of public authority transparency obligations. In 
Clift v. Slough Borough Council, the court remarked that it was “a notable feature of the 
Directive and the DPA that they draw no distinction between public authorities and 
others”.112 However, the definition of fair processing was interpreted to make a distinction 
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based on the public or private context of certain processing. Section 40(2) FOIA has been 
the subject of a host of cases before the Information Tribunal.113 Although the courts have 
noted that the fairness of processing is “justiciable… in terms of data protection… in the 
public as well as the private sector”,114 the public sector context has had an important impact 
on the assessment of what processing is fair. This reflects a further narrow extension of a 
state-restrictive approach. 
In Corporate Officer of the House of Commons v Information Commissioner, the Tribunal 
considered whether the disclosure of MPs’ travel expenses would be fair processing. The 
Tribunal considered that there were “three principal matters” that required resolution in 
relation to fair processing.115 The third of these is most interesting for the purpose of the 
public-private divide: “Whether it is correct to draw a distinction between personal data 
related to an individual’s public and his private life?”.116 The Tribunal accepted the ICO’s 
proposed approach “which recognizes that in determining fair processing regard can be had 
as to whether the personal data relates to the private or public life of the data subject”.117 As 
the “public function is why the data is being processed” the Tribunal found that it could have 
regard to it.118 The Tribunal held that “the consideration given to the interests of data 
subjects, who are public officials where data are processed for a public function, is no longer 
first or paramount”119 and “where data subjects carry out public functions, hold elective office 
or spend public funds they must have the expectation that their public actions will be subject 
to greater scrutiny than would be the case in respect of their private lives”.120 The legitimate 
interests of the public included transparency and accountability in the use of public funds.121 
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Those “legitimate interests of members of the public outweighed the prejudice to the rights, 
freedoms and legitimate interests of MPs”.122 This is a state-restrictive analysis of the data 
protection rights of those who carry out public functions, hold office or are responsible for the 
expenditure of public funds.  
Later Blake J in Corporate Officer of the House of Commons v Information Commissioner,123 
confirmed this approach and held that there was “no doubt that the public interest [was] at 
stake”: the “expenditure of public money through the payment of MPs’ salaries and 
allowances [was] a matter of direct and reasonable interest to taxpayers”: 
In the end they bear on public confidence in the operation of our democratic 
system at its very pinnacle, the House of Commons itself. The nature of the 
legitimate public interest engaged by these applications is obvious.124 
In Ministry of Defence v Information Commissioner, the Information Tribunal has also held 
that the expectations of civil servants differ from private employees because they “might be 
expected to lose some degree of anonymity on taking up such employment”.125 However, 
the jurisprudence did distinguish between senior and junior officials. In 2007 in Department 
for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform v Information Commissioner,126 the 
Information Tribunal addressed a Freedom of Information request for details of discussions 
between a government department and private lobbyists. The tribunal found that “a senior 
official of both the government department and lobbyist attending meetings and 
communicating with each other can have no expectation of privacy”, whereas junior officials 
did have such an expectation.127 In 2014 in Edem v Information Commissioner,128 the 
claimant before the Court of Appeal was unable to make an argument that it was in his 
legitimate interests for the names of three junior employees of the Financial Services 
Authority, who had no responsibility for making “significant decisions”, no “outward-facing 
role” and did not act as “spokesperson for the FSA”,  to be disclosed through a FOI 
request.129 This narrow extension of the state-restrictive approach was therefore targeted at 
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senior officials, though this is of course consistent with a desire to subject decision-makers 
to greater scrutiny. 
The effect of this court and tribunal jurisprudence was to introduce a public-private divide in 
relation to personal information held by public authorities. To the extent that the processing 
is rendered fair by the public context of the processing, it must be disclosed pursuant to an 
FOI request.130 Private actors are not subject to FOI and, due to the absence of a public 
context, it is less likely that voluntary disclosure of employee personal data would be fair. 
The increase in transparency for public authorities under the 2000 Act has therefore 
contributed to the existence of this more state-restrictive feature in UK data protection law. 
RESTORING TRUST IN PUBLIC SECTOR DATA: A STATE-RESTRICTIVE APPROACH FROM A STATE-
FACILITATIVE OBJECTIVE    
Reforms of the enforcement powers of the ICO also reflect a state-restrictive approach. 
However, this development in the public-private divide resulted from a complex interaction of 
state-restrictive and state-facilitative approaches. The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
amended the Data Protection Act 1998 to grant the ICO a power to issue assessment 
notices.131 The power could only be used in relation to “(a) a government department, (b) a 
public authority designated for the purposes of this section by an order made by the 
Secretary of State, or (c) a person of a description designated for the purposes of this 
section by such an order.”132 Assessment notices permitted the ICO to carry out compulsory 
compliance assessments.133 This reform followed in the wake of a 2008 data breach scandal 
involving data held by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and a number of other 
high profile data breaches in the public sector. In relation to provisions granting the ICO 
power to conduct compulsory audits of public authorities, Jack Straw MP, the Justice 
Secretary, said that the “Government recognise the need to strengthen the protection of 
personal data, and to restore public confidence in its security” following those breaches.134 
However, it would be misleading to consider the amendments brought about by the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 without considering the legislative history of the provisions 
and the other clauses that were ultimately withdrawn in the face of intense Parliamentary 
opposition. The Coroners and Justice Bill was not merely a state-restrictive set of provisions 
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catalysed by serious failings in public sector data protection but part of a much broader 
executive agenda to encourage data sharing by public bodies: a state-facilitative ambition 
was, following Parliamentary resistance, reduced to state-restrictive provisions. In this case, 
therefore a struggle between state-facilitative and state-restrictive approaches shaped the 
public-private divide. 
A consistent effort has been made by Government departments and public authorities in the 
UK to facilitate greater data sharing in the public sector within the framework provided by the 
Data Protection Act 1998.135 The main way this has been attempted is through the 
expansion of statutory bases for the further processing of personal data. In this there is a 
deep vein of state-facilitative thought, although it has been constrained by a lively and 
sometimes vigilant state-restrictive tendency in UK politics.    
THE CORONERS AND JUSTICE BILL 2009, CLAUSE 152 
In 2007, HMRC suffered the largest personal data security breach in UK history, losing 25 
million personal records. In November 2007, the Government consented to “spot checks” of 
government departments by the ICO.136 By December 2007, the Government sought to 
increase the enforcement powers of the ICO to restore public trust. The ICO argued for “a 
power to inspect the processing of personal data without necessarily having the consent of 
the organisation concerned” and civil penalties for serious breaches.137 
A key Government interest before the HMRC scandal was the development of a fast-track 
procedure to create more or broader legislative bases for data sharing.138 The Government 
introduced proposed reforms to both enhance data protection and to improve data sharing in 
the Coroners and Justice Bill. The Secretary of State for Justice Jack Straw pointed to the 
recommendations of the Thomas Walport Review, which supported such reforms, and 
introduced clause 152 as a “new scheme for data sharing”.139 The scheme involved an 
extensive Henry VIII power to amend primary legislation. This power could be used to create 
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powers to share information or remove statutory barriers to sharing in the public sector.140 It 
received considerable opposition in Parliament, reflecting state-restrictive concerns. 
The proposal attracted cross-party opposition. Shadow Attorney General Dominic Grieve 
criticised Straw for reducing “a seismic change in the relationship between the state and the 
citizen to something utterly benign” and the Government for “proposing to drive a coach and 
horse through the duty of confidentiality that the state owes to individuals in any case where 
a quite nebulous concept of public good decides to trump the private right”.141 Grieve labeled 
the proposal “draconian”142 and argued that it raised “really serious possibilities of the 
oppressive state”.143 His opposition stemmed in part from concern about the Government’s 
data security record.144 David Howarth MP, the Liberal Democrat Shadow Secretary of State 
for Justice, criticized the proposals, saying they would “create amazingly broad exemptions 
to the principles of data protection legislation”145 and voiced fears about the potential for the 
future abuse of such powers.146 
Other fears were voiced about the level of parliamentary scrutiny orders under clauses 152 
would receive147 and the compatibility of the provision with Article 8 ECHR.148 In the Public 
Bill Committee, evidence given by Liberty raised concerns that the legislation could “override 
all the protections contained in the Data Protection Act” and the Human Rights Act.149 Liberty 
was also concerned about the broad scope of the power and lack of oversight and 
safeguards,150 as well as the Government’s record on data losses and security.151 David 
Howard MP further critiqued the clause as “part of a bigger picture in which the state allows 
itself more and more powers to collect and process personal data about individuals for 
purposes that are not revealed to those individuals”.152 
Eventually, Bridget Prentice MP, Under-Secretary of State for Justice, offered to seek “a 
more streamlined version” of the clause with a greater role for Parliament so that “we will 
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give the people whom we represent better public services.”153 The Government removed 
clause 152 during the Public Bill Committee stage on 10th March 2009.154 Justifying that 
decision on 24th March 2009, Prentice said that the Government had “concluded that a more 
in-depth analysis of the features of an information-sharing power was needed”.155 
The enlarged enforcement powers of the ICO were therefore the residue of legislation 
intended to smooth the passage of the controversial clause 152. The public-private divide in 
the enforcement powers of the ICO was not in fact welcomed by the ICO and was repeated 
challenged in Parliament. Giving evidence to the Public Bill Committee, Richard Thomas 
argued for a “power to inspect without consent”156 but commented that he was 
very concerned indeed that it extends only to Government Departments. Our 
report made it very clear that that sort of power is required right across the 
private and voluntary sectors for all data controllers.157 
When questioned about the public-private divide, Thomas said 
we explicitly said that it no longer makes sense to draw sharp dividing lines 
between public, private and voluntary sectors. We have the use of private 
sector contractors, the involvement of the private sector in traditional public 
functions and the use of the voluntary sector to carry out public functions… It 
is right to have a global approach. We cannot draw those sorts of distinctions 
between the different sectors any more. That is one fundamental reason why 
we think the powers available to the commissioner’s office need to extend to 
all data controllers.158   
In the Public Bill Committee, David Howarth MP, in discussion of the clause, questioned its 
coverage of only the public sector.159 His attempt to amend the provision to cover the private 
sector was later withdrawn.160 He noted that “the power that holding vast amounts of data 
gives is not restricted to the public sector”.161 Additionally, he pointed out that “a lot of 
privatization of public services or at least contracting out of public services to either the 
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private or voluntary sector” had blurred the lines between public authorities and private 
actors.162 Labour MP Alun Michael voiced similar concerns,163 arguing that “where a burden 
is needed in the public-interest to protect the public or individuals – it should apply fairly 
across the sectors”.164 He observed that  
At one time, an enormous amount of information would have been only in the 
public sector because it was gathered by or on behalf of authorities, or 
because the public sector undertook surveys and research, but that 
information is now very much part of the private sector’s day to day 
activities.165 
Similar concerns were raised by Conservative MP Henry Bellingham.166 There was therefore 
cross-party opposition to the public-private divide in the ICO’s enforcement powers. The ICO 
itself objected on the basis of an individual approach. On the other hand, the CBI opposed 
any change to the ICO’s enforcement powers against the private sector,167 including raising 
concerns about permitting search without a warrant.168 The Government defended the 
remaining provision on a state-restrictive basis and resisted an individual approach. 
Bridget Prentice MP replied that the “Government are strongly committed to improving public 
trust and confidence in the handling of personal information by public sector data 
controllers”.169 The proposed amendments represented “an unwarranted extension” of the 
ICO powers.170 There was, in the Government’s view, a “qualitative difference” between the 
public and private sectors:171 
Those who provide information to a data controller normally cannot refuse to 
do so, if they want to access a public service or have entitlement to a benefit. 
The public generally have no choice in that relationship, which is not exactly 
the same as that with the private sector.172 
… 
The fact that citizens must provide personal information to access essential 
services is a defining feature in the relationship between the citizen and the 
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public authority. In the private sector, the ability for someone to choose to go 
elsewhere should be a powerful driver that encourages businesses to look 
after personal information.173 
This distinction between coercion in the public sector and choice in the private reflects a key 
aspect of state-restrictive thinking. Additionally, she argued on behalf of the Government that 
“additional burdens would be in conflict with the Hampton principles”,174 which sought to 
ensure that burdens on business were proportionate to the risk they sought to avoid. 
Assessments notices were a response to build public confidence after the HMRC breach175 
and would represent a “significant additional regulatory burden”176 for business. Similar 
principles did not protect public authorities. Lord Bach, defending the Government’s position 
in the House of Lords, argued that they were “an important step towards building public 
confidence in the handling of personal data by public-sector data controllers”177 but would be 
a “little excessive and impose disproportionate burdens on business”.178 This appears to 
clearly reflect a state-restrictive thinking in which regulatory burdens on public authorities are 
viewed more positively. The Government was ultimately successful in passing assessment 
notices with a public-private divide in the face of this parliamentary opposition. In doing so, 
they introduced a public-private divide which is interesting in that it is state-restrictive, albeit 
that the provision was originally part of a wider state-facilitative intention. A struggle between 
different approaches of the Government and Parliament therefore shaped the public-private 
divide in this case, leaving a state-restrictive enforcement power in place.  
ATTITUDE OF THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE TO THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE 
The ICO has not adopted a public-private divide in its attitude to UK data protection. Instead 
it demonstrates elements of market and individual rights approaches. The introduction of 
public-private divides at the national level has been driven by Government, Parliament and 
the courts. None of the last three Information Commissioners have supported reforms or 
ideas that would introduce a public-private divide in national data protection law. 
Although in an editorial for The Times in 2004, Richard Thomas stated that his “primary 
objective [was] preventing the emergence of a Big Brother Society”,179 his surveillance fears 
were not directed at an Orwellian state. Thomas argued that “data protection stops too much 
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information about our personal lives ending up in the hands of governmental, commercial 
and voluntary organisations”. He was concerned to work against the establishment of a 
“surveillance society”,180 understood broadly. Indeed, the Thomas Walport Review, which he 
led with Mark Walport, sought to facilitate greater data sharing within government, subject to 
suitable safeguards.181 Although Thomas’s ICO addressed matters including ID cards, 
information sharing databases in children’s services, the transfer of airline passenger details 
to foreign governments,182 MPs’ travel expenses,183 the “Transformational Government” 
programme,184 sharing personal information across the public sector,185 and the “Connecting 
for Health” programme,186 his focus was on the “danger of function creep”,187 “ensuring good 
practice”188 and making sure there were proper “data protection safeguards”189 in place. The 
fact that his ICO was consulted on many Government projects does not mean that the 
approach he brought to bear was a state-orientated one. For Thomas, building “trust and 
confidence” was “key” to data protection:190 “mishandling personal information will lead to an 
erosion of confidence and businesses and government will suffer”.191 The Thomas ICO was 
the first body to voice serious concerns about the sale of personal information by private 
investigators in its 2006 special report “What Price Privacy?”.192 His concerns about 
surveillance spanned the public-private divide and reflect concerns for trust and confidence 
in the market and individual rights. Thomas’s comments in his 2008-2009 Annual Report 
were indeed more state-restrictive in tone, noting the “need to limit the state’s knowledge 
about the private lives of citizens”, while increasing transparency about state activities.193 
However, he also consistently argued that Government proposals to empower the ICO to 
conduct compulsory audits was “seriously deficient” as it did not extent to the private 
sector.194 The Thomas ICO’s approach to data protection reform did not incorporated a 
public-private divide and on occasion explicitly rejected it. 
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Christopher Graham’s ICO used a less rhetorical style in its reports but continued to see its 
role as one of “upholding information rights in the public interest”, irrespective of sector.195 
Although Graham was consulted and commented on the Protection of Freedoms Act, 
including restrictions on DNA profile retention, criminal vetting, the regulation of CCTV, 
restrictions on school biometric data use,196 and was involved in consultations on reform of 
data sharing in the public sector,197 his focus was on “enabling good practice”198 across the 
public and private sectors rather than taking a state-restrictive or state-facilitative approach. 
Graham showed a more pragmatic approach to extending the ICO’s assessment notice 
powers: where “it had become apparent that the case for the health sector was progressing 
faster” than that for local government, he supported the development, although he intended 
to seek further extension at a later date.199 However, this was more reflective of a practical 
approach to extending the scope of a favoured regulatory tool rather than revealing any 
deeper shift in general approach. Graham saw the importance of “effective information 
rights” in “rebuilding necessary public confidence, both in digital services, whether 
commercial or public sector, and in transparent and accountable government”.200 He 
repeated calls for the extension of compulsory audit to the private sector201 and his 
participation in the data sharing projects of the Cabinet Office and Law Commission 
balanced a recognition of the need for appropriate reforms with sufficient safeguards, within 
the scope of existing data protection law.202 His approach therefore similarly reflected an 
individual approach. 
Elizabeth Denham’s speeches point to a trust and confidence approach without a public-
private divide, rooted in tendencies characteristic of the market and individual approaches. In 
an early speech on 29 September 2016,203 Denham emphasised that privacy and innovation 
go hand in hand, because a good privacy framework builds “foundations of trust” that are 
“integral” to innovation. Denham set out a “fundamental objective” to “build a culture of data 
confidence in the UK” with “greater trust in businesses and public bodies”. Her vision was 
not of a “data protection regime that appeals because it is overly lax or ‘flexible’” but one that 
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“stands up to scrutiny”. Again, market and individual approaches are reflected in her views. 
 
The ICO under the last three Information Commissioners has therefore not endorsed 
approaches that require a public-private divide. Rather, public-private divides have been 
developed by Government, Parliament and the courts, reflecting a mixture of state-restrictive 
and state-facilitative themes. However, the ICO had limited influence over UK legal 
developments in his regard. 
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE IN NATIONAL DATA PROTECTION 
The development of the public-private divide in UK data protection law demonstrates 
complex interactions between the four conceptual approaches that have shaped the law in 
this area. Although market and individual approaches underpin the broad statutory scheme 
and the attitudes of successive regulators, Governments have been both more market-
orientated than Europe and willing to countenance more state-facilitative approaches to data 
protection at the national level, albeit supporting apparently state-restrictive approaches 
where necessary to build the confidence necessary to support disclosure to the public 
sector. Freedom of Information has increased subject access and accuracy rights against 
public authorities and provided opportunities for the courts and tribunals to introduce state-
restrictive tendencies in the jurisprudence on fair processing. Parliament has shown itself to 
be state-restrictive in the face of legislative attempts to increase data-sharing and in the 
passage of greater enforcement powers against the public sector for the ICO. One 
interesting phenomenon is the existence of provisions that, while state-restrictive in effect, 
were intended to help restore necessary public confidence to facilitate state activity and were 
intended as part of a package to smooth the passage of state-facilitative legislative bases for 
data sharing: state-restrictive in effect but state-facilitative in strategy. This is shows the 
complexities and nuances of the interaction of different approaches to the public-private 
divide. It does not show any linear or inevitable rise of an individual approach and also 
uncovers a history which is substantially more complex than that of a mere struggle, 
although struggle was also present in the development of the public-private divide in national 
data protection law. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE AND UNAUTHORISED DISCLOSURE OFFENCES 
INTRODUCTION 
The criminalisation of the unauthorised disclosure of information by officials and government 
subcontractors is a significant feature of the public-private divide in UK individual information 
law. This chapter examines the development of the public-private divide in official secrecy 
and the large number of individual-identifying information disclosure offences in the UK, 
including those found in data protection law. This field has an intense focus on the state. 
Market and individual approaches have carried little weight, save in shaping minor data 
protection offences and a small number of other narrowly defined offences. It is an area that 
provides a clear counter example to claims which focus on a gradual shift towards a more 
pronounced individual approach to individual information. Instead, state-facilitative and state-
restrictive approaches have come into conflict. To that extent it is one field that shows the 
role of struggle in the development of the public-private divide. Importantly, the chapter 
argues that the development of many unauthorised disclosure offences protecting individual-
identifying information is not indicative of an individual approach but rather is usually state-
facilitative in nature. 
Official secrecy has dominated discussion in this field and reflects struggles between 
advocates of state-facilitative and state-restrictive approaches to the public-private divide. 
However, a focus on official secrecy alone would distract from an analysis of the existence of 
many unauthorised disclosure offences, the vast majority of which protect individual-
identifying information. Although it is true that the emphasis on other disclosure offences 
intensified after 1989 in the aftermath of the reform of section 2 of the Official Secrets Act, 
disclosure offences existed independently before then. The criminal law has been used both 
to enhance the effectiveness of state activities and to restrain harmful disclosures of 
information acquired through the state’s coercive power. The resultant legal framework is 
complex and inconsistent, reflecting ad hoc legislative developments. European institutions 
have had little influence over information law in this field. It is largely an area of national 
development. The influence of Europe across the development of the public-private divide in 
UK individual information law can therefore be seen to vary across confidentiality, the right to 
private life, data protection and the protection of individual-identifying information through the 
criminal law. 
This chapter begins by examining the development of official secrecy. By the 1940s, a 
detailed legal regime had been created to regulate a wide range of official information. 
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Nothing of similar scope and strength has ever existed in relation to wrongful disclosure by 
private individuals.1 It breadth was such as to cover individual-identifying information held by 
the state alongside a vast range of other information. The approach taken was distinctly 
state-facilitative. This is because it was designed to centralise control over disclosures by 
officials by the state, permitting authorised disclosures, backed by serious criminal sanctions 
for unauthorised disclosures. Although officials were criminalised, the intended effect was to 
strengthen the state’s control over information, rather than to restrict the state from making 
disclosures at all. 
The reform of the Official Secrets Acts in 1989 reflected the rise of a state-restrictive critique. 
This ultimately resulted in the narrowing of the scope of official secrecy in 1989. That retreat 
of the state-facilitative approach reflected concerns about the appropriate reach of the 
criminal law and was therefore state-restrictive, concerned that the state’s powers to punish 
unauthorised disclosure were too great, in particular where disclosures were merely 
embarrassing, inconvenient or exposed the Government to criticism. It also reflected 
demands for greater transparency. However, the Official Secrets Act 1989 crystallised 
around several core areas of state concern: security and intelligence, defence, international 
relations and cooperation, and crime. The state-facilitative approach of the earlier law 
survived in relation to information disclosures that were likely to damage those central 
interests. The courts interpreted the 1989 Act to resist a more state-restrictive approach to 
official secrecy. The scope of official secrecy therefore reflects a tension between the state-
facilitative approach favoured by the executive and the state-restrictive approach voiced by 
some Parliamentarians and civil society. These tensions continue to appear and are deeply 
ingrained. They illustrate well a dynamic of struggle as one of the complex interactions that 
can occur between the different approaches to the public-private divide. The recent Law 
Commission consultation on the Protection of Official Data reflects a continuation of a 
broader state-facilitative approach with concessions to state-restrictive elements. Civil 
society resistance was fiercely state-restrictive in response, criticising the Law Commission’s 
closeness to Government Departments. 
This chapter then considers other information disclosure offences. Data protection law has 
criminalised certain unauthorised disclosures of personal data since 1984 and does so 
without a public-private divide. However, these offences are best understood more as 
instances of a market approach rather than an individual approach because they enhance 
the control of data by data controllers rather than protecting the rights of data subjects. 
Importantly, they are subject only to fines and therefore the scope of other imprisonable 
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offences are of greater importance to the public-private divide.2 Many other information 
disclosure offences exist in the criminal law. A clear majority were passed after 1989. They 
reflect piecemeal attempts to respond to the narrowing of official secrecy, re-criminalising the 
unauthorised disclosure of information that would have fallen within section 2 of the Official 
Secrets Act 1911. Others, including those which existed before 1989, reflect a set of 
concerns about the disclosure of commercial or personal information acquired by the state in 
the exercise of its power. Although many of these offences protect information relating to 
businesses and individuals, thereby serving markets or personal privacy, they are best 
understood as more fundamentally state-facilitative or state-restrictive in ambition. In many 
cases, especially post-1989, the protection of commercial or personal information was 
motivated by state-facilitative considerations. Public authorities were granted legal control 
through the criminal law to help public authorities gather the information needed to perform 
their functions. The chapter takes the development of offences relating to taxpayer 
confidentiality as a case study to illustrate this point in greater detail. In a small number of 
other contexts, the criminalisation of unauthorised disclosure is intended to restrict public 
authorities from harming individuals and businesses, showing diversity of approach, 
especially through ad hoc state-restrictive provisions.  
The development of official secrecy and other unauthorised disclosure offences highlights an 
area of individual information law which has consistently ignored or marginalised market and 
individual rationales and which shows a tension between state-facilitative and state-
restrictive approaches. Although it sits comfortably with accounts that emphasise the 
struggle, at least regarding the state, it is a powerful counterexample for narratives that 
anticipate the rise of an individual approach. It shows the resurgence the state-restrictive 
approach in UK law but also the endurance of state-facilitative thinking. 
OFFICIAL SECRECY: STATE-FACILITATIVE CONTROLS ON INFORMATION 
The Official Secrets Acts 1911 to 1939 formed the most important and extensive part of the 
criminal law on unauthorised disclosure from 1948 to 1989. The Official Secrets Act 1911 
was passed to replace the Official Secrets Act 1889,3 in response to Government criticisms 
that it was ““full of weaknesses and difficult to operate”. This perception made it unpopular 
with Governments.4 In particular, the 1911 Act was intended to strengthen the hand of the 
state against the threat of espionage.  Although the 1889 Act itself placed a great deal of 
power in the hands of the state to control official information, section 2 of the 1911 Act was 
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incredibly broad, criminalising the unauthorised disclosure of all information obtained owing 
to official positions or entrusted in confidence by officials.5 
The Official Secrets Act 1889 had been passed to maintain trust in government departments 
following a number of unauthorised disclosures before 1888.6 The 1889 Act created offences 
of disclosure of information7 and breach of official trust.8 The offence of disclosure of 
information was an espionage offence, capable of being committed by any individual, official 
or private, who wilfully and without lawful authority communicated or attempted to 
communicate certain types of information “to any person to whom [the information] ought 
not, in the interests of the State, to be communicated at that time”.9 It criminalised 
communications of documents or knowledge obtained in contravention of the Act to those 
who “ought not, in the interests of the State” receive it at that time.10 It also criminalised 
communications of certain information related to protected sites or naval or military affairs 
where the information had been “entrusted in confidence by some officer under Her Majesty 
the Queen”.11 It finally criminalised the wilful communication of certain documents or 
information relating to certain places belonging to the Crown, or relating to naval or military 
affairs, “to any person to whom he knows [it] ought not, in the interests of the State” be 
communicated.12 The Act also criminalised breach of official trust.13 Like later official secrecy 
legislation, the offence of breach of official trust in 1889 Act applied to state officials, official 
contractors and employees.14  The personal scope of official secrecy legislation has 
remained substantially the same for nearly 130 years. The offence criminalised 
communications of certain documents or information “to any person to whom [it] ought not, in 
the interest of the State, or otherwise in the public interest” be communicated where the 
communication was corrupt or contrary to official duty.15  
The 1911 Act was drafted to increase even further these considerable powers to apply 
criminal sanctions to officials. The circumstances of its passage through Parliament ensured 
little parliamentary scrutiny of the 1911 legislation. The catalyst for change was the “growing 
threat of international espionage”16 in the context of the arms race preceding the First World 
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War.17 This period was later described in Parliament as “the paranoia of 1911”.18 Lord 
Mishcon, during debates in the House of Lords on the Official Secrets Bill 1989, 
characterised the passage of the 1911 Act as one  “passed in Parliament one afternoon in 
an atmosphere of some panic.”19 This context significantly strengthened the Government’s 
hand, producing a state-facilitative Act of enormous breadth. 
Viscount Haldane, Secretary of State for War in 1911, stated that the purpose of the Bill was 
to “strengthen the law” on official secrecy and espionage and to make it more effective.20 
The Government insisted that the Bill contained “nothing novel in the principle of the Bill” but 
that it was “desirable and necessary to remodel the legislation, in order to adapt it to 
particular circumstances or emergencies”.21 Many MPs complained about the speed with 
which the Act passed. The speed and lack of debate highlight the role of a powerful 
executive and relatively weak Parliament in the context of national security legislation. Those 
MPs who struggled to resist the Government’s legislation were easily defeated. The 
motivation behind the 1911 reforms was strongly state-facilitative, aided by weak 
Parliamentary oversight and driven by military concerns. 
Section 1 of the Act imposed penalties for spying. These could be committed by any person 
who did certain acts “for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State”,22 
which could be proved “if, from the circumstances of the case, or his conduct, or his known 
character as proved, it appears that his purpose was a purpose prejudicial to the safety or 
interests of the State”.23 Such acts could include obtaining or communicating information and 
it was therefore state-facilitative, in that it constrained the obtaining or communication of 
information to prejudice the state.  
The most significant provision of the Act was section 2. It also criminalised the wrongful 
communication of information, extending this to information  
• “which [related] to or [was] used in a prohibited place”,  
• “which [had] been made or obtained in contravention” of the Act,  
• “which [had] been entrusted in confidence to him by any person holding office under 
His Majesty”,  
• or “which he [had] obtained owing to his position as a person who holds or has held 
office under His Majesty,  
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• or as a person who holds or has held a contract made on behalf of his Majesty, or as 
a person who is or has been employed under a person who holds or has held such 
an office or contract”.24  
The 1911 Act, therefore, placed enormous power in the hands of the state to regulate the 
disclosure of official information. It covered all such information and criminalised disclosures 
without official authorisation. The 1911 Act also made it an offence to retain certain 
documents without a right to do so or when it was contrary to the person’s duty.25 Knowing 
receipt or receipt with reasonable ground to believe that the material or information was 
communicated in contravention of the Act was an offence, unless proved that the 
communication was contrary to the person’s desire.26  
It might be thought that the 1911 Act represented a high-water mark of a state-facilitative 
approach in the UK. However, the 1911 Act was subsequently strengthened by both the 
1920 and 1939 Official Secrets Acts. The Official Secrets Act 1920 broadened the provisions 
of the 1911 Act to include the retention of any official document “for any purpose prejudicial 
to the safety or interests of the State” when it was “contrary to his duty to retain it” or one 
“fails to comply with any directions issued by the Government Department or any person 
authorised by such department with regard to the return or disposal” of the document.27 It 
also made it an offence to permit others to have possession of official documents “issued for 
his use alone” or to communicate secret code words or passwords or to possess them 
where they had been issued to another person or, having obtained or found an official 
document, neglected or failed to restore it to the person or authority by whom or for whose 
use it was issued or to the police.28 The 1920 Act also sought to make proof of offences 
more straightforward. It provided that communications with foreign agents was evidence of 
the commission of certain offences under the Official Secrets Acts.29 The Official Secrets Act 
1939 made further amendments relating to investigating offences under the Acts for the 
purpose of making prosecutions easier to obtain by creating powers to require the furnishing 
of information relating to official secrecy offences.30  
This made the criminalisation of unauthorised disclosures made by official, government 
employees and government contractors incredibly broad. It was driven primarily by national 
security concerns and little scrutinised by Parliament. It imposed extensive and onerous 
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obligations on official information. Nothing remotely comparable applied to information in 
private organisations. The approach reflects a very strong state-facilitative approach. It 
placed powerful tools in the hands of the state to regulate the flow of information held by its 
officials, employees and contractors, which were unavailable to private organisations. 
The courts in the 1960s showed some tendency to uphold a state-facilitative approach to the 
Official Secrets Acts, influenced by concerns about justiciability, the separation of powers, 
and the reviewability of the royal prerogative in the courts. In Chandler v DPP, the 
defendants argued that a purpose to disrupt a nuclear airbase was not a purpose “prejudicial 
to the interests of the State” within the meaning of the Official Secrets Act 1911.31 At the trial 
of the defendants, the judge had refused to allow the cross-examination of witnesses, and 
other evidence to be led, to challenge the defence policy of the Government. The 
defendants were members of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. They sought to argue 
that their acts would in fact be beneficial to state interests, by inhibiting the state’s ability to 
use nuclear weapons. They argued that the use of nuclear weapons would in fact have dire 
consequences for the state. The court held that the Crown was entitled to decide defence 
policy and that decision could not be called into question in a court of law. The interests of 
the state were therefore determined by the executive and evidence challenging that 
determination was not permitted. Although the case related to sabotage rather than the 
disclosure of information, this interpretation further strengthened the role of the state in 
determining the regulation of information within the state, by preventing juries from taking a 
different view of state interests. It was a state-facilitative driven by a deferential approach by 
the courts. 
Lord Parker CJ held that once a “proposed act is ascertained… the only remaining question 
is whether that act is in fact prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State.”32 The defence 
policy of the state was an exercise of the royal prerogative and “the manner of the exercise 
of such prerogative powers cannot be inquired into by the courts”.33 Lord Reid did distinguish 
the state from the Government or executive but refused to interpret it broadly as “the 
individuals who inhabit these islands”.34 Instead he favoured “the country or the realm” or 
even “the organised community”.35 Although he refused to “subscribe to the view that the 
Government or a Minister must always or even as a general rule have the last word” about 
the public interest,36 he considered that “the disposition and armament of the armed forces 
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are and for centuries have been within the exclusive discretion of the Crown and that no one 
can seek a legal remedy on the ground that such discretion has been wrongly exercised”.37 
The “criminal system [was] not devised to deal with issues of that kind”.38 Viscount Radcliffe 
also considered that the matter was “not justiciable”:39 Lord Hodson similarly found the 
suggestion that a court could determine the interests of the state “an impossible proposition 
involving the court and jury in the consideration of questions of policy.”40 Lord Devlin said 
that “the statute is not concerned with what the interests of the State might be, or ought to 
be, but with what they actually are at the time of the alleged offence.”41 The statute protected 
“the objects of State policy, even though judged sub specie aeternatis, that policy may be 
wrong”.42 Although whether the purpose was prejudicial was a matter of fact for the jury, the 
definition of the “interests of the State” was for the Crown.43 Lord Pearce similarly held that 
“interests of the State” did not mean “the interests of the amorphous populace”:44 “the 
interests of the State must… mean the interests of the State according to the policies laid 
down for it by its recognised organs or government and authority, the policies of the State as 
they are, not as they ought, in the opinion of the jury, to be.”45 The courts unwillingness to 
scrutinised the purported interests of the state and their deference to the executive in 1964 
therefore reinforced the high degree of state-facilitative control over information in the Official 
Secrets Acts 1911 to 1939.   
OFFICIAL SECRECY: THE RETREAT OF A STATE-FACILITATIVE APPROACH 
Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 was widely criticised for being overly broad and for 
placing too much power in the hands of the executive to enforce secrecy through the 
criminal law. This resistance to the wide state-facilitative approach in the law led to the 
retreat of that approach. The 1972 Franks Committee argued for reform of section 2, 
proposing more limited categories of information, although accepting a role for conclusive 
ministerial certification of the appropriate classification of the information.46 Although the 
Committee’s recommendations were accepted in 1973 by the Conservative Government, no 
further action was taken at the time.47 Under the Callaghan Labour Government, a 1978 
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White Paper and the 1979 Protection of Official Information Bill were proposed to implement 
this reform but it failed to attract sufficient support in Parliament before the 1979 General 
Election.48 Such reforms would have limited the material scope of Official Secrets, although 
the executive would have maintained a large amount of ministerial control through the 
certification of classified information.  
In 1989, the Government published a White Paper advocating reform of the 1911 Act. ATH 
Smith suggests that it was the Conservative Government’s defeats in the Ponting trial in 
198549 and the Spycatcher litigation, ending in 1988, that inspired legislative reform in 
1989.50 The same point was made by opponents of the Bill in Parliament.51 Ponting had 
been prosecuted for leaking official documents about the sinking of the General Belgrano 
during the Falklands War. He was acquitted by the jury despite a direction from the trial 
judge that public interest disclosure was not a defence. The Spycatcher litigation sought 
unsuccessfully to prevent the publication of the memoirs of Peter Wright, a former MI5 
officer. Both pieces of litigation resulted in considerable embarrassment to the Government 
and discredited so strong an approach to official secrecy. The 1989 White Paper proposed 
reform of the 1911 Act by narrowing the categories of information to which official secrecy 
applied, while maintaining a great deal of executive control in the areas in which official 
secrecy would continue to apply. It also proposed to enlarge the role of the jury in 
determining whether damage had in fact been caused to the relevant interest. There was 
therefore a retreat from the all-encompassing state-facilitative approach to official secrecy 
under the 1911 to 1939 Acts. 
However, the proposed reforms maintained a state-facilitative approach to information 
whose disclosure could cause damage to certain state interests. The 1989 Act replaced 
section 2 of the 1911 Act with “provisions protecting more limited classes of official 
information”,52 narrowing official secrets but maintaining a focus on key areas of state 
concern. It protected six categories of information”, namely,  security and intelligence,53 
defence,54 international relations,55 crime and special investigation powers,56 information 
resulting from unauthorised disclosures or entrusted in confidence,57 and information 
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entrusted in confidence to other states or international organisations.58 The Act, while 
protecting the secrecy of such information, directs officials towards formal channels or 
authorised disclosure. Authorised disclosures by Crown servants or notified persons could 
be “made with lawful authority if, and only if, it is made in accordance with his official duty.”59 
Authorised disclosures could be made by government contractors “if, and only if, it [was] 
made in accordance with an official authorisation or for the purposes of the functions by 
virtue of which he is a government contractor and without contravening an official 
restriction.”60 For other persons, authorised disclosures could be made “if, and only if, it is 
made to a Crown servant for the purposes of his functions as such or in accordance with an 
official authorisation”.61 A belief, with no reasonable cause to believe otherwise, that a 
person had lawful authority, was also made a defence.62 This marked a retreat from, but not 
an abandonment of, the state-facilitative approach by the Government. 
Opposition to the Bill centred around those who felt that the reforms should go further in 
introducing a more state-restrictive approach. There was a concern that secrecy made the 
executive too powerful and shielded it from accountability and potentially wrongdoing from 
exposure. There was therefore an ongoing tension between the state-facilitative core of 
official secrecy preserved by the Government and state-restrictive demands of opposition to 
the Bill. For example, Stephanie Palmer, commenting on the Government’s reform proposals 
in 1988, criticised the proposed reform, arguing that “the government [had] its priorities 
wrong” because the “interests of political democracy demand maximum public access to 
official information” as a “safeguard against the abuse of power”.63 Palmer also criticised the 
proposed protection of all information about interception, fearing that in the absence of a 
public interest test it would permit illegal telephone tapping to be hidden. 64 Palmer was 
particularly critical of the absence of a public interest defence, arguing that “it is not always 
clear that it is in the public interest for information defined by the government as secret to 
remain so”.65 This was because past disclosures had in fact served the public interest.66 She 
argued that the degree of executive control over information was “a dangerous situation for a 
political democracy”67 as “excessive secrecy” allowed “governments to pursue their own 
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ends apart from the public interest”, avoid scrutiny and “conceal mistakes and abuses”.68 
Palmer’s criticisms reflect a state-restrictive approach. 
A similar vein of criticism was voiced by those who opposed the Bill in Parliament. Roy 
Hattersley MP, the Shadow Home Secretary and a prominent critic of the Bill, criticised the 
Government for failing to introduce greater freedom of information. He claimed that it 
continued the “cocoon of unnecessary and debilitating secrecy” around government.69 He 
criticised the dominant role the Bill gave to the Government of the day in exercising control 
over information, arguing that Governments would inevitably fail to “distinguish between the 
true national interest and the sectional interests that they represent”.70 He feared that the Bill 
would prevent officials from exposing wrongdoing and merely serve the convenience of the 
Government.71  
Others in Parliament emphasised the need for transparency both in government and for the 
sake of democracy.72 They emphasised the importance of a public interest defence that 
would “enable crime, abuse of power and scandal to be exposed”.73 Tony Benn MP, an 
opponent of the Bill, argued that “if any structure of power is surrounded by secrecy, there is 
a danger of abuse”.74 Others were stronger in their criticism, accusing the Government of 
seeking to strengthen official secrets legislation to avoid embarrassment. For example, 
Diane Abbott MP claimed, with some hyperbole, that had the Government sought “ensure 
that all the people who had embarrassed the Government in the past would be caught by it 
and would serve time behind bars, this is the Bill that they would have come up with”.75 
Abbott further criticised the Bill for conflating the public interest and the “interest of the 
Government of the day”.76 
Ultimately, this strong opposition, rooted in set of state-restrictive concerns, had little impact 
on the legislation. Several attempts to introduce public interest defences to the Bill were 
defeated.77 The Government carried the necessary votes with comfortable majorities and 
built a regime around a state-facilitative approach, albeit one that more precisely targeted 
criminal sanctions around more limited classes of official information. The state-facilitative 
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approach might have retreated in the face of state-restrictive concerns but it was not 
defeated in core areas of state concern. The state-facilitative and state-restrictive 
approaches therefore interacted through tension, the state-restrictive making some gains 
through reform of section 2 of the 1911 Act but not fundamentally exposing official secrecy to 
the scrutiny of public interest disclosures. 
The Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd MP, agreed that “the criminal law should be prised away 
from the great bulk of official information”78 and only “protect, and protect effectively, 
information whose disclosure is likely to cause serious harm to the public interest.79 The 
intention of the Bill was to more precisely and effectively target the criminal sanction in order 
to enhance and strengthen the ability of the state to control the flow of information in relation 
to key areas of state interest. However, it did not create freedom of information rights: 
internal discipline would still apply to breaches and there were no positive rights to 
disclosure.80 
Importantly, the Bill made no provision for a public interest defence. It was based around a 
damage test, rather than a “serious harm” test as had been suggested in 1972 and by 
opponents of the Bill. Hurd argued that the definition of damage was for Parliament and not 
the courts,81 that the harm test struck the appropriate balance of public interest, and that it 
was undesirable that “the court should be left to balance some sort of competing interest”.82 
The Bill did, however, reflect a loosening of executive control to the extent that it rejected 
“the proposal for a ministerial certificate” in the Franks Report to instead rely on “objective 
criteria for the jury”.83 Hurd argued that secrecy was necessary for the effective protection of 
the nation by the Security Service.84 Unauthorised disclosures by members or former 
members could endanger life and undermine the trust necessary for their work, which would 
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“cause deep damage”.85 He also argued that there were “effective and reasonable ways for 
members of the security services and others affected to ensure that anxieties are not 
smothered and that concern about wrongdoing is not overlooked”.86 This reflected a state-
facilitative approach in that strong criminal controls on disclosure were seen an encouraging 
officials to rely on formal internal mechanisms and authorised disclosure.  
Supporters of the Bill also argued that internal controls were sufficient to prevent abuses of 
power. Jonathan Sayeed argued that “should they discover what they believe to be 
corruption or malpractice, they have not only the facility but the duty to report their concern 
to the permanent secretary, to the staff counsellor for the security and intelligence services, 
to the Minister or even to the head of the Civil Service.”87 Chris Patten argued that  
there is a place for a Crown servant with a worried conscience to go, but that 
place is not the front page of a newspaper or a surreptitious dispatch in a 
brown envelope. That is why we have a clear system of access to the head of 
the Civil Service and, in the case of members of the intelligence and security 
services, to the staff counsellor.88  
Other supporters of the Bill argued that a public interest defence would “encourage leaks” 
after which “the harm has been done”.89 Lord Hunt of Tanworth feared that a public interest 
defence “would be a recipe for politicising the Civil Service” and damage the trust between 
Ministers and civil servants.90 This reflected a state-facilitative concern to promote the 
working relationships of ministers and officials. 
Attempts to introduce a public interest defence were later pursued unsuccessfully through 
the courts, which maintained the state-facilitative approach in the face of human rights 
challenge. In R v Shayler,91 the defendant, a former member of the Security Service, had 
disclosed documents to a national newspaper purporting to reveal evidence of Security 
Service involvement in an assassination attempt against the head of government of a foreign 
State. The case concerned whether the Official Secrets Act 1989, read in light of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 and Article 10 ECHR, required a public interest defence. In the House of 
Lords,92 the Court held that the 1989 Act could not be interpreted to contain a public interest 
defence. Lord Bingham held that the “natural and ordinary meaning and reading [of sections 
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1(1)(a), 4(1) and 3(a)] in the context of the [Act] as a whole, was that a defendant prosecuted 
under these sections is not entitled to be acquitted if he shows that it was or that he believed 
that it was in the public or national interest to make the disclosure in question”.93 He added 
that the “sections leave no room for doubt” and that the “intention of Parliament [was] clear 
beyond argument.”94 However, this was not a violation of Article 10 because it was a ban on 
disclosure without lawful authority and a number of avenues were open to the defendant.95 
In this, the courts upheld the state-facilitative logic that drove the legislative majority to 
exclude a public interest defence on the face of the 1989 Act. The national courts have 
therefore done little to undermine the state-facilitative approach of the 1989 Act.  
The continuing tensions between state-restrictive and state-facilitative approaches became 
apparent recently as the result of provisional conclusions drawn by the Law Commission of 
England and Wales in the course of its consultation paper on the protection of official data. 
The Law Commission consulted on reform of the official secrecy and wrongful disclosure 
offences in February 2017.96 Its provisional conclusions reflect a broad continuation of the 
state-facilitative approach. These conclusions identified the definition of “enemy” under the 
1911 Act as problematic because identifying another state as an enemy could have 
“negative diplomatic consequences”97 and this could “inhibit the ability to prosecute”.98 The 
Law Commission acknowledged that the effect of changing the term would be “potentially to 
widen the scope of the offence”99 but asked whether a broader definition of foreign powers 
might be “a helpful starting point”.100 The Law Commission also argued provisionally that it 
should no longer be necessary to “demonstrate actual prejudice”101 to the interests of the 
state. Instead, it should be an offence “if the defendant, in intentionally engaging in the 
proscribed conduct, knew, or had reasonable grounds to believe that his or her conduct may 
cause prejudice to the safety or interests of the state”.102 It also provisionally concluded that 
it would be better “to focus on whether the defendant knew or believed that his conduct 
might benefit a foreign power.”103 This was because proving that the “defendant’s conduct 
did in fact benefit  foreign power could be very difficult given the nature of the activity in 
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question.”104 The provisional conclusions regarding the 1911 Act all act to make it easier to 
prosecute individuals under that legislation and represent a strengthening of the state-
facilitative approach. In relation to official secrecy, the provisional conclusions take issue with 
the requirement to prove damage or the likelihood of damage.105 This is because such proof 
may have the  “potential to compound the damage”106 and the “requirement to prove the 
existence of a vulnerability” was an “obstacle” to prosecution.107 The Law Commission 
suggested that a “inchoate mode” for the offence might be preferable.108 This would require 
reason to believe in the capacity of the information to do damage. Notably, capacity is a 
lower bar than the likelihood of damage required under the 1989 legislation. The Law 
Commission also provisionally concluded that the notification process for making individuals 
subject to section 1(1) of the 1989 Act needed to be more efficient,109 as “the process is 
slow… [and] sometimes a person must be notified at short notice”.110 The Law Commission 
also provisionally concluded that greater maximum sentences were required for breaches of 
official secrecy to “adequately reflect the culpability in the most egregious cases”.111 Finally, 
it provisionally concluded that “the problems associated with the introduction of a statutory 
public interest defence outweigh the benefits”, although it did provisionally conclude that 
internal mechanisms should be improved.112 In its efforts to make prosecutions easier and 
more efficient, to increase maximum sentences, and to reject a public interest defence the 
Law Commission’s provisional conclusions represent a continuation and strengthening of a 
state-facilitative approach to official secrecy.  
Media and civil society outrage following the publication of the consultation paper, on the 
other hand, reflect ongoing state-restrictive approaches in fierce conflict with the Law 
Commission’s approach. In February 2017, significant concerns were voiced by journalists 
and civil liberties groups about some of the Law Commission’s provisional conclusions and 
the potential impact of any reform on journalists and whistle blowers.113 As a result, the 
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Government distanced itself from the project.114 This fierce resistance by the media and civil 
society reflects a more state-restrictive approach, in which transparency, protection for 
whistle blowers and public interest disclosure defences act to prevent abuses of power by 
public authorities. The struggle between the state-facilitative and state-restrictive models of 
official secrecy is therefore very much ongoing. 
UNAUTHORISED DISCLOSURE AND DATA PROTECTION 
Unauthorised disclosure offences existed in both the Data Protection Act 1984 and Data 
Protection Act 1998.115 These offences contain no public-private divide and have a very wide 
potential scope. The Data Protection Act 1984 made it an offence for a person, or their 
servant or agent,116 “carrying on a computer bureau” to disclose connected personal data 
“without the prior authority of the person for whom those services are provided”.117 A 
“computer bureau” referred to one who provided “services in respect of data” as an agent 
who processed data on behalf of others or by allowing the use of equipment for processing 
data.118 The concept was therefore very similar to a processor under the Data Protection Act 
1998. Section 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998 made it an offence for a person to “obtain 
or disclose personal data or the information contained in personal data” or to “procure the 
disclosure to another person of the information contained in personal data” without the 
consent of the data controller, unless this was necessary “for the purpose of preventing or 
detecting crime” or was required by law,119 there was a reasonable belief in the right to 
obtain, disclose or procure,120 a reasonable belief that he would have had the consent of the 
data controller,121 or that the act was justified in the public interest.122 These offences were 
directed at preserving control over personal data in the hands of one who employed a 
                                                                                                                                                  
12th February 2017): https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/feb/12/the-guardian-view-on-
official-secrets-new-proposals-threaten-democracy; Chakrabarti, Whistleblowers Keep Us Safe. We 
Can’t Allow Them to Be Silenced (13th February 2017): 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/feb/13/whistleblowers-official-secrets-act-law-
commission; Cobain, This Assault on Whistleblowers Exceeds Even the Draconian 1911 Act (The 
Guardian, 15th February 2017): 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/feb/15/whistleblowers-law-commission-official-
secrets-act.          
114 Bowcott and Mason, No 10: Official Secrets Act Proposals ‘Project of Previous Prime Minister’ 
(The Guardian, 13th February 2017): https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/feb/13/uk-government-
law-commission-report-outlaw-whistleblowers-investigative-journalism. 
115 There are also similar unauthorised disclosure offences in the Data Protection Act 2018, s.170, 
although this is out of the scope of the thesis. See chapter 1, p. 19. 
116 Data Protection Act 1984, s. 15(2). 
117 Ibid., s. 15(1). 
118 Ibid., s. 1(6). 
119 Data Protection Act 1998, s. 55(2). 
120 Ibid., s. 55(2)(b). 
121 Ibid., s. 55(2)(c). 
122 Ibid., s. 55(2)(d). 
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computer bureau or who was a data controller. The offences are not directed towards the 
rights of data subjects, as a data controller, for example, might consent to disclosures in 
violation of data subject rights. They serve the efficacy of the statutory scheme and the 
smooth running of computer bureau or data controller arrangements. They are therefore 
primarily reflective of a market approach, which operates as a broad baseline in this field.  
However, the maximum penalty for an offence under section 15 of the Data Protection Act 
1984 or section 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998 was a fine.123 Although the Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Act 2008 provided for a power of the Secretary of State to amend 
section 55 by order to increase the maximum sentence to imprisonment of up to two 
years,124 the power was never exercised and has now been repealed by the Data Protection 
Act 2018.125 This means that the other offences considered in this chapter are typically 
subject to greater penalties, such as imprisonment, and transcend the market approach 
found in data protection, largely focusing on other approaches to the public private divide. 
The data protection offences are therefore of relatively minor significance. 
OTHER UNAUTHORISED DISCLOSURE OFFENCES IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
A very large number of other offences of unauthorised disclosure have been created by 
statute. The Law Commission of England and Wales recently identified 124 such offences 
currently in force126 and further offences have been passed since it published that 
research.127 Most unauthorised disclosure offences apply only to certain individuals in the 
public sector, thereby creating a public-private divide in individual information law. They rely 
on authorisation and statutory powers for lawful disclosure. The offences usually 
demonstrate a state-facilitative approach in their extensive statutory authorisations or 
exemptions to disclose for the purposes of other statutory functions. It is important, in this 
context, to note that the majority of unauthorised disclosure offences were passed after 
1989. Although the criminal law has never returned to the breadth and scope of the law as it 
was under section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911, reflecting state-restrictive concerns and 
greater scrutiny of criminal provisions, a state-facilitative approach has gradually eroded the 
impact of the reforms in the Official Secrets Act 1989. This shows the ongoing tensions 
between state-facilitative and state-restrictive approaches in the development of the law, 
albeit through gradual erosion rather than high-profile conflict. State-facilitative approaches 
                                               
123 Data Protection Act 1984, s. 19(2); Data Protection Act 1998, s. 60(2). 
124 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s. 77. See Rosemary Jay, Data Protection Law and 
Practice (2012), paras. 21-32 to 21-38. 
125 The offence in the 2018 Act, s. 170 is also only subject to a fine: Data Protection Act 2018, s. 
196(2).  
126 Law Commission (2017) Consultation Paper No 230.  
127 See, for example, the Digital Economy Act 2017.  
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have consistently and gradually undermined the reform of section 2 of the Official Secrets 
Act 1911.   
Below, I analyse the criminalisation of disclosures related to taxpayer confidentiality in detail. 
It is also an important example due to the amount of information and number of officials 
covered by its provisions. This case study shows that even though offences related to 
taxpayer confidentiality, like many other offences, concern individual-identifying information, 
the core concern remains state-facilitative, rather than reflecting an individual approach. 
Criminalisation in the context of taxpayer confidentiality is also a key example of the 
expansion of criminal liability for wrongful disclosure by officials after the reform of section 2 
of the Official Secrets Act 1911 in 1989. The scope of the criminal law expanded once again 
in 2005 as part of the merger of HM Inland Revenue and HM Customs and Excise, to 
support the significant advances in information sharing that those reforms brought about. 
Although the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 contained public interest 
disclosure provisions, these are a limited concession and do not undermine the state-
facilitative framework, especially the public interest disclosure process is controlled by senior 
officials. 
Many unauthorised disclosure offences do not simply protect all information gathered 
pursuant to the exercise of statutory power128 or in the course of official duties, employment 
                                               
128 Atomic Energy Act 1946, s. 13; Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946, s. 56; Agricultural 
Marketing Act 1958, s. 47; Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1961, s. 12; Harbours Act 1964, s. 46; 
Medicines Act 1968, s. 118; Sea Fish Industry Act 1970, s. 14; Counter-Inflation Act 1973, Sch. 4; 
Employment Agencies Act 1973, s. 9(4); Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 etc., s. 33; Carriage of 
Goods (Prohibition of Discrimination) Regulations 1977/276, reg. 9(2); Highways Act 1980, s. 292(4); 
Fisheries Act 1981, s. 12; Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981, s. 54; Civil Aviation Act 1982, s. 23; 
Industrial Training Act 1982, s. 6; Iron and Steel Act 1982, s. 33; Merchant Shipping (Liner 
Conferences Act 1982, s. 10; Telecommunications Act 1984, s. 101; Airports Act 1986, s. 74; 
Companies Act 1989, s. 86; Electricity Act 1989, s. 98; Water Act 1989, s. 174; Broadcasting Act 
1990, s. 197; Child Support Act 1991, s. 50; Criminal Justice Act 1991, s. 91; Water Industry Act 
1991, s. 206; Water Resources Act 1991, s. 204; Cardiff Bay Barrage Act 1993, s. 22; National 
Lottery Act 1993, s. 4C; Railways Act 1993, s. 145; Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 
1995, s. 35; Shipping and Trading Interests (Protection) Act 1995, s. 3; Chemical Weapons Act 1996, 
s. 32; Airports (Groundhandling) Regulations 1997/2389, reg. 23; Bank of England Act 1998, Sch. 7; 
Data Protection Act 1998, s. 59; Landmines Act 1998, s. 19; Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000, s. 6; 
Television Licences (disclosure of Information) Act 2000, s. 3; Transport Act 2000, s. 143 and Schs. 9 
and 10; Utilities Act 2000, s. 105; Communications Act 2003, s. 393; Public Audit (Wales) Act 2004, s. 
54; Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005, s. 19; Education Act 2005, s. 109; Childcare 
Act 2006, s. 13B; Companies Act 2006, s. 460; National Health Service Act 2006, s. 8 and Sch. 22; 
Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, s. 111; Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007, s. 39; UK Borders 
Act 2007, s. 42; Health and Social Care Act 2008, s. 76; Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010, s. 
23; Postal Services Act 2011, s. 56; Civil Aviation Act 2012, Sch. 6; Customs Disclosure of 
Information and Miscellaneous Amendments Regulations 2012/1848, reg. 3; Legal Aid, Sentencing 
and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, s. 33; Welfare Reform Act 2012, s. 129; Energy Act 2013, 
Sch. 9; Defence Reform Act 2014, Sch. 5. 
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or the administration of statutory schemes.129 Instead, like taxpayer confidentiality, many 
protect individual-identifying information130 or commercial information,131 such as 
manufacturing processes, trade secrets and other information about businesses. This 
reflects a more targeted approach than the pre-1989 approach to official secrecy, but it often 
remains state-facilitative. This is because such offences facilitate centralised control over 
official information and facilitate the collection of information for official purposes by 
reassuring individuals and businesses that their information cannot be disclosed without 
proper authorisation. Unlike the 1989 Act, these offences do not require proof of the 
likelihood of damage to any particular interest.  
Some exceptions to this remain, however, demonstrating the occasional impact of state-
restrictive, individual or market approaches to the regulation of information through the 
criminal law, although these are relatively rare. Many powers of entry have unauthorised 
disclosure offences relating only to individual or commercial information indirectly acquired 
                                               
129 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, ss. 9 and 9A; Finance Act 1989, s. 182; Social Security 
Administration Act 1992, s. 123; Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s. 14; Criminal Appeal 
Act 1995, s. 23; Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, s. 158; Equality Act 2006, s. 6; Cross-border 
Railway Services (Working Time) Regulations 2008/1660, reg. 11; Crime and Courts Act 2013, s. 10; 
Mesothelioma Act 2014, s. 8; Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, Sch. 10, paras. 15 and 25. 
130 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, ss. 9 and 9A; Civil Aviation Act 1982, s. 23; 
Telecommunications Act 1984, s. 101; Electricity Act 1989, s. 89; Finance Act 1989, s. 182; Water Act 
1989, s. 174; Child Support Act 1991, s. 50; Criminal Justice Act 1991, s. 91; Water Industry Act 
1991, s. 206; Water Resources Act 1991, s. 204; Social Security Administration Act 1992, s. 123; 
National Lottery Act 1993, s. 4C; Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s. 14; Bank of England 
Act 1998, Sch. 7; Data Protection Act 1998, s. 59; Transport Act 2000, s. 143 and Schs. 9 and 10; 
Utilities Act 2000, s. 105; Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005, s. 19; Education Act 
2005, s. 109; Childcare Act 2006, s. 13B; Companies Act 2006, s. 460; Statistics and Registration 
Service Act 2007, s. 39; UK Borders Act 2007, s. 42; Health and Social Care Act 2008, s. 76; Postal 
Services Act 2011, s. 56; Civil Aviation Act 2012, Sch. 6; Welfare Reform Act 2012, s. 129; Defence 
Reform Act 2014, Sch. 5; Mesothelioma Act 2014, s. 8; Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, Sch. 
10, paras. 15 and 25. 
131 See Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946, s. 56(1); Industrial Organisation and Development Act 
1947, s. 5; Statistics of Trade Act 1947, s. 9; Prevention of Damage by Pests Act 1949, s. 22(5); 
Medicines Act 1968, s. 118; Sea Fish Industry Act 1970, s. 14; Carriage of Goods (Prohibition of 
Discrimination) Regulations 1977/276, reg. 9(2); Highways Act 1980, s. 292(4); Fisheries Act 1981, s. 
12; Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981, s. 54; Industrial Training Act 1982, s. 6; Building Act 1984, s. 
96; Telecommunications Act 1984, s. 101; Airports Act 1986, s. 74; Electricity Act 1989, s. 98; Water 
Act 1989, s. 174; Town and Country Planning Act 1990, ss. 196C and 325, Sch. 15(14); Water 
Industry Act 1991, s. 206; Water Resources Act 1991, s. 204; Water Resources Act 1991, s. 205; 
Cardiff Bay Barrage Act 1993, s. 22; Railways Act 1993, s. 145; Goods Vehicles (Licensing of 
Operators) Act 1995, s. 35; Chemical Weapons Act 1996, s. 32; Airports (Groundhandling) 
Regulations 1997/2389, reg. 23; Bank of England Act 1998, Sch. 7; Data Protection Act 1998, s. 59; 
Landmines Act 1998, s. 19; Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000, s. 6; Transport Act 2000, s. 143 and Schs. 
9 and 10; Utilities Act 2000, s. 105; Communications Act 2003, s. 393; Companies Act 2006, s. 460; 
Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, s. 111; Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010, s. 23; Postal 
Services Act 2011, s. 56; Civil Aviation Act 2012, Sch. 6; Defence Reform Act 2014, Sch. 5. 
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during their exercise.132 The exercise of such powers does not require cooperation with the 
holders of that information and the information in question might be irrelevant to the purpose 
of the entry. Such powers are therefore state-restrictive in intention, protecting individuals 
and businesses from the indirect harmful effects of the exercise of state power. Some 
unauthorised disclosure offences are targeted at information that is dangerous or harmful 
information itself, in contexts which are not necessarily official.133 Such offences reflect the 
occasional presence of an individual approach. This is because it is the potential harm to 
individuals, irrespective of the status of a potential disclosing party, that characterises the 
offence. Such offences apply to anyone who comes into possession of such information and 
are therefore broader in personal scope that the official secrecy related regime. Others, such 
as the Access to Information (Post Commencement Adoptions) (Wales) Regulations 
2005/2689, regulation 19 and the Access to Information (Post Commencement Adoptions) 
Regulations 2005/888, regulation 21, apply to all providers of a service, whether public or 
not, in this case registered adoption societies. Such offences reflect a recognition of service 
provision across the public-private divide. Some offences relate to the wrongful disclosure of 
business information in a commercial setting. These offences reflect market approaches and 
are not limited to officials or focused on individual-identifying information, although some 
such information may be included within the scope of commercial information.134 Individual 
and market approaches underlie such disclosure offences. This demonstrates the variety of 
approaches that occasionally influence the passage of ad hoc unauthorised disclosure 
offences. They are however more unusual examples compared to state-facilitative offences. 
The majority of offences cover official information that was formerly covered by section 2 of 
the Official Secrets Act 1911. They act to restore control over that information for state-
facilitative ends. A clear example of this is in relation to taxpayer confidentiality.  
TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY 
For much of the 20th century, secrecy in relation to taxpayer information was enforced 
through the criminal law in the Official Secrets Acts and through internal disciplinary 
proceedings.135 Solemn declarations of secrecy by tax officials were much older and have 
                                               
132 Prevention of Damage by Pests Act 1949, s. 22(5); Gas Act 1965, s. 9; Building Act 1984, s. 96; 
Town and Country Planning Act 1990, ss. 196C and 325, Sch. 15(14); Water Resources Act 1991, s. 
205; Private Security Industry Act 2001, s. 19. 
133 Atomic Energy Act 1946 (certain information about atomic energy plants); Anti-Terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act 2001, ss. 79 (information that might prejudice the security of any nuclear site or of 
any nuclear material) and 80 (information about the enrichment of uranium or any information or thing 
which is, or is likely to be, used in connection with the enrichment of uranium). 
134 Companies Act 1985, s. 449; Companies Act 1989, s. 86. 
135 Osita Mba, Transparency and Accountability of Tax Administration in the UK: The Nature and 
Scope of Taxpayer Confidentiality (2012) British Tax Review 187, 207. 
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been imposed since the Income Tax Act 1799.136 Secrecy at that time supported the 
introduction of a system of self-assessment by reducing opposition to the tax’s onerous and 
intrusive disclosure requirements.137 Mba states that “it is arguable that the primary rationale 
for tax secrecy was not the protection of privacy of taxpayers per se but the facilitation of the 
imposition and collection of income tax.”138 Customs and excise officers were not required to 
make similar declarations.139 This reflected the reduced practical rationale for the state 
protecting confidentiality outside the context of self-assessment. Customs and excise 
officers relied to a much greater extent on intelligence gathering and search and seizure 
powers, which do not require, or indeed presuppose, the cooperation of taxpayers. This 
reflected their historic role in tackling smuggling activities. 
There has been consistent and long-standing recognition of the role of taxpayer 
confidentiality in facilitating the collection of tax. In Inland Revenue Commissioners v 
National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd, Lord Wilberforce observed 
that the “total confidentiality of assessments and of negotiations between individuals and the 
revenue is a vital element in the working of the system.”140 More recently, the Permanent 
Secretary for Tax told Parliament in 2011 that “if taxpayers believe that their information may 
be disclosed, it will make it very much more difficult for us to collect tax”.141 In 2014, the 
HMRC Tax Assurance Commissioner told MPs that there was “‘extremely overwhelming’ 
evidence that ending taxpayer confidentiality would result in a loss of tax revenue”:142 
The reason we don’t have to use our powers extensively is that the public 
have confidence in us, and the taxpaying public is willing to share information, 
and sometimes more information than they are required [to share].143 
In response to an oral question in March 2016 calling for greater transparency, Lord Ashton 
of Hyde explained that: 
My Lords, taxpayer confidentiality is key to the effective operation of the tax 
system. Taxpayers have confidence that the sensitive information that they 
give to HMRC will be protected and this trust underpins the high levels of 
                                               
136 Ibid., p. 189. 
137 Ibid., pp. 204 to 205. 
138 Ibid., p. 205. 
139 Ibid., p. 206. 
140 Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd 
[1982] AC 617, 633. 
141 Andrew Goodall, Taxpayer confidentiality: Harnett sets out HMRC view for MPs, Tax Journal, 21 
October 2011. 
142 Andrew Goodall, MPs ask HMRC to justify taxpayer confidentiality, 14th October 2014, 
http://www.accountingweb.co.uk/tax/hmrc-policy/mps-ask-hmrc-to-justify-taxpayer-confidentiality. 
143 Ibid. 
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voluntary tax compliance that the UK enjoys. The public benefit of taxpayer 
confidentiality lies in the overall effectiveness of the tax administration that it 
significantly supports. 
The policy behind preserving taxpayer confidentiality is therefore not the protection of 
individuals but rather the facilitation of the collection of tax by the state, which requires 
individual-identifying information from taxpayers. Taxpayer confidentiality also illustrates the 
way in which such state-facilitative individual information disclosure offences are part of a 
wider, if ad hoc, erosion of the reform of section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911. Although 
individual privacy certainly benefits from taxpayer confidentiality, it would be mistaken to 
consider that these offences are directed primarily at protecting the individual or restricting 
the state. It is rather a necessary part of the assurances given to support the maximum tax 
yield and to encourage voluntary disclosure, which is more efficient than coerced disclosure. 
Taxpayer confidentiality is therefore a state-facilitative practice. 
The argument above can be substantiated through a more detailed historical consideration 
of interventions made during the enactment of the Official Secrets Act 1989 and policy 
changes which followed. In 1989, a number of MPs voiced concern that the removal of a 
criminal sanction for the unauthorised disclosure of taxpayer information would damage the 
collection of tax. Concerns for taxpayer confidentiality were also voiced in the House of 
Lords, as were hopes that the matter would be addressed in the Finance Bill of the same 
year.144 The value of taxpayer confidentiality was once again stressed in terms of the 
effective operation of the tax system.145 Chris Patten MP, the Minister for Oversees 
Development, announced during debates on reform of the Official Secrets Acts that separate 
criminal provision would be made to protect taxpayer confidentiality,146 although it would be 
targeted at information about taxpayers, including companies, and exclude information about 
tax policy and administration.147 Patten also noted at that time that other areas might need 
further criminal legislation in the future. This would be considered on a Bill by Bill basis.148 
Lord Belstead finally confirmed in the House of Lords that the Government’s intention was to 
make provision in the Finance Bill to protect taxpayer confidentiality through the criminal 
law.149  
                                               
144 Lord Houghton of Sowerby, H.L. Deb. 9 March 1989, vol. 504, col. 1619. 
145 Ibid., col. 1621. 
146 H.C. Deb 22 February 1989, vol. 147, cols. 1073. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid., cols. 1074. 
149 H.L. Deb. 09 March 1989, vol. 504, col. 1665. 
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Section 182 of the Finance Act 1989 was introduced to protect taxpayer information 
following the narrowing of Official Secrets legislation in that year.150 The section came into 
force on the same day as the repeal of section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911.151 
Taxpayer confidentiality was therefore never without the protection of the criminal law. Unlike 
official secrets legislation, section 182 and later protections have focussed on “identifiable 
persons” and not all information relating to tax. However, it would be wrong to argue that this 
represents a shift towards an individual approach. The reason for this is that taxpayer 
confidentiality, rather than official secrecy generally, was and is understood to play an 
important role in ensuring the effective collection of tax. Denying confidentiality to taxpayers 
was seen as threatening the tax base and it is this, rather than a concern for individual 
interests and values, that has driven the protection of taxpayer confidentiality in the UK. It is 
best understood as a targeted criminal offence designed to facilitate the state rather than to 
protect individual interests. This also explains its application to tax officials and not more 
generally to those wrongfully disclosing the same information, such as, for example, private 
accountants.  
Section 182(1) made it an offence for a person to disclose “any information which he holds 
or has held in the exercise of tax functions… if it is information about any matter relevant, for 
the purposes of those functions, to tax or duty in the case of any identifiable person”. Section 
182(4) made it an offence for a person to disclose  
any information which he holds or has held in the exercise of functions of the 
Comptroller and Auditor General and any member of the staff of the National 
Audit Office, or of the Parliamentary Commissioner or Administration and his 
officers, is, or is derived from, information which was held by any person in 
the exercise of tax functions and is information about any matter relevant, for 
the purposes of tax functions, to tax or duty in the case of any identifiable 
person.152 
These offences do not apply to disclosure with lawful authority, consent of the individual 
identified, or “which has been lawfully made available to the public before the disclosure is 
made.”153 Belief in lawful authority, without cause to believe otherwise, is a defence.154 The 
section was successively amended to extend to tax credit functions,155 child trust fund 
                                               
150 Mba (2012), p. 208. 
151 Finance Act 1989, s. 182(12). 
152 Emphasis added. 
153 Finance Act 1989, s. 182(5). 
154 Ibid., s. 182(7). 
155 By the Tax Credits Act 1999, s. 12(2)(a). 
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functions,156 certain social security functions157 and other audit and Ombudsmen 
functions.158 Although an expanding scope of the offence to new functions was adopted by 
the state over time, the same rationale subsisted.  
Offences protecting taxpayer confidentiality were further expanded to facilitate extensive 
data sharing on the merger of Inland Revenue and Excise and Custom to form HMRC in 
2005. The O’Donnell Review was announced in July 2003 to consider the organisations 
responsible for tax policy and administration.159 The O’Donnell Review sought “a coherent 
approach to information”160 in order to use “information provided by taxpayers to develop a 
better understanding of customer needs so that policies and services can be best 
targeted”.161 With other organisational reforms, the aim was “to improve efficiency in the 
revenue departments”.162 The O’Donnell Review led to the Commissioners for Revenue and 
Customs Act 2005, the main purpose of which was to merge Inland Revenue and Excise 
and Customs to form HMRC.163 
The Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Bill was introduced by the Paymaster 
General Dawn Primarolo MP on 24thNovember 2004. At the Bill’s Second Reading, she said 
the Bill was “principally a machinery-of-Government Bill to implement sensible reforms to tax 
administration”, including reforms to the use of information.164 The Bill would make “better 
use of information, built around an ability to look across a taxpayer’s affairs” to “allow for 
more effective targeting of resources to areas of risk”.165 This would include allowing HMRC 
“to pool information internally so that information supplied for one of its functions can be 
used for any of its other functions”.166 She promised that there would be “no let-up in 
HMRC’s commitment to safeguarding taxpayer confidentiality”.167 The Bill extended the 
protection of the criminal law to many matters previously dealt with by Customs and 
                                               
156 By the Child Trust Funds Act 2004, s. 18(2)(a). 
157 By the Social Security Contributions (Transfer of Functions, etc.) Act 1999, Sch. 6 para. 9(2)(a). 
158 By the Government of Wales Act 1998, Sch.12 para. 31(2); Budget Responsibility and National 
Audit Act 2011, Sch. 5(2) paras. 14(2)(a) and 14(2)(b); Public Audit (Wales) Act 2013, Sch. 4 para. 2; 
Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2005, Sch. 6 para. 22(a), Scottish Public Services 
Ombudsman Act 202 (Consequential Provisions and Modifications) Order 2004/1823, art. 10(b).  
159 Gus O’Donnell, Financing Britain’s Future: Review of the Revenue Departments (2004), para. 1.1. 
160 Ibid., para. 1.20. 
161 Ibid., para. 1.33. 
162 Ibid., para. 1.34. 
163 Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Bill, Bill 3 of 2004-05, Research Paper 04/90, 6 
December 2004, p. 10.  
164 H.C. Deb. 8 December 2004, vol. 428. cols. 1147 to 1170. 
165 Ibid., col. 1170. 
166 Ibid., col. 1174. 
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Exercise.168 Dawn Primarolo justified this extension of the criminal law by reference to the 
needs of tax administration:  
It is vital for continuing compliance rates that taxpayers provide information to 
the Revenue departments. The bedrock of that process is the knowledge that 
their confidentiality is protected.169  
Andrew Tyrie MP echoed such concerns: “If people do not have confidence in the Revenue 
department, they will not share information and the tax yield will suffer.”170 David Heathcoat-
Amory MP added that taxpayer confidentiality was “important, and it is very much in the 
interests of the Revenue departments, because people will co-operate freely with the 
Revenue authorities only if they can be sure that the information given is protected”.171 
The Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 merged Inland Revenue and 
Customs and Excise into HMRC. Section 17(1) facilitated an enormous pooling of 
information held by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue and the Commissioners of 
Customs and Excise, “their staff and anyone acting on their behalf”.172 It provided that 
“information acquired by the Revenue and Customs in connection with a function may be 
used by them in connection with any other function”, subject to any restrictions in statute or 
international agreements.173 A significant feature of the merger was this enormous 
expansion of the use of information for any function of HMRC. Section 18 provided that 
“Revenue and Customs officials may not disclose information which is held by the Revenue 
and Customs in connection with a function of Revenue and Customs”,174 unless it is a 
disclosure which was made in one of a list of statutorily recognised circumstances.175 The 
section 18 duty of confidentiality was backed by an offence of wrongful disclosure in section 
19. Section 19(1) provided that a “person commits an offence if he contravenes [the 
confidentiality duties imposed by the Act] by disclosing revenue and customs information 
relating to a person whose identity is specified in the disclosure or can be deduced from 
it.”176 There was a defence of reasonable belief that the disclosure was lawful or that it “had 
already and lawfully been made available to the public”.177 The Commissioners for Revenue 
and Customs Act 2005 also imposed an obligation on “each person who is appointed under 
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169 Ibid., col. 1175. 
170 Ibid., col. 1186. 
171 Public Bill Committee, Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Bill (H.C. 2004-2005 2nd Sitting) 
11 January 2005, col. 58. 
172 Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005, s. 17(3). 
173 Ibid., s. 17(2) (emphasis added). 
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175 Ibid., ss. 18(2) and (3). 
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this Act as a Commissioner or officer of Revenue and Customs” to make a “declaration 
acknowledging his obligation of confidentiality under section 18”,178 “as soon as is 
reasonably practicable following the person’s appointment”.179  
Unlike the Official Secrets Acts, the 2005 Act contained provision for public interest 
disclosures. However, it remains tightly controlled and subject to oversight by the 
Commissioners for Revenue and Customs. It is therefore a provision more in line with a 
state-facilitative approach: placing control in the hands of the organisation as to whether 
information is released in the public interest, which is defined so as to cover core areas of 
state concern, including the prevention of crime;180 the regulation of professional misconduct 
concerning HMRC’s functions;181 police functions concerning the free movement of persons 
or goods;182 and public safety and public health.183 Section 20 could be relied on where a 
disclosure is “made on the instructions of the Commissioners (which may be general or 
specific)”,184 is of a certain class,185 and “the Commissioners are satisfied that it is in the 
public interest.”186 It is emphatically not a public interest defence of the kind favoured by the 
opponents of the Official Secrets Act 1989, which would protect decisions made without 
official agreement. Further disclosure without the consent of the Commissioners is not 
permitted and may be punished under section 19.187  
The expansion of offences concerning taxpayer confidentiality illustrates a process of the 
gradual erosion of the reform of section 2 in pursuit of state-facilitative aims by a major 
unauthorised disclosure offence. A state-facilitative approach has therefore eroded the 
retreat of section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 without the open conflict that 
characterised the legislative struggle in 1989.  
STRUGGLES OVER THE CRIMINALISATION OF UNAUTHORISED DISCLOSURE 
Official secrecy and other unauthorised disclosure offences have maintained a strong public-
private divide, using the criminal law to control information disclosure by officials, 
government employees and contractors. Although the scope of the criminal law on official 
secrecy has narrowed and been more precisely targeted towards a core set of state 
concerns, it has largely followed a state-facilitative approach, with a state-restrictive 
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approach unsuccessfully opposing changes pushed through Parliament by a powerful 
executive. Reform was driven by a desire to refine the state-facilitative approach and to 
respond to broader concerns about over-criminalisation, at best reflecting a retreat in the 
face of state-restrictive criticisms. That retreat has been subsequently eroded by many 
targeted wrongful disclosure offences in the public sector. The national courts have also 
largely supported a state-facilitative approach to official secrecy, although very few decisions 
have arisen for judgment.  
Official secrecy and other unauthorised disclosure offences are a key example of the 
dominance of a state-facilitative approach in an area of individual information law. It reflects 
features of the UK constitutional landscape, especially executive dominance of Parliament 
and the unwillingness of the courts to intervene in core areas of state power. It also reflects 
the limited role of European information law on the development of national criminal law. The 
scope of the state-facilitative approach was significantly eroded by state-restrictive critiques 
in the 1970s and 1980s and expanded in a piecemeal fashion thereafter through 
unauthorised disclosure offences. It reflects struggles between state-facilitative and state-
restrictive approaches with limited consideration for individual or market approaches. The 
criminalisation of unauthorised disclosure has been highly resistant to expansion into 
disclosures of information held by private actors, producing only relatively minor data 
protection offences. It is an important counter example to narratives of a gradual rise of the 
individual approach in information law. Although admittedly it does demonstrate the role of 
struggle, the gradual expansion of a state-facilitative approach through unauthorised 
disclosure offences after 1989 is a different form of interaction between those approaches. 
The development of the public-private divide in the criminal law on unauthorised disclosure 
shows the complex ways in which the approaches can interact, in this field predominantly 
through competition and struggle. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE IN UK INDIVIDUAL INFORMATION 
LAW: COMPLEX INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DIVERSE APPROACHES  
INTRODUCTION 
The history of the public-private divide in UK individual information law does not support 
either of the two distinctive historical narratives about the development of the public-private 
divide identified in chapter 1.1 It does not reflect a general, paradigmatic shift from a state-
restrictive and towards an individual approach. Neither does it support historical accounts 
that emphasise the importance of struggle as the main form of interaction between different 
approaches to the development of individual information law. Instead, the thesis provides a 
historically-grounded theoretical model for understanding the set of complex interactions 
between diverse approaches that shaped the public-private divide in individual information 
law between 1948 and 2017. The adoption of market, individual, state-restrictive or state-
facilitative approaches by a variety of executive, legislative, judicial and regulatory actors 
and the tensions, compromises, cooperation, inspiration, catalysation, reaction, resistance, 
erosion, evolution, parallel coexistence and shifts in approach between those approaches 
explain the uneven and non-linear development of the public-private divide better than rival 
theories. The thesis provides a more complex and nuanced account for thinking about the 
development of the public-private divide and the sets of concerns, attitudes, assumptions 
and tendencies that have shaped it.  
The thesis also contributes to the “ontological challenge” in the Europeanisation literature. It 
does this by helping to illustrate the complex, inconsistent and diverse ways in which UK 
individual information law at the national level has implemented, resisted, or diverged from 
European individual information law concerning the public-private divide. It shows the 
agency of national actors interacting with European law and the role of the approaches that 
span the division of national and European law. It also helps to illustrate that the influence of 
Europe has been uneven in respect to different fields of individual information law: more 
influential in relation to data protection and human rights and less influential in relation to 
pre-Human Rights Act confidentiality and unauthorised disclosure offences. The historical 
approach adopted demonstrates the complex interactions of approach that have framed the 
decisions of architects of that divide. Those interactions implicate a variety of actors across 
time, in various locations and different levels of governance. The thesis identifies that those 
interactions are subject to trends, ebbs and flows in importance. European developments 
                                               
1 See chapter 1, p. 6. 
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have, at various points, been adopted, accommodated, engaged with, or resisted at the 
national level.  
The thesis is also important because the historically-grounded theoretical framework it 
provides is able to inform the broader scholarship on the public-private divide in individual 
information law. Our historical narratives matter. The narrative of a paradigmatic shift from a 
state-restrictive to an individual approach is liable to create important blind spots, especially 
a failure to account for enduring or resurging approaches that treat public authorities 
distinctively. Similarly, the narrative of struggle risks obscuring the role played by diverse 
interactions between different approaches, especially the complex relationship between 
market and individual approaches in the development of European data protection law.2 
The wide-ranging analysis found in this thesis is needed because a wide range of areas of 
law impact on the public-private divide in individual information law. The thesis helps to show 
why a more holistic view is necessary. A narrow focus on reforms to the public-private divide 
in privacy or data protection law risk being undermined by developments in confidentiality or 
statutory controls in national law, especially in relation to disclosure by public authorities. 
Theorists who oppose the public-private divide in information law concerned with individuals 
need to look beyond privacy and data protection to appreciate the broader legal landscape 
and therefore the likely effect of reforms to remove the public-private divide. For example, 
loosening state-restrictive legality requirements on some public authorities in human rights or 
data protection jurisprudence would be readily undercut by the approach to confidentiality in 
Ingenious Media.3 Efforts to encourage public authorities to innovate with data on a par with 
the private sector and embrace the advantages of new technologies can be threatened by 
risk aversion linked to the proliferation of statutory offences.4 
The thesis highlights the importance of engagement with the theories and arguments that 
underpin the different approaches identified in this thesis as the public-private divide in 
individual information law develops in the future. In particular, the thesis highlights priorities 
for scrutiny and justification or reform. Public authorities receive distinctive treatment in 
relation to their duties of confidence;5 the common law fundamental right to Marcel 
confidentiality;6 the Article 8 ECHR requirement of standards of legal precision, detail, 
foreseeability and accessibility of public authorities, with substantive safeguards and 
                                               
2 See chapter 5. 
3 See chapter 2, pp. 48 to 51.  
4 See Law Commission, Data Sharing between Public Bodies (2014) Law Com No. 351, p. 77. 
5 See chapter 2, pp. 39 to 47. 
6 See chapter 2, pp. 48 to 51. 
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effective controls, that are not required of private actors;7 the imposition of controls on public 
authorities not placed on private actors by the Human Rights Act 1998;8 the GDPR’s 
imposition of various state-restrictive requirements on public authorities, and in particular its 
denial of reliance on “legitimate interest” processing;9 the heightened transparency, accuracy 
and oversight requirements in national data protection;10 the criminalisation of various 
unauthorised disclosures of individual-identifying information held by public authorities;11 and 
abounding state-facilitative exemptions.12 A satisfactory theory of information law must 
reconcile this distinctiveness with the literatures on privacy and data protection that generally 
reject public-private divides. It requires a better understanding of why public authorities might 
require distinctive treatment, either state-facilitative or state-restrictive. There is therefore a 
need to situate this distinctiveness within a broader constitutional theory regarding individual 
information, its limits and its interaction with markets and civil society and to successfully 
integrate the positive insights of each approach while identifying their proper limits. 
The thesis identifies the role of historical choices that are bound up with our current 
arrangements.13 By providing a richer and more detailed history of the public-private divide in 
information law and presenting a complex picture of its development, it has the potential to 
inform understanding and reflection on the diverse normative underpinnings of the public-
private divide in individual information law.14 This is relevant for thinking about whether the 
law should be reformed. For example, this thesis shows the role of the Single Market and 
European harmonisation in the development of the public-private divide according to a 
market approach. Now that European data protection no longer relies on Article 100a EC 
and has its own legal basis in Article 16 TFEU, there is a question of whether should it 
nevertheless preserve all or part of the historically market approach. Where the historical 
choices bound up in current arrangements are the result of European integration, and to the 
extent that Brexit might ultimately change the nature of that connection, there will be new 
questions about whether the approaches bound up in the GDPR should be preserved or the 
new potential for reform realised. This will require a careful consideration of normative 
considerations embedded in its historical development and illuminated by the thesis. 
Although the scholarship on the changing nature and structure of the state makes plausible 
the expectation that the public-private divide would have diminished over time, the history of 
                                               
7 See chapter 3, pp. 73 to 76, and chapter 4, pp. 87 to 95. 
8 See chapter 4, 80 to 96. 
9 See chapter 5, pp. 133 to 144. 
10 See chapter 6, pp. 160 to 170. 
11 See chapter 7, pp. 190 to 198. 
12 See p. 216. 
13 See John Allison, History in the Law of the Constitution (2007) 28 Journal of Legal History 263. 
14 See chapter 1, pp. 8 to 10.  
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the public-private divide suggests that no strong connection exists between these changes 
and the development of the law.15 There is a need to account for the continued appeal of the 
different approaches. The intertwining of public authorities and private actors, related 
demands for intrusive information practices, public authority regulatory and commissioning 
roles, the use of technology and transfer of information across the public-private divide and 
within mixed bureaucracies has not had unilateral or monolithic effects on the development 
of the public-private divide.16 Changes in approach to the public-private divide reflect 
complex interactions between different approaches to the public-private divide. There is a 
need for deeper consideration of the reasons for the persistence of these approaches and 
the values that inform them. The thesis also shows that the existence and interaction of the 
different approaches is a point of continuity within an area characterised by scholarship on 
the information society, which emphasises expectations of revolutionary change. It resists 
historical determinism and points to a more complex reality.17 
EUROPEANISATION AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE 
Europe has acted to inspire, catalyse and require change in UK information law at various 
points in the history of the public-private divide.18 National divergence, resistance and 
reluctance to change in response to European pressure all form part of the history of this 
divide. This forms an important contribution to the “ontological challenge” of Europeanisation 
literature: how to explain asymmetries across settings in processes of legal change in 
Europe.19 The literature sets ongoing agency and choice against various deterministic 
claims. It emphasises that legal development is often non-linear, fragmented, and shaped by 
agency and choice in response to “the pressures emanating directly or indirectly from 
[Europe]”.20 The thesis contributes to such literature, by clarifying “the role of structure and 
agency within the Europeanization process” and “identifying the mechanisms that are the 
interactive link between the “domestic” and the “EU” spheres of activity”.21 In common with 
that literature, the thesis highlights that Europeanisation is a “complex reality” with elements 
of both convergence and fragmentation,22 with “differential or asymmetrical impact[s]”.23 This 
                                               
15 See chapter 1, p. 9.  
16 See chapter 1, pp. 10 to 13.  
17 See chapter 1, pp. 13 to 16. 
18 See chapter 1, pp. 19 to 21. 
19 Kevin Featherstone, “Introduction: In the Name of Europe”, in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio 
Radaelli (eds.), The Politics of Europeanization (2003), p. 13. 
20 Ibid., p. 7. 
21 Ibid., p. 13. 
22 Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli, “A Conversant Research Agenda”, in Featherstone and 
Radaelli (eds.) (2003), p. 340. 
23 Ibid., p. 338. 
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can be seen in the complex interactions of diverse approaches by various European and 
national actors during the development of the public-private divide.  
The thesis finds common ground with claims that the “impact of Europeanisation is typically 
incremental, irregular, and uneven over time and between locations, national and 
subnational”.24 With it, the thesis has illustrated asymmetries25 of “absorption, 
accommodation, and transformation”26 and “acknowledges the dynamism, imbroglio, and 
limits to determinism in present-day Europe”.27 This can be seen across European and 
national human rights, European and national data protection, confidentiality, and official 
secrecy and unauthorised disclosure offences.  
As Higgs has noted, regarding the development of the information state in UK, its “long, 
complex and discontinuous process” requires a “more interesting history of information”.28 
The thesis provides an important part of that history and a historically-grounded theoretical 
framework for understanding its development. The history of the public-private divide 
demonstrates that although, as Wincott rightly says, Europe is a dynamic forum “built 
through political contexts and struggles”,29 the public-private divide is not the fruit of struggle 
alone. This thesis does not point to the “ubiquity of struggle” in which “patterns of past 
struggle [are] woven into the fabric of stability”.30 A richer set of interactions characterises 
legal development in this field and have woven themselves into the law. 
THE APPROACHES OF VARIOUS ACTORS TO THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE 
The development of the public-private divide has not involved a straightforward shift from 
one paradigm to another. Nor is it merely the product of struggle. Instead, the thesis 
demonstrates the complex ways in which proponents of different approaches have 
interacted to shape the architecture of information law. Struggle is only one form of 
interaction found in this development. There was also compromise, cooperation, inspiration, 
catalysation, reaction, resistance, erosion, evolution, parallel coexistence and shift in 
emphasis or approach over time. No one approach has dominated consistently over time. 
No one approach can accurately be described as outdated or anachronistic, at least in the 
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26 Ibid., p. 19. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Edward Higgs, The Information State in England: The Central Collection of Information Since 1500 
(2003), p. 11. 
29 Claudio Radelli, “The Europeanization of Public Policy”. in Featherstone and Radelli (eds.) (2003), 
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sense that all four approaches continue to play an active role in shaping the public-private 
divide.  
National Governments have often acted, both at the national and European level, to pursue 
a state-facilitative approach in relation to the public sector. Market approaches have also 
found favour with Governments. Parliament has often, dominated by the executive, 
supported the Government of the day, although parliamentarians have also resisted some 
stronger state-facilitative tendencies successfully and remain a voice for state-restrictive 
concerns. The Blair Labour Government was unusual in supporting the passage of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and Freedom of Information Act 2000, both of which, partly through 
jurisprudential development by the courts and certainly as drafted, contributed to the 
resurgence of the state-restrictive approach in the UK. This should not be exaggerated, 
however, as New Labour showed itself to be state-facilitative in various ways, especially in 
the attempt to pass broad statutory information sharing powers.31 
In UK individual information law, Government remains a powerful actor. Often able to 
dominate Parliament and thereby able to make use of its sovereignty, executive architects of 
the public-private divide have considerable influence. One tendency is to use this power to 
protect key public authorities from law that might inhibit or undermine their ability to perform 
their functions. A state-facilitative approach is therefore likely to result where the executive is 
developing policy and have an interest in protecting the public sector. Parliament is often a 
forum for dissent but more rarely makes that dissent felt. The national courts have moved 
beyond support for a market approach and a state-facilitative attitude to public authorities 
towards support to an individual approach and some more state-restrictive tendencies. 
Courts have been influential in shaping the common law and developing jurisprudence in 
relation to legislative regimes. They have not felt bound to replicate the approaches which 
influenced legislators, either in Europe or at the national level. Though Europe has been very 
important in the development of human rights and data protection, national courts, 
Governments and Parliament have all shown themselves willing to take divergent 
approaches to the public-private divide at times. Within the Europeanisation literature some 
structural accounts emphasise the role of “structural convergence”.32 By contrast, this thesis 
highlights the important role of different approaches to the public-private divide which do not 
always mirror structural expectations.33   
                                               
31 See chapter 6, pp. 165 to 170. 
32 Tanja Borzel, “Conceptualising the Domestic Impact of Europe”, in Featherstone and Radaelli 
(eds.) (2003), p. 66. 
33 Christopher May, The Informational Society: A Sceptical View (2002), pp. 13 to 14. 
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European and national regulators have frequently supported individual or market 
approaches. Sometimes the market approach has been instrumentalised to further an 
agenda more interested in the individual approach. The European Commission and 
Parliament have always supported market approaches but have increasingly come to 
support an individual approach. Data protection as a fundamental right is in the ascendancy 
in Europe. It is not clear whether Article 8 CFR will diverge from Article 8 ECHR regarding 
tensions between the state-restrictive and individual approaches. The European courts 
demonstrate ongoing tensions between state-restrictive and individual approaches to the 
public-private divide, showing the influence of each in their jurisprudence. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The history of the law of confidence in the UK shows little influence of struggle nor a gradual 
shift from a state-restrictive towards an individual approach. It has been developed almost 
exclusively by the national courts, at least until the development of the tort of misuse of 
private information, and so illustrates an area of development that was not significantly 
shaped by Europe, at least until the Human Rights Act 1998. The jurisprudence is not best 
described as revealing conflict or struggle. Rather, over the course of its development, the 
national jurisprudence has been influenced and shaped by shifting emphases of approach 
by the courts and the parallel coexistence of different approaches within different lines of 
case law. These shifts are little acknowledged, let alone best framed as struggle. All four 
approaches feature. The recent resurgence of the state-restrictive approach undermines the 
claim that the individual approach is the exclusive influence in this area of law.   
First, and consistently, the national courts have protected the confidentiality of commercially 
valuable information and business relationships for the sake of the market. The courts later 
went beyond this to protect certain private relationships of gradually expanding scope. They 
finally protected information that was confidential itself,34 without a relationship of confidence 
and against any person. In this, the courts shifted towards an individual approach. In the 
1980s and 1990s, the courts developed a set of state-facilitative doctrines: a ready 
acceptance of the public interest in the disclosure of confidential information to or by public 
authorities, distinctive duties of confidence owed to the Crown and a liberal approach to 
disclosure pursuant to statutory authority. There was no acknowledgment of discontinuity in 
approach or incoherence. Such developments run counter to narratives of the inexorable 
rise of the individual approach. State-restrictive elements coexisted within these 
developments, such as in the imposition of Marcel confidentiality on information gathered by 
                                               
34 Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109.   
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public authorities pursuant to their functions and the subjection of duties of confidence to the 
Crown to public interest tests for enforcement. This mixture of state-restrictive and state-
facilitative approaches abruptly and surprisingly shifted towards a more state-restrictive 
approach in the Supreme Court in Ingenious Media. Marcel confidentiality was treated as a 
common law fundamental right and therefore the statutory power to disclose was interpreted 
narrowly: a State-restrictive approach.  
The law of confidence reflects the influence of all four approaches to the public-private 
divide: the market approach underlies and endures, the individual approach has risen 
(ultimately to be overtaken by the development of the tort of misuse of public information), 
and the state-facilitative approach to information has been significantly reduced by a 
resurgent state-restrictive reading of the law in the Supreme Court. There is no evidence of 
outside pressures at work in these developments, such as Europe influence. Instead, they 
reflect choices of judicial architects of the public-private divide; choices which reflect a 
diversity of approach across its history.       
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
The history of Article 8 ECHR demonstrates a parallel development of state-restrictive and 
individual approaches to the public-private divide within the right to private life. It provides 
evidence of compromises struck between rival schools of thought and a mixture of approach 
within the public-private divide.  
Even at the earliest stages in the development of Article 8 ECHR, both state-restrictive and 
individual approaches influenced legal developments. This was more so than traditional 
accounts of the development of human rights allow. The drafting history of Article 8 ECHR 
suggests that an individual approach to thinking about the public-private divide was already 
sufficiently influential to merit discussion and to provoke attempts to clarify the scope of 
Article 8(1) at the very beginning. The fact that an amendment to so clarify the effect of 
Article 8 ECHR, in favour of a state-restrictive approach, was rejected indicates the presence 
of disagreement among the drafters of Article 8 ECHR on this point. However, the 
compromise struck left the door open to a more expansive interpretation of Article 8(1). This 
possibility was indeed subsequently taken up by the ECtHR after 1998.  
It is important not to exaggerate the willingness of the ECtHR to impose an individual 
approach to the public-private divide on the text of Article 8 ECHR. The development took a 
significant amount of time. Early jurisprudence adopted a state-restrictive approach. Positive 
obligations relating to information under Article 8 ECHR are only developments of the last 20 
years. Understandings of the development of positive obligations as part of a fundamental 
shift away from the state-restrictive approach and towards an individual approach are 
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unsatisfactory. Neither was the development limited to a response to the privatisation of 
traditional state functions. It extended beyond the reformulation of a state-restrictive ambition 
to adapt to new relationships between public and private actors. The jurisprudence instead 
reveals the endurance of parallel state-restrictive and individual approaches within the 
ECtHR. Views that see the shift to an individual approach as always inherent in the nature of 
the human rights project neglect this mixture of approach within the jurisprudence. It is also 
important not to overstate the dominance of the individual approach in modern Article 8 
ECHR jurisprudence. The ECtHR’s role in this legal development was key.  
The early development of positive obligations in Article 8 ECHR did little to alter the public-
private divide. In 1986, the European Commission of Human Rights accepted a partially 
successful defamation action as adequate to show respect from private life.35 It was not until 
the late 1990s that an individual approach started to exert any significant influence over 
information law in relation to Article 8 ECHR. Even then, dissenting opinions which objected 
to the existence of a negative/positive distinction and would have introduced a strong 
individual approach to Article 8 ECHR were not adopted by the ECtHR.36 Instead, a more 
modest, though rising, individual approach to the public-private developed. First, this 
occurred in the European Commission of Human Rights in dicta comments in Earl Spencer v 
United Kingdom37 and then more clearly in Von Hannover v Germany in 2005 by the 
ECtHR.38 The positive obligations jurisprudence has remained relatively flexible and has 
accorded a margin of appreciation to the state.39 It has not displaced the state-restrictive 
approach also present within the jurisprudence. Positive obligations continue to impose only 
a relatively low intensity review of the application of a civil action on states, to be resolved in 
conformity with the criteria laid down by the ECtHR, including a balancing exercise.40 The 
flexibility of the ECtHR approach to private actors extends beyond media interference, where 
freedom of expression must be balanced with privacy, to the use of information by private 
employers in internal disciplinary investigations.41 The rejection of dissenting voices in the 
ECtHR that would have removed the public-private divide in favour of “an obligation of 
                                               
35 Winer v United Kingdom App. No. 10871/84. 
36 See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wilberhaber in Stjerna v Finland (1997) 24 EHRR 195. 
37 (1998) 24 EHRR CD105. 
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results” across the public-private divide shows that the ECtHR has not adopted a full 
individual approach to Article 8 ECHR.42 
A state-restrictive public-private divide has endured, and indeed strengthened, despite the 
rise of the individual approach in ECHR jurisprudence. These developments reflect a vein of 
state-restrictive thinking within the ECtHR and a more limited adoption of the individual 
approach than might be expected were a more fundamental shift occurring. That the state-
restrictive approach remains influential in the ECHR jurisprudence can be seen in a number 
of ways. There are good reasons to believe that several members of the ECtHR continue to 
favour a state-restrictive approach, even if a more limited set of compromises have been 
reached with the individual approach. The continuing judicial rhetoric of the court, its attitude 
to state surveillance, and the development of the doctrine of imputation in the context of 
Article 8 ECHR all indicate that a state-restrictive understandings endure. The mere 
mirroring of general international law on attribution and imputation is unlikely to explain the 
ECtHR’s development of the doctrine of imputation: no reference is made to it, as one would 
expect if the ECtHR felt compelled to diverge from a unanimous preference for an individual 
approach. Further, the strange approach taken to imputation in Masden v Denmark is further 
evidence of the ECtHR negotiating a greater degree of internal disagreement and struggle.43 
Had there been a greater degree of consensus around an individual approach to imputation, 
the opportunity to develop the jurisprudence was a surprising one to miss. The ECtHR has 
also elaborated the negative obligation of the state to require standards of clarity, precise, 
detail and safeguards unseen in relation to the positive obligation on the state. The state-
restrictive approach has therefore not only endured but has resurged in some respects in the 
ECHR jurisprudence. 
Although there has been a significant erosion of the public-private divide in Article 8 ECHR 
jurisprudence, revealing the influence of an individual approach, the state-restrictive 
approach has remained vibrant alongside the individual approach. Rather than reflecting a 
gradual paradigm shift, the history of the public-private divide in Article 8 ECHR reveals the 
coexistence of different approaches within the jurisprudence.  
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS     
State-restrictive, individual and state-facilitative approaches have all played an important role 
in the development of the public-private divide in national human rights law. While New 
Labour’s Human Rights Act 1998 was drafted with a distinctive state-restrictive public-private 
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43 (2003) 36 EHRR CD 61. 
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divide, albeit somewhat different from the public-private divide in ECHR jurisprudence, the 
divide was significantly eroded by the development of the tort of misuse of private 
information by national courts. Although this development was inspired and catalysed by the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and ECHR jurisprudence, its roots lie in an individual approach 
adopted by the national courts in the 1990s to confidentiality. There is evidence to suggest 
that the national courts were already developing the law in this direction and took advantage 
of human rights to accelerate that process in cooperation with the individual approach 
inherent in the European jurisprudence. 
However, alongside this the national courts have introduced some divergent state-facilitative 
elements to national human rights law. They have also been willing to diverge from ECHR 
jurisprudence when developing the tort of misuse of private information. The ECHR 
jurisprudence and its criticism of the national jurisprudence was more influential, however, in 
requiring a resurgence of the state-restrictive approach in the national courts, where a more 
robust doctrine of “in accordance with the law” and necessity has developed in relation to 
state databases and processing. The state-restrictive approach has therefore resurged 
alongside the rise of an individual approach. This highlights the different effects of European 
influences on the development of the law: much stronger in relation to the national 
implementation of the state-restrictive negative obligations of States than the positive 
obligations jurisprudence. The implementation of Article 8 ECHR at the national level did not 
simply replicate ECHR jurisprudence. National courts resisted and diverged from ECHR 
jurisprudence in some places as well as implementing it in others. 
EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION 
The history of European data protection reveals a much more complex interaction between 
different approaches to the public-private divide than a simple shift towards an individual 
approach. All four rival approaches to the public-private divide have been influential in the 
development of European data protection. The General Data Protection Regulation reflects 
the concerns of the market, individual, state-facilitative and state-restrictive approaches. The 
history of European data protection does not reflect struggle alone. 
Early European data protection should be understood as the result of a rejection of the state-
restrictive approach of early ECHR jurisprudence in favour of a more individual approach. 
This produced a range of national legislative responses with diverse approaches to data 
protection and the public divide. It was this rejection of the state-restrictive approach that 
produced the conditions in Europe that gave rise to support for the market approach from 
national Governments, tempered by state-facilitative exemptions. Rejection of the state-
restrictive approach in favour of an individual approach catalysed market concerns which 
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were in turn tempered by state-facilitative exemptions. The Data Protection Directive was 
catalysed by the individual approach favoured by a network of data protection authorities in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. This network instrumentalised market concerns, and the 
new powers available to the EC, to persuade the European Commission to act. Member 
State Governments once again acted to secure their interests through state-facilitative 
exemptions.  
Later the ECJ and CJEU first reflected the market approach of the Directive before 
developing a more state-restrictive jurisprudence for the Data Protection Directive. This was 
in turn followed by the extension of protections against private data controllers, although to a 
lesser extent, reflecting an emergent individual approach under the influence of the ECHR 
and CFR. The jurisprudence shows shifts in approach over time. 
Changes in European data protection post-Lisbon saw the market approach that dominated 
the Directive transcended by the recognition of data protection as a fundamental right. The 
drafting of the General Data Protection Regulation reflects individual and state-restrictive 
approaches to this fundamental right as well as state-facilitative exemptions successfully 
fought for by Member State Governments. Although market concerns form a baseline, 
several other approaches have transcended it. Although the individual approach has risen, 
the state-restrictive has resurged and state-facilitative approaches endured in particular 
fields alongside a baseline of market concerns. 
NATIONAL DATA PROTECTION 
Although national data protection owes its broad shape and content to European data 
protection, national level divergence has occurred in several respects. Attempts to increase 
transparency and accuracy in the public sector and restore trust following the 2008 HMRC 
data breach scandal both contributed to a distinctive state-restrictive undercurrent in some 
parts of UK data protection. 
National Governments before and during the 1970s were resistant to increases in data 
protection in the public sector and apathetic about its need in the private sector. National 
Governments reflected state-facilitative and market approaches to the public-private divide. 
The Conservative Government’s embrace of data protection in the Data Protection Act 1984 
owed much more to the 1981 Convention and its market approach, tempered by state-
facilitative exemptions, than the individual approach that drove some national calls for data 
protection in the 1970s. The Data Protection Act 1998 was an implementation of the Data 
Protection Directive 46/95 EC but reflected a more market approach in several respects, 
diverging from the approaches in European law.  
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Important national divergence followed in response to demands for greater transparency in 
the early 2000s and control over the public sector following a series of data breaches in the 
late 2000s. National courts and tribunals developed the public-private divide in their 
jurisprudence on fair processing in the context of section 40(2) Freedom of Information Act 
2000, making it easier to process personal data about officials in response to legitimate 
interests in transparency and accountability. The enforcement powers of the ICO also 
became more state-restrictive through reforms in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, 
although it would be remiss to fail to observe the bundle of state-facilitative reforms in the 
Coroners and Justice Bill that failed to gain Parliamentary support. The Government’s 
attempt to expand the power of public authorities to share data and reinforce a state-
facilitative approach was defeated in a rare display of Parliamentary assertiveness, leaving 
only the state-restrictive safeguards from that package of reforms. The ICO’s preference for 
an individual approach to these powers, extending to both the public and private sector, was 
not acted upon. Instead, business interests managed to persuade the Government that 
going beyond state-restrictive enforcement to include the private sector would impose an 
undesirable regulatory burden. The market approach’s accepted compromise was in fact a 
state-restrictive conclusion in this instance and a state-facilitative ambition failed, leaving a 
state-restrictive remnant of the legislative package. National data protection law therefore 
illustrates well the complex interplay of differing approaches to the public-private divide in 
shaping the development of individual information law.  
UNAUTHORISED DISCLOSURE OFFENCES 
The complex and inconsistent framework for the criminalisation of unauthorised disclosures 
of official and other public authority information reflect struggles between the state-facilitative 
and state-restrictive approaches. These struggles have largely occurred between national 
Governments and Parliament, with a limited role for the courts. European institutions have 
done little to influence information law in this area, in contrast to human rights and data 
protection law, demonstrating the irregular and uneven impact of Europe over different fields 
of individual information law. 
By the 1940s, a distinctively state-facilitative regime for the regulation of a wide range of 
official information had been created by Governments with little Parliamentary scrutiny. Its 
design centralised control over the disclosure of information by officials. The rise of a state-
restrictive critique of official secrecy in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in the narrowing of 
official secrecy in Official Secrets Act 1989: a retreat of the state-facilitative approach. 
However, the core preserved by the Act reflected the survival of the state-facilitative 
approach. The national courts interpreted official secrecy legislation to resist more state-
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restrictive approaches and the most recent Law Commission consultation on the Protection 
of Official Data has reflected a continuation of state-facilitative approaches to official 
secrecy. Media and civil society responses indicate that a fierce state-restrictive opposition 
exists and is willing to struggle against it. 
An exclusive focus on official secrecy would result in neglecting the development of wider 
unauthorised disclosure offences. While a small number of such ad hoc statutory offences 
have been driven by market or individual concerns, and some by a genuine state-restrictive 
objective, the majority of offence demonstrate the endurance of a state-facilitative approach. 
Many of these offences were passed after 1989, as Governments slowly pushed to re-
extend criminalisation to support public authority control of disclosure and to engender the 
trust necessary for public authorities to carry out their functions, without creating private 
sector equivalents.  
A HISTORICALLY-GROUNDED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE PUBLIC-
PRIVATE DIVIDE 
Complex interactions between the four approaches have shaped the public-private divide in 
individual information law. Various architects the public-private divide have shifted in their 
advocacy or support for different approaches. Different actors have played greater or lesser 
roles at different points in the history of individual information law. Developments have not 
been linear, or uniform, or consistent. The relationship between Europe and the UK, and the 
agency of the various architects of the public-private divide in individual information law, 
have been complex and nuanced. The history of UK individual information law, its 
Europeanisation, and national divergence and idiosyncrasy, reflect the interaction of 
approaches to the public-private divide that are identified and traced in this thesis.    
Trends, however, can be discerned and commented upon within this. There has been a 
broad acceptance of the market approach to the regulation of information. It is difficult to see 
the future of information law ignoring the need to have a baseline of regulation to ensure the 
free flow of information across borders and to engender the trust of participants in the 
market. However, in many ways it has been transcended by the other approaches, 
remaining an interest of reactive and conservative voices that fear overregulation and 
excessive burdens on commerce. It finds some common ground with the individual 
approach, whose fortunes have risen and continue to rise. In more recent debates, one 
detects a readier conflation of the two. The argument that market confidence and the flow of 
information require strong protections for individual rights across the public-private divide 
has become more common. This was not always the case: the market approach has 
historically been concerned about the high standards of the individual approach. While state-
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facilitative approaches have lost favour before courts, they endure and find favour with 
Governments, perhaps the institution most likely to see the benefit of a more lenient regime 
or special treatment for public authorities. As long as Governments dominate Parliament, we 
should expect to see a continuing push for state-facilitative exemptions in privacy and data 
protection and regimes for the regulation of official data. Finally, the history of the public-
private divide has shown a surprising resurgence of the state-restrictive approach that had 
appeared to fall away between the 1970s and 1990s. That resurgence has, at different times 
and in relation to different parts of individual information law, been driven by judicial, 
legislative and executive actors. 
THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE MARKET APPROACH 
There is now broad acceptance of the market approach in data protection and confidentiality 
as a baseline, although it has only had limited influence on human rights and official secrecy. 
The market approach became highly influential in European data protection following the 
multiplication of piecemeal national legislative responses in the 1970s. Resolutions (73) 22 
and Resolution (74) 29 of the Council of Europe, the 1981 Council of Europe Convention 
and the OECD Guidelines were motivated by concern for the free flow of information. Those 
concerns formed a major, if not exclusive, motivation behind the Data Protection Directive 
46/95 EC and a substantial justification underpinning the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation. The resistance of the European Parliament to a public-private divide in 1992 was 
substantially driven by market concerns for the Data Protection Directive. Early ECJ 
jurisprudence reflected clear concerns of the market approach for the workability of the 
Directive. Nationally, both the Data Protection Act 1984 and Data Protection Act 1998 were 
primarily driven by this market imperative from Europe and in some respects for more 
market-orientated than European law. The doctrine of breach of confidence was built on 
jurisprudence with a core concern for commercial confidence and the protection of 
information to protect economic activity. 
Although the market approach has widespread acceptance it has often been superseded by 
concerns of the individual or state-restrictive approaches. While a basic level of uniform 
protection is often granted for the sake of the market, concern for heighted protections for 
the individual, even where the market bears a greater regulatory burden, or state-restrictive 
and state-facilitative approaches, which emphasise non-market concerns have each proven 
more influential at different times. 
Market approaches continue to appear in more recent developments but often as 
conservative reactions to changes proposed on the basis of other approaches. These often 
argue that a more restrictive approach will impose a disproportionate burden on business. It 
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is difficult to see this baseline concern for the free flow of information losing its importance in 
future debates over the regulation of individual information. Indeed, possibly the opposite will 
occur. It is a core feature accepted at the heart of the public-private divide in UK individual 
information law. 
THE ENDURANCE OF THE STATE-FACILITATIVE APPROACH 
The state-facilitative approach has endured throughout the history of the public-private 
divide. In the “absence of multiple veto points and the presence of supportive institutions”, 
such as nationally with a dominant executive and supportive Parliament, Governments have 
been free to introduce state-facilitative exemptions or regimes.44 Where Governments have 
benefited from vetoes at the European level, they have successfully extracted state-
facilitative exemptions, which helps to explain why Governments have successfully pursued 
this approach at both the European and national level.  
Isolated examples of the state-facilitative approach can be found in the jurisprudence of the 
ECHR but there is no general pattern.45 The law of confidence in the national courts was 
broadly state-facilitative in the 1970s and 1990s, with disclosure in the public interest where 
it was reasonably connected to public functions and state-facilitative duties of confidence to 
the Crown. However, with the development of the tort of misuse of private information and 
recognition of Marcel confidentiality as a fundamental common law right, the national courts 
have moved away from the state-facilitative approach to a mixture of individual and state-
restrictive approaches. 
National Governments, on the other hand, have frequently sought to introduce state-
facilitative exemptions to mitigate the full rigours of information law. This can be seen across 
the history of data protection in Resolutions (73) 22 and Resolution (74) 29 of the Council of 
Europe, the 1981 Council of Europe Convention, the 1981 OECD Guidelines, Data 
Protection Act 1984, Data Protection Directive 46/95 EC, and the Data Protection Act 1998. 
Later reforms of the Data Protection Act 1998, in response to major public-sector data 
breaches, though state-restrictive in effect, were in fact intended to restore trust in public 
authorities. Those reforms themselves were part of a broader, ultimately failed, attempt to 
introduce a comprehensive and wide power to enable public authorities to share information: 
a state-facilitative project. The history of official secrecy and other legislative secrecy 
regimes and wrongful disclosure offences is replete with examples of state-facilitative 
approaches being championed by Governments.  
                                               
44 Borzel, “Conceptualising the Domestic Impact of Europe”, in Featherstone and Radaelli (eds.) 
(2003), p. 74. 
45 See chapter 3, pp. 76. 
 217 
So long as national Governments can dominate Parliament and Governmental support is 
required for the success of European and international regimes, the state-facilitative 
approach is likely to endure. It is a core feature enduring at the heart of the public-private 
divide in information law, supported by executive and legislative actors. 
THE RISE OF THE INDIVIDUAL APPROACH 
Individual approaches to the public-private divide have been present from the beginning. 
They were present in the drafting debates surrounding the ECHR and in national responses 
to the perceived inadequacy of the ECHR in the 1970s. From humble beginnings, it has 
enjoyed an impressive rise to prominence, but not dominance. Undoubtedly, this 
improvement in the fortunes of an individual approach to the public-private divide in 
individual information law represents the fruits of reflection on the implications of rapid 
technological change and the greater interconnection between public authorities and private 
actors that results from the greater flow of information and structural blurring of the public-
private divide. My argument is not that these trends are not important, but that they do not 
vindicate deterministic claims about the trajectory of the public-private divide. 
The rise of the individual approach in Article 8 ECHR is perhaps the clearest and most 
commented upon instance of this trend. The recognition by the ECtHR of positive obligations 
to regulate private actors across a variety of rights did a great deal to erode the public-
private divide. In relation to information, its effect was only significant in human rights after 
1998. Positive obligations on the state to secure respect for private life, even between 
private actors, were a major jurisprudential development and positive obligations are now 
widespread and varied in ECtHR jurisprudence. From the mere recognition that the absence 
of an actionable remedy to protect private life from interference by private actors could 
breach the positive obligation under Article 8 ECHR in Earl Spencer v UK, positive 
obligations have moved to clear recognition in Von Hannover v Germany.46 In the latter 
case, the ECtHR emphasised that the applicable principles in relation to both negative and 
positive obligations were “similar”.47 In Von Hannover v Germany (No 2), the ECtHR 
elaborated the requirements of a civil action to protect Article 8 ECHR rights from violations 
by private actors and the supervisory review the ECtHR would exert over such decisions.48 
The Grand Chamber in Barbulescu v Romania have continued this trend of applying the 
individual approach in relation to private actors.49 
                                               
46 (1997) 24 EHRR 195 and (2005) 40 EHRR 1. 
47 (2005) 40 EHRR 1, para. 58. 
48 (2012) 55 EHRR 15. 
49 App. No. 61496/08. 
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The rise of the individual approach is also crucial to understanding the development of 
European data protection. The proliferation of diverse national approaches in response to 
criticism of the state-restrictive approach to Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence in the 1960s 
catalysed the development of early European data protection. Although the market approach 
was responsible for early European data protection and persisted in later European data 
protection, this process was initiated by the rise of the individual approach. Transnational 
data protection authority networks, motivated by an individual approach, instrumentalised 
market concerns to encourage the European Communities to legislate in the 1990s. The rise 
of data protection in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Lisbon Treaty reflect the 
work of fundamental rights advocates and produced the much stronger protections of the 
General Data Protection Regulation. In the national courts, the individual approach has 
become increasingly important to the law of breach of confidence from the early recognition 
of personal relationships as capable of protection from private actors to the development of 
the tort of misuse of private information, supported by the Human Rights Act 1998 and 
developing ECHR jurisprudence. 
Though present from the beginning, the individual approach is a core and rising feature of 
the public-private divide in the UK individual information law. It is increasingly influential 
across legislative, judicial and regulatory actors. 
THE RESURGENCE OF THE STATE-RESTRICTIVE APPROACH 
Finally, the state-restrictive approach has not only endured but resurged in the recent history 
of the public-private divide in information law. The surprising result runs contrary to 
narratives that consider it to be a historical anachronism and its presence in the law a 
historical remnant to be gradually overcome. It has resurged as a core feature of the public-
private divide in individual information law. 
The state-restrictive approach, dominant in the drafting of and the early jurisprudence of the 
ECHR, was not abandoned. This was so even during a period of significant jurisprudential 
development in response to an individual approach. In more recent jurisprudence it has in 
fact strengthened. This is especially apparent in relation to the development of jurisprudence 
on the requirement that public authority interferences with the right to private life are “in 
accordance with the law” and “necessary in a democratic society”. It persists in the rhetoric 
of the ECtHR, the treatment of state surveillance, and the approach of the ECtHR to the 
doctrine of imputation. Article 8 ECHR requires standards of precision, detail, foreseeability 
and accessibility, with substantive safeguards and effective controls, quite beyond those 
required by the national law regulating private actors. The ECtHR has strengthened this 
requirement at the same time as developing positive obligations. 
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After an initially market approach to interpretation, the ECJ and CJEU developed a more 
state-restrictive approach in their jurisprudence on the 1995 Directive. They did this first by 
subjecting processing under Article 7(c) and (e) to Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence as a 
“general principle of law”. Later they subjected such processing to Articles 7 and 8 CFR. 
Although the CJEU has more recently extended fundamental rights review to private entities 
processing, it has not matched the intensity and structure of review for public authorities. It 
remains predominantly a state-restrictive jurisprudence, although showing the influence of 
an individual approach as well. The state-restrictive approach has resurged in the General 
Data Protection Regulation, especially in relation to the clear restriction of processing 
necessary for the legitimate interests to bodies which are not public authorities in the 
performance of their tasks. 
In relation to the protection of confidential information, the national courts have most recently 
taken a distinctive turn in favour of a state-restrictive approach, recognising Marcel 
confidentiality as a common law fundamental right. They therefore insist on the narrow 
interpretation of statutory powers that restrict that right. This is in contrast to the more state-
facilitative approach of the national courts in the 1990s.  
In national data protection, Government, Parliament and national courts and tribunals have 
all contributed to divergence from European data protection by adopting more state-
restrictive approaches to ICO enforcement powers and transparency. In national human 
rights, pushed and prompted by the ECHR, national courts have become more state-
restrictive in relation to public authority databases, search powers and disclosures. 
The resurgence of the state-restrictive approach is clear and important evidence that the 
public-private divide is not simply being eroded by concerns and developments motivated by 
an individual approach. The state-restrictive approach is a core feature at the heart of the 
public-private divide in UK information law which has resurged in multiple parts of the law. 
UNDERSTANDING THE PAST AND LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 
This thesis has provided a historically-grounded theoretical framework for understanding and 
reflecting upon the public-private divide in UK information law during a period of significant 
technological, social and political change. The market, individual, state-restrictive and state-
facilitative approaches help to explain complex interactions that have shaped the history of 
the public-private divide. Its history is more complex and nuanced than a shift towards to 
individual approach or struggle alone. The different approaches identified in this thesis have 
profoundly shaped the public-private divide in individual information law across its history 
and are woven throughout the current law. Understanding individual information law and the 
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public-private divide first requires an understanding of this complex interaction and history. It 
is necessary if we are to engage effectively in debates about its future. 
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